A statement of record issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed its report on how federal requirements affect local school districts, focusing on: (1) the major federal requirements that affect school districts; (2) the issues school districts face in implementing these requirements; and (3) recent initiatives by Congress and the Department of Education to provide flexibility to school districts."

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The loss of personally identifiable information can result in substantial harm, embarrassment, and inconvenience to individuals and may lead to identity theft or other fraudulent use of the information. As shown in prior GAO reports, compromises to such information and long-standing weaknesses in federal information security raise important questions about what steps federal agencies should take to prevent them. As the federal government obtains and processes information about individuals in increasingly diverse ways, properly protecting this information and respecting the privacy rights of individuals will remain critically important. GAO was requested to (1) identify the federal laws and guidance issued to protect personally identifiable information from unauthorized use or disclosure and (2) describe agencies' progress in developing policies and documented procedures that respond to recent guidance from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to protect personally identifiable information that is either accessed remotely or physically transported outside an agency's secured physical perimeter. To do so, GAO reviewed relevant laws and guidance, surveyed officials at 24 major federal agencies, and examined and analyzed agency documents, including policies, procedures, and plans. In commenting on a draft of …

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins ""

Correspondence issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "GAO reported on the Administrative Office of the United States Courts' (AOUSC) progress in implementing six GAO recommendations to improve its long-range space planning process. AOUSC has fully implemented five of the six recommendations and partially implemented one. Specifically, AOUSC began (1) using a statistical classification technique, known as cluster analysis, to create groups of federal districts with similar characteristics; (2) relying on an automated computer program called AnyCourt to verify that districts' estimates of space baselines are consistent with the U.S. Courts Design Guide; (3) using a standard statistical forecasting technique, known as AutoRegressive Integrated Moving-Average, as a basis for developing more accurate caseload projections; (4) helping districts improve their personnel projections by comparing their projections to AOUSC personnel projections and discussing the results with districts when large deviations occurred; and (5) providing the General Services Administration (GSA) with data related to 10-year projections of districts' estimated space needs to support the judiciary's request for congressional approval of funds to build new court-related facilities and modify existing buildings. AOUSC has been unable to fully implement the remaining recommendation to update the districts' plans every 3 to 5 …

A letter report issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "The Defense Department (DOD) encourages the reuse of excess property, including vehicles, weapons, hand tools, lumber, medical equipment, and furniture. DOD components, civilian federal agencies, and "special programs" have equal priority and first rights to excess property. This report discusses excess property issued to three of 12 special programs--the Military Affiliate Radio System, the Civil Air Patrol, and the 12th Congressional Regional Equipment Center. Between 1995 and 2000, these programs obtained $34 million worth of items that they were not eligible to receive. The three programs were able to obtain the items because the DOD facilities that store the property are not required to verify which items the programs are eligible to receive, and because program officials do not consistently follow applicable guidelines. GAO also noted that the programs' lists of property they are allowed to obtain are not comprehensive because the lists exclude mission-related items similar to those already permitted. Furthermore, these programs did not have reliable records for more than three-quarters of their excess property. Together, the three special programs obtained more than 80,000 hazardous supplies. In many cases, program officials were unaware that …

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and Department of State (State) provide democracy assistance for Cuba aimed at developing civil society and promoting freedom of information. Typical program beneficiaries include Cuban community leaders, independent journalists, women, youths, and marginalized groups. USAID receives the majority of funding allocated for this assistance, although State has received 32 percent of funding since 2004. In recent years, both USAID and State have provided more funding for program implementation to for-profit and nongovernmental organizations (NGO) with a worldwide or regional focus than to universities and to NGOs that focus only on Cuba. All types of implementing partners, but worldwide or regional organizations in particular, used subpartners to implement program activities under 21 of the 29 awards and contracts that GAO reviewed."

