Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "A complete and accurate census is becoming an increasingly daunting task, in part because the nation's population is growing larger, more diverse, and more reluctant to participate, according to the U.S. Census Bureau (Bureau). When the census misses a person who should have been included, it results in an undercount, and the differential impact on various subpopulations, such as minorities, is particularly problematic. This testimony provides an update on the Bureau's readiness to implement its Integrated Communications Campaign, one of several efforts aimed at reducing the undercount. GAO focused on the campaign's key components: partnerships with local and national organizations, paid advertising and public relations, and Census in Schools (designed to reach parents and guardians through their school-age children). GAO also discusses the extent to which the rollout of the campaign is consistent with factors important for greater accountability and successful results. This testimony is based on previously issued work, ongoing reviews of relevant documents, and interviews with key Bureau officials."

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The decennial census is a constitutionally-mandated activity that produces data used to apportion congressional seats, redraw congressional districts, and allocate billions of dollars in federal assistance. In March 2008, GAO designated the 2010 Census a high-risk area in part because of problems with the performance of handheld computers used to collect data. The U.S. Census Bureau has since strengthened its risk management efforts and made other improvements; however, the Bureau curtailed a dress rehearsal scheduled for 2008 and was unable to test key operations under census-like conditions. This testimony discusses the Bureau's readiness for 2010 and covers: (1) importance of reliable cost estimates; (2) building a complete and accurate address list; (3) following up on missing and conflicting responses to ensure accuracy; (4) targeting outreach to undercounted populations; and (5) designing, testing, and implementing technology for the census. The testimony is based on previously issued and ongoing GAO work."

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The decennial census is a constitutionally-mandated activity that produces data used to apportion congressional seats, redraw congressional districts, and allocate billions of dollars in federal assistance. In March 2008, GAO designated the 2010 Census a high-risk area in part because of problems with the performance of handheld computers used to collect data. The U.S. Census Bureau has since strengthened its risk management efforts and made other improvements; however, the Bureau curtailed a dress rehearsal scheduled for 2008 and was unable to test key operations under census-like conditions. This testimony discusses the Bureau's readiness for 2010 and covers: (1) the importance of reliable cost estimates; (2) building a complete and accurate address list; (3) following up on missing and conflicting responses to ensure accuracy; (4) targeting outreach to undercounted populations; and (5) designing, testing, and implementing technology for the census. The testimony is based on previously issued and ongoing GAO work."

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The United States has invested more than $6.2 billion in the Afghan Ministry of Interior (MOI) and Afghan National Police (ANP). The Department of Defense's (Defense) Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A), with the Department of State (State), leads U.S. efforts to enhance MOI and ANP organizational structures, leadership abilities, and pay systems. This report assesses the status of U.S. efforts to help Afghanistan (1) restructure MOI and ANP, (2) retrain ANP units, (3) screen MOI and ANP personnel, and (4) enhance MOI and ANP pay systems. GAO reviewed Defense, State, and United Nations (UN) data and met with officials in the United States and Afghanistan."

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "This testimony discusses GAO's plans to carry out its oversight role related to the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Recovery Act). The Recovery Act funds are provided for purposes including: preserving and creating jobs and promoting economic recovery; assisting those most impacted by the recession; investing in transportation, environmental protection, and other infrastructure to provide long-term economic benefits; and stabilizing state and local government budgets. The Recovery Act assigns GAO a range of responsibilities to help promote accountability and transparency. Some are recurring requirements such as providing bimonthly reviews of the use of funds by selected states and localities. Others include targeted studies in several areas such as small business lending, education, and trade adjustment assistance. This statement discusses (1) GAO's plans to carry out its responsibilities under the Recovery Act, (2) how GAO's responsibilities relate to other oversight authorities, such as the Inspectors General (IG) and the Recovery Accountability and Transparency Board (Board), and (3) the challenges posed in ensuring accountability over the use of funds and associated lessons learned and best practices that can be helpful in addressing those challenges."

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "This testimony discusses GAO's role to help ensure accountability and transparency for science funding in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Recovery Act). The purposes of the Recovery Act funds include preserving and creating jobs and promoting economic recovery; assisting those most impacted by the recession; investing in transportation, environmental protection, and other infrastructure to provide long-term economic benefits; and stabilizing state and local government budgets. The Recovery Act, estimated to cost $787 billion, includes more than $21 billion in spending at the Departments of Energy and Commerce, the National Science Foundation (NSF), and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) for research and development (R&D) related activities that support fundamental research, demonstrate and deploy advanced energy technologies, purchase scientific instrumentation and equipment, and construct or modernize research facilities. This statement discusses (1) GAO's responsibilities under the Recovery Act related to science funding; (2) particular R&D funding areas that deserve special attention to ensure that funds are best used; and (3) GAO's plans for carrying out its responsibilities under the act."

