A letter report issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "The State Department has determined that about 80 percent of overseas U.S. diplomatic facilities lack adequate security and may be vulnerable to terrorist attack. In September 1998, State expanded its capital construction program to accelerate replacing its most vulnerable embassies and consulates by acquiring sites and preparing plans at 10 priority locations. This report summarizes (1) the status of the 10 priority embassy and consulate construction projects and (2) State's plans for the overall construction program. As of November 2000, seven projects are in the construction phase. The remaining three projects are on hold pending agreement between State and Congress about the Department's construction proposals. Although State envisions a long-term, multi-billion dollar program and has ranked more than 180 facilities it may need to replace, it has not prepared a long-term capital construction plan that identifies (1) proposed construction project's cost estimates and schedules and (2) estimated annual funding requirements for the overall program."

A chapter report issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "In 1998, the Navy consolidated the Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard and the Naval Intermediate Maintenance Facility in Hawaii. Because of concerns about some aspects of the consolidation, the Navy began a test project, commonly called the Pearl Harbor pilot, to determine if integrating the management, operations, and funding of the shipyard and the intermediate maintenance facility can result in greater efficiency and lower overall ship maintenance costs. In September 1999, GAO reported that the preliminary results of the ongoing Pearl Harbor pilot were mixed and recommended that the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Navy address unresolved issues related to the financial management of the consolidation as the Navy proceeds with similar consolidations in other locations. This report updates GAO's earlier report and discusses whether (1) the Navy has provided adequate cost visibility and accountability over the consolidation, (2) DOD and the Navy have resolved other issues related to the financial structure for consolidations at Pearl Harbor and elsewhere, and (3) the consolidation has generated greater efficiency and lower costs for ship maintenance at Pearl Harbor. GAO found that the Navy still has not provided adequate …

A letter report issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "This report reviews the Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) third expenditure plan for its systems modernization project. GAO found that the plan satisfied the conditions specified in Treasury's 1998 and 1999 appropriations acts and that IRS was making progress towards satisfying Congress' direction on the Custodial Accounting Project (CAP) and Security and Technology Infrastructure Release (STIR) Project. Although IRS has made significant progress in establishing effective modernization management capability, important and challenging work remains to ensure that the systems work as intended. GAO also found that five modernization initiatives experienced schedule delays or cost increases, each of which IRS disclosed in the third plan. However, the third plan did not address whether projects' prior commitments for delivery of promised systems capabilities and benefit/business value were being met. IRS used contractor-provided "rough order-of-magnitude" estimates in preparing its third expenditure plan. However, consistent with its established practice, IRS planned to validate the third plan's estimates as part of its negotiating and definitizing contract task orders. For IRS' second expenditure plan, this process resulted in finalized contract costs that were $9 million under the "rough order-of-magnitude" estimates in the plan."