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Our work to this point has identified several promising practices that could help to reduce the risk of fraud within the FECA program. The promising practices link back to fraud-prevention concepts contained in GAO’s Fraud Prevention Framework and Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, and include agencies’ use of full-time staff dedicated to the FECA program, periodic reviews of claimants’ continued eligibility, data analysis for potential fraud indicators, and effective use of investigative resources. These promising practices have already resulted in successful investigations and prosecutions of FECA-related fraud at some agencies, and could help to further enhance the program’s fraud-prevention controls. However, our preliminary work has also identified several potential vulnerabilities in the program’s design and controls that could increase the risk for fraud. Specifically, we found that limited access to necessary data is potentially reducing agencies’ ability to effectively monitor claims and wage-loss information. In addition, agencies’ reliance on self-reported data related to wages and dependent status, lack of a physician selected by the government throughout the process, and difficulties associated with successful investigations and prosecutions all potentially reduce the program’s ability to …

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Because the U.S. Department of State (State) is the lead U.S. foreign affairs agency, its personnel require certain knowledge, skills, and abilities to address the global challenges and security threats facing the United States. State devoted about $255 million to personnel training in fiscal year 2010; the department's Foreign Service Institute (FSI) is the primary training provider for State's more than 66,000 Foreign Service, civil service, and locally employed staff (LE staff) worldwide. GAO was asked to examine (1) State's purpose and structure for training personnel and (2) the extent to which State's training incorporates elements for effective training programs. GAO reviewed and analyzed data and documentation related to the agency's training efforts; completed a training assessment using a tool developed based on prior GAO guidance; and interviewed officials in Washington, D.C., and at 12 overseas posts."

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) did not effectively implement appropriate information security controls in the initial components of the Enhanced Secured Network (ESN) project. Although FCC took steps to enhance its ability to control and monitor its network for security threats, weaknesses identified in the commission's deployment of components of the ESN project as of August 2012 resulted in unnecessary risk that sensitive information could be disclosed, modified, or obtained without authorization. This occurred, in part, because FCC did not fully implement key information security activities during the development and deployment of the initial components of the project. While FCC policy is to integrate security risk management into system life-cycle management activities, the commission instead deployed the initial components of the ESN project without, among other things, first selecting and documenting the security controls, assessing the controls, or authorizing the system to operate. As a result of these deficiencies, FCC's information remained at unnecessary risk of inadvertent or deliberate misuse, improper disclosure, or destruction. Further, addressing these deficiencies could require costly and timeconsuming rework."

Correspondence issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "FEMA's NCRC officials are not assisting regional officials in (1) developing performance measures to better assess the implementation of their strategic plan and (2) identifying federal funding available to prioritize preparedness investments. They are not doing so because they view their role as that of acting as a coordinator for other federal agencies, although they agreed that they could do more to support regional efforts and are positioned to do so. The NCR Strategic Plan helps regional officials identify the capabilities needed to strengthen the region's homeland security efforts and defines the framework for achieving those capabilities. NCR preparedness officials said that they have been working to develop preparedness measures since 2003, but noted that these measures are difficult to link to a measured improvement in regional preparedness. For example, while the region identified more than $25 million in UASI grant projects invested in providing public alerts and warnings, regional officials have not developed a measure to determine the effectiveness of these activities. Without such measures, it is unclear to what extent the efforts will advance the region's goals."

Correspondence issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The Secretary of the Treasury, in coordination with the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), is required to annually prepare and submit audited financial statements of the U.S. government to the President and Congress. We are required to audit these consolidated financial statements (CFS) and report on the results of our work. An issue meriting concern and close scrutiny that emerged during our fiscal year 2004 CFS audit was the growing number of Chief Financial Officers (CFO) Act agencies that restated certain of their financial statements for fiscal year 2003 to correct errors. Errors in financial statements can result from mathematical mistakes, mistakes in the application of accounting principles, or oversight or misuse of facts that existed at the time the financial statements were prepared. Frequent restatements to correct errors can undermine public trust and confidence in both the entity and all responsible parties. Further, when restatements do occur, it is important that financial statements clearly communicate, and readers of the restated financial statements understand, that the financial statements originally issued by management in the previous year and the opinion thereon should no longer be …

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Since 2004, DHS’s use of its CBRN risk assessments to inform its CBRN response plans has varied, from directly influencing information in the plans to not being used at all. DHS guidance states that response planning and resource decisions should be informed by risk information. GAO’s analysis showed that DHS used its CBRN risk assessments to directly inform 2 of 12 CBRN response plans GAO identified because planners considered the risk assessments to be more accurate than earlier DHS planning assumptions. For another 7 of the 12 plans, DHS officials said that the assessments indirectly informed the plans by providing background information prior to plan development. However, GAO could not independently verify this because DHS officials could not document how the risk assessments influenced the information contained in the plans. GAO’s analysis found general consistency between the risk assessments and the plans. For the remaining 3 plans, DHS officials did not use the risk assessments to inform the plans; for 2 of the 3 plans DHS officials told GAO they were not aware of the assessments. DHS officials also noted that there was no departmental guidance …