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The National Aviation Operations Monitoring Service (NAOMS), begun by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) in 1997, aimed to develop a methodology that could be used to survey a wide range of aviation personnel to monitor aviation safety. NASA expected NAOMS surveys to be permanently implemented and to complement existing federal and industry air safety databases by generating ongoing data to track event rates into the future. The project never met these goals and was curtailed in January 2007. GAO was asked to answer these questions: (1) What were the nature and history of NASA's NAOMS project? (2) Was the survey planned, designed, and implemented in accordance with generally accepted survey principles? (3) What steps would make a new survey similar to NAOMS better and more useful? To complete this work, GAO reviewed and analyzed material related to the NAOMS project and interviewed officials from NASA, the Federal Aviation Administration, and the National Transportation Safety Board. GAO also compared the development of the NAOMS survey with guidelines issued from the Office of Management and Budget, and asked external experts to review and assess the survey's …

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 mandates the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to establish a system to physically screen 50 percent of cargo transported on passenger aircraft by February 2009 and 100 percent of such cargo by August 2010. This testimony provides preliminary observations on the Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) progress in meeting the mandate to screen cargo on passenger aircraft and the challenges TSA and industry stakeholders may face in screening such cargo. GAO's testimony is based on products issued from October 2005 through August 2008, and its ongoing review of air cargo security. GAO reviewed TSA's air cargo security programs, interviewed program officials and industry representatives, and visited two large U.S. airports."

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) Business Systems Modernization (BSM) program is a multi-billion-dollar, high-risk, highly complex effort that involves the development and delivery of a number of modernized systems that are intended to replace the agency's aging business and tax processing systems. As required, IRS submitted its fiscal year 2009 expenditure plan in August 2008 to the congressional appropriations committees, requesting $222 million from the BSM account. GAO's objectives in reviewing the expenditure plan were to (1) determine whether it satisfies the applicable legislative conditions, (2) determine IRS's progress in implementing prior expenditure plan review recommendations, and (3) provide additional observations about the plan and the BSM program. To accomplish the objectives, GAO analyzed the plan, reviewed related documentation, and interviewed IRS officials."

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "This testimony discusses our recent report on the Department of Energy's (DOE) decision to restructure the FutureGen program. The original FutureGen plant was to capture and store underground about 90 percent of its CO2 emissions. DOE's cost share was to be 74 percent, and industry partners agreed to fund the rest. Concerned about escalating costs, DOE announced in January 2008 that it had decided to restructure FutureGen. In October 2008, DOE received a small number of applications for the restructured FutureGen; however, some of these applications were for proposals outside the restructured FutureGen's scope. As we reported, DOE is currently assessing proposals received and stated it expected to announce a selection of projects by December 2008; however, as of the beginning of March 2009, it had made no decision. DOE requested supplemental information from restructured FutureGen applicants, which will be reviewed before any selection decision. As Congress may know, the recently enacted American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, known as the stimulus law, provides DOE an additional $3.4 billion for "Fossil Energy Research and Development." Such a substantial amount of funding could significantly impact DOE's decisions about …

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Changes in the climate attributable to increased concentrations of greenhouse gases may have significant environmental and economic impacts in the United States. For example, climate change could threaten coastal areas with rising sea levels, alter agricultural productivity, and increase the intensity and frequency of floods and storms. Federal, state, and local agencies are tasked with a wide array of responsibilities that will be affected by a changing climate, such as managing natural resources. Furthermore, climate change could increase the cost of federal programs, such as crop and flood insurance, and place new stresses on infrastructure. Greenhouse gases already in the atmosphere will continue altering the climate system into the future regardless of emissions control efforts. Therefore, adaptation--defined as adjustments to natural or human systems in response to actual or expected climate change--is an important part of the response to climate change. Today's testimony summarizes GAO's prior and ongoing work examining (1) actions that federal, state, local, and international authorities are taking to adapt to a changing climate, (2) the challenges that federal, state, and local officials face in their efforts to adapt, and (3) actions that the Congress …

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Carbon offsets--reductions of greenhouse gas emissions from an activity in one place to compensate for emissions elsewhere--can reduce the cost of regulatory programs to limit emissions because the cost of creating an offset may be less than the cost of requiring entities to make the reductions themselves. To be credible, however, an offset must be additional--it must reduce emissions below the quantity emitted in a business-as-usual scenario--among other criteria. In the U.S., there are no federal requirements to limit emissions and offsets may be purchased in a voluntary market. Outside the U.S., offsets may be purchased on compliance markets to meet requirements to reduce emissions. The Congress is considering adopting a market-based cap-and-trade program to limit greenhouse gas emissions. Such a program would create a price on emissions based on the supply and demand for allowances to emit. Under such a program, regulated entities could potentially substitute offsets for on-site emissions reductions, thereby lowering their compliance costs. Today's testimony summarizes GAO's prior work examining (1) the challenges in ensuring the quality of carbon offsets in the voluntary market, (2) the effects of and lessons learned from the Clean …