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "One-third of the Department of Defense's (DOD) fiscal year 2006 spending on goods and services was for subcontracts. Concerns have been raised among DOD auditors and Congress about the potential for excessive pass- through charges by contractors that add little or no value when work is subcontracted. To better understand this risk, Congress mandated that GAO assess the extent to which DOD may be vulnerable to these charges. This report examines (1) DOD's approach to assessing the risk of excessive pass-through charges when work is subcontracted, (2) the strategies selected private sector companies use to minimize risks of excessive pass-through charges when purchasing goods and services, and (3) DOD's interim rule to prevent excessive pass-through charges. GAO's work is based on analysis of 32 fiscal year 2005 DOD contract actions at 10 DOD top contracting locations and discussions with DOD acquisition policy, audit, and contracting officials, including Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) and Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) staff. GAO also interviewed nine selected private sector companies with diverse contracting experience."

Correspondence issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Congress's long-standing interest in health care services for servicemembers returning from deployment has grown regarding National Guard and Reserve servicemembers because they are being activated in numbers not seen since World War II. For servicemembers who have been deployed overseas--whether National Guard, Reserve, or active duty--the Department of Defense (DOD) has developed a continuum of programs to assess servicemembers' health needs by obtaining information on their health concerns. One health assessment is administered before deployment, another about the time servicemembers return from deployment, and a third 90 to 180 days after deployment, which is called the post-deployment health reassessment (PDHRA). DOD directed the PDHRA to be implemented in June 2005 in response to studies that showed that health concerns were emerging several months after servicemembers' return from deployment. One intent of the PDHRA is to identify servicemembers' health concerns with a specific emphasis on screening for mental health and to assess whether servicemembers need referrals for further evaluation. PDHRAs can result in referrals being made to military treatment facilities, TRICARE providers, chaplains, Military OneSource, or Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) facilities, such as VA medical centers, VA community …

Correspondence issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "China's 2001 accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) raised expectations with Congress and the private sector about the prospects for China to reform its markets and allow greater access to foreign goods and services. As part of our long-term body of work related to China's membership in the WTO, we reported in October 2004 on how the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) and the Departments of Commerce, State, and Agriculture were positioned to monitor and enforce China's compliance with its WTO commitments in 2003. In that report, we examined the multilateral annual WTO review of China's progress, referred to as the Transitional Review Mechanism (TRM). We found that the TRM has ongoing limitations in its participation and its procedures. We made recommendations to improve related U.S. government activities. In a subsequent request, Congress asked us to provide detailed information about the TRM process in 2003 so that they could better gauge the level of activity and the efficacy of the United States and other WTO members' efforts to utilize it."

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins ""

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Customs and Border Protection's (CBP) Container Security Initiative (CSI) aims to identify and examine high-risk U.S.-bound cargo at foreign seaports. GAO reported in 2003 and 2005 that CSI helped to enhance homeland security, and recommended actions to strengthen the program. This report updates information and assesses how CBP has (1) contributed to strategic planning for supply chain security, (2) strengthened CSI operations, and (3) evaluated CSI operations. To address these issues, GAO interviewed CBP officials and reviewed CSI evaluations and performance measures. GAO also visited selected U.S. and CSI seaports, and met with U.S. and foreign government officials."

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "From fiscal year 2007 through fiscal year 2010, DOD activities for the treatment and research of PH and TBI received more than $2.7 billion. In fiscal year 2007, funding for these activities totaled $900 million; in fiscal year 2008, it was $573.8 million; in fiscal year 2009, $395 million; and in fiscal year 2010, $838.6 million. GAO found, however, that the reports DOD provided to Congress on these activities did not include expenditures, as required by law, and that the obligations data they contained were unreliable. Governmentwide policies call for agencies to have effective internal controls to assure accurate reporting of obligations and expenditures. However, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs has not developed quality control mechanisms to help ensure that data on PH and TBI activities are complete and accurate. Further, although DOD listed patient care among reported costs, it did not specify what those costs included, making it difficult for decisionmakers and Congress to fully understand the costs."

A letter report issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "Bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), also known as mad cow disease, has been found in cattle in 23 countries. Countries with BSE have suffered large economic losses because of declines in both beef exports and domestic beef sales. The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) have primary responsibility for preventing the introduction of BSE-contaminated cattle, beef, and cattle-derived products into the United States. GAO found that FDA has not acted promptly to force firms to keep prohibited proteins out of cattle feed and to label animal feed that cannot be fed to cattle. FDA's data on inspections are severely flawed, and FDA is unaware of the full extent of industry compliance. If BSE was discovered in U.S. cattle, many consumers might refuse to buy domestic beef; beef exports could decline dramatically as could sales in related industries, such as hamburger chains and frozen dinner manufacturers. Furthermore, some people might develop mad cow disease if infected cattle were to enter the food supply. The United States acted as many as five years earlier than did other countries to impose controls over imports …

A letter report issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "The Defense Department (DOD), the Coast Guard, and the Customs Service all interdict illegal drugs--primarily cocaine--from South America. DOD is the lead agency, but all three agencies play a role in monitoring and detecting shipments of illegal drugs. The Coast Guard is the lead agency for apprehending ships that are smuggling drugs, with Customs providing help as needed. The Coast Guard and Customs share responsibility for apprehending aircraft involved in drug-smuggling. GAO could not identify the funds obligated and the number of flight hours and ship days used for drug interdiction in the drug transit zone because the three agencies do not routinely track this information. The results tracked by the three agencies to demonstrate their effectiveness of their drug interdiction efforts in the transit zone varied according to whether they focused on drug seizures or results of detection and monitoring and whether they were specific to the transit zone. Agencies can use several controls to ensure the accuracy of their own cocaine seizure data, such as assigning unique identification numbers to each seizure and headquarters review of data from field units. Although two interagency data …

A letter report issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the Health Care Financing Administration's (HCFA) efforts to implement changes to the Medicare program, focusing on HCFA's implementation of the: (1) expansion of the partial hospitalization benefit; and (2) more recent changes under the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 (BBA) to determine whether HCFA is acting upon lessons learned from the partial hospitalization program."

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has established a program--the U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT)--to collect, maintain, and share information, including biometric identifiers, on selected foreign nationals who enter and exit the United States. US-VISIT uses these biometric identifiers (digital fingerscans and photographs) to screen persons against watch lists and to verify that a visitor is the person who was issued a visa or other travel document. Visitors are also to confirm their departure by having their visas or passports scanned and undergoing fingerscanning at selected air and sea ports of entry. GAO was asked to testify on (1) the status of US-VISIT and (2) DHS progress in implementing recommendations that GAO made as part of its prior reviews of US-VISIT annual expenditure plans. The testimony is based on GAO's prior reports as well as ongoing work for the House Committee on Homeland Security. GAO's recommendations are directed at helping the department improve its capabilities to deliver US-VISIT capability and benefit expectations on time and within budget. According to DHS, the recommendations have made US-VISIT a stronger program."

A letter report issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the development of competition in telecommunications markets, focusing on the: (1) development of competition in local telephone markets and the market strategies employed by new carriers in five states under the 1996 Telecommunications Act; and (2) key issues affecting that development and the enforcement activities of federal and state regulators to address those issues."

A chapter report issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "GAO issued a report on the results of its management and operational review of the Department of Justice's (DOJ) Public Integrity Section (PI). Specifically, GAO reviewed: (1) PI's organization, staffing, workload, and results; (2) the policies and procedures in place to govern PI's case management practices and its compliance with those policies and procedures, and; (3) DOJ's management oversight of those practices. PI was staffed with 30 attorneys, including a chief and three deputies. Between 1995 and 2000, PI opened 1,013 matters for investigation and filed 163 cases for the court. The conviction rate was 94 percent for cases prosecuted during this time. DOJ's written policies and procedures outlined how PI should manage its caseloads. For the closed cases and matters GAO reviewed, PI generally complied with DOJ's procedures. However, GAO found that, in some cases, PI did not resolve issues in a timely manner. As a result, some matters remained opened for extended periods. DOJ also had policies and procedures in place to ensure that PI's case management practices were subject to management oversight. These oversight practices included documented reviews, daily interactions with attorneys, and …