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "GAO has a large body of work examining government agencies' approaches to managing their large acquisition projects. GAO has noted that without sufficient knowledge about system requirements, technology, and design maturity, programs are subject to cost overruns, schedule delays, and performance that does not meet expectations. The Deepwater Program, intended to replace or modernize 15 major classes of Coast Guard assets, accounts for almost 60 percent of the Coast Guard's fiscal year 2009 appropriation for acquisition, construction and improvements. GAO has reported over the years on this program, which has experienced serious performance and management problems such as cost breaches, schedule slips, and assets designed and delivered with significant defects. To carry out the Deepwater acquisition, the Coast Guard contracted with Integrated Coast Guard Systems (ICGS) as a systems integrator. In April 2007, the Commandant acknowledged that the Coast Guard had relied too heavily on contractors to do the work of government and announced that the Coast Guard was taking over the lead role in systems integration from ICGS. This testimony reflects our most recent issued work on Deepwater, specifically our June 2008 report, Coast Guard: Change in …

Correspondence issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "This letter formally transmits the summary of an oral briefing we gave on December 8, 2008, and subsequent agency comments. We gave this briefing in response to Senate Report 110-129, accompanying the 2008 Financial Services and General Government Appropriations Bill. In accordance with direction in that report, and in consultation with House and Senate Appropriation Committee staff, we are reporting on the Office of National Drug Control Policy's (ONDCP) Counterdrug Technology Assessment Center (CTAC). Specifically, we address issues pertaining to CTAC's use of funds since fiscal year 2003, the ONDCP Director's approach to funding decisions for research and development, CTAC's measures of performance, and CTAC's reorganization in 2007."

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "This is GAO's seventh annual assessment of selected Department of Defense (DOD) weapon programs. The report examines how well DOD is planning and executing its weapon acquisition programs, an area that has been on GAO's high-risk list since 1990. This year's report is in response to the mandate in the joint explanatory statement to the Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing Appropriations Act, 2009. The report includes (1) an analysis of the overall performance of DOD's 2008 portfolio of 96 major defense acquisition programs and a comparison to the portfolio performance at two other points in time--5 years ago and 1 year ago; (2) an analysis of current cost and schedule outcomes and knowledge attained by key junctures in the acquisition process for a subset of 47 weapon programs--primarily in development--from the 2008 portfolio; (3) data on other factors that could impact program stability; and (4) an update on changes in DOD's acquisition policies. To conduct our assessment, GAO analyzed cost, schedule, and quantity data from DOD's Selected Acquisition Reports for the programs in DOD's 2003, 2007, and 2008 portfolios. GAO also collected data from program …

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The Future Combat System (FCS) program is the centerpiece of the Army's effort to transition to a lighter, more agile, and more capable combat force. By law, GAO is to report annually on the FCS program. Also, law requires the Department of Defense (DOD) to hold a milestone review of the FCS program, now planned for 2009. This report addresses (1) what knowledge will likely be available in key areas for the review, and (2) the challenges that lie ahead following the review. To meet these objectives, GAO reviewed key documents, performed analysis, attended demonstrations and design reviews, and interviewed DOD officials."

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Since 1990, GAO has consistently designated the Department of Defense's (DOD) management of its major weapon acquisitions as a high-risk area. A broad consensus exists that weapon system problems are serious, but efforts at reform have had limited impact. Last year, GAO reported that DOD's portfolio of weapon programs experienced cost growth of $295 billion from first estimates, were delayed by an average of 21 months, and delivered fewer quantities and capabilities to the warfighter than originally planned. At a time when DOD faces increased fiscal pressures from ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the federal budget is strained by a growing number of priorities, it is critical that the department effectively manage its substantial investment in weapon system programs. Every dollar wasted or used inefficiently on acquiring weapon systems means that less money is available for the government's other important budgetary demands. This testimony describes the systemic problems that contribute to the cost, schedule, and performance problems in weapon system programs, recent actions that DOD has taken to address these problems, proposed reform legislation that the committee recently introduced, and additional steps needed to improve future …

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Since fiscal year 2000, the Department of Defense (DOD) has significantly increased the number of major defense acquisition programs and its overall investment in them. However, acquisition outcomes have not improved. Over the next 5 years, DOD expects to invest $357 billion on the development and procurement of major defense acquisition programs and billions more on their operation and maintenance. Last year, we reported that the total acquisition cost of DOD's portfolio of major defense programs under development or in production has grown by $295 billion (in fiscal year 2008 dollars). In most cases, the programs we assessed failed to deliver capabilities when promised--often forcing warfighters to spend additional funds on maintaining legacy systems. Continued cost growth results in less funding being available for other DOD priorities and programs, while continued failure to deliver weapon systems on time delays providing critical capabilities to the warfighter. This testimony describes the systemic problems that have contributed to poor cost and schedule outcomes in DOD's acquisition of major weapon systems; recent actions DOD has taken to address these problems; and steps that Congress and DOD need to take to improve the …

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The Future Combat System (FCS) program--which comprises 14 integrated weapon systems and an advanced information network--is the centerpiece of the Army's effort to transition to a lighter, more agile, and more capable combat force. The substantial technical challenges, the cost of the program, and the Army's acquisition strategy are among the reasons why the program is recognized as needing special oversight and review. This testimony is based on GAO's March 12, 2009 report and addresses knowledge gaps that will persist in the FCS program as Congress is asked to make significant funding commitments for development and production over the next several years."

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) has spent about $56 billion and will spend about $50 billion more through 2013 to develop a Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS). GAO was directed to assess the annual progress MDA made in developing the BMDS as well as improvements in accountability and transparency in agency operations, management processes, and the new block strategy. To accomplish this, GAO reviewed contractor cost, schedule, and performance; tests completed; and the assets fielded during 2008. GAO also reviewed pertinent sections of the U.S. Code, acquisition policy, and the activities of the new Missile Defense Executive Board (MDEB). An appendix on the effect the cancellation of a Ground-based Midcourse Defense flight test had on BMDS development is also included."

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The 2005 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission recommended that the Department of Defense (DOD) establish 12 joint bases by consolidating the management and support of 26 separate installations, potentially saving $2.3 billion over 20 years. In response to a direction from the House Armed Services Committee report accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, GAO evaluated DOD's (1) efforts and expected costs to deliver installation support at joint bases and (2) funding for facility sustainment, which includes the maintenance and repair activities necessary to keep facilities in good working order, at all installations. GAO compared new support standards with the current support levels, visited nine installations that will become four joint bases, and compared facility sustainment funding levels with requirements and goals."

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "This testimony discusses the Department of Defense's (DOD) efforts to reduce fuel demand at its forward-deployed locations, particularly those that are not connected to local power grids. In 2008, more than 68 million gallons of fuel, on average, were supplied by DOD each month to support U.S. military forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. Transporting large quantities of fuel to forward-deployed locations presents an enormous logistics burden and risk. Long truck convoys moving fuel to forward-deployed locations have encountered enemy attacks, severe weather, traffic accidents, and pilferage. For example, DOD reported that in June 2008 alone, 44 trucks and 220,000 gallons of fuel were lost due to attacks or other events while delivering fuel to Bagram Air Field in Afghanistan. High fuel demand, coupled with the recent volatility of fuel prices, also have significant implications for DOD's operating costs. The fully burdened cost of fuel--that is, the total ownership cost of buying, moving, and protecting fuel in systems during combat--has been reported to be many times higher than the price of a gallon of fuel itself. While DOD's weapon systems require large amounts of fuel, the department reports that …

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "To more quickly field ballistic missile defenses, the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) has been exempted from traditional Department of Defense (DOD) requirements development, acquisition, and oversight processes since its creation in 2002. Instead, MDA has unique roles and missions to develop and field weapon systems that address a variety of ballistic missile threats. To date, MDA has spent about $56 billion and plans to spend about $50 billion more through 2013 to develop an integrated Ballistic Missile Defense System. The system consists of a layered network of capabilities that includes defensive components such as sensors, radars, interceptors, and command and control. In reviews of DOD's approach to acquire, operate, and maintain ballistic missile defense systems, GAO has previously reported on several challenges that have stemmed from the broad flexibilities provided to MDA. This testimony summarizes the challenges facing DOD in acquiring and operating its ballistic missile defense systems and describes DOD's efforts to improve transparency and accountability. This statement is based primarily on previously issued GAO reports and testimonies. GAO also reviewed documents and interviewed key officials to update past work and identify DOD and MDA efforts to …

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The number of private defined benefit (DB) pension plans, an important source of retirement income for millions of Americans, has declined substantially over the past two decades. For example, about 92,000 single-employer DB plans existed in 1990, compared to just under 29,000 single-employer plans today. Although this decline has been concentrated among smaller plans, there is a widespread concern that large DB plans covering many participants have modified, reduced, or otherwise frozen plan benefits in recent years. GAO was asked to examine (1) what changes employers have made to their pension and benefit offerings, including to their defined contribution (DC) plans and health offerings over the last 10 years or so, and (2) what changes employers might make with respect to their pensions in the future, and how these changes might be influenced by changes in pension law and other factors. To gather information about overall changes in pension and health benefit offerings, GAO asked 94 of the nation's largest DB plan sponsors to participate in a survey; 44 of these sponsors responded. These respondents represent about one-quarter of the total liabilities in the nation's single-employer …