On 23 April 1964, five months after assuming the office of President of the United States, Lyndon B. Johnson launched the "More Flags" program as United States policy. While the publicly stated purpose of.the "More Flags" program was to obtain as much non-military free world aid for the Republic of Vietnam as possible, the program's principle goal centered around Lyndon Johnson's desire to obtain an international consensus for America's policies toward Vietnam and Southeast Asia. The "More Flags" program continued to serve both goals for the remainder of Johnson's presidency. Although started with high expectations of success, the "More Flags" program never succeeded in achieving the levels of international cooperation Lyndon Johnson desired. In fact, the program's significant lack of success necessitated a number of changes, during the program's first year, in both its stated goals and in the methods used to prosecute it's implementation. The most important of these changes would be Washington's use of the program's beneficent objectives to mask it's use as the means through which the United States would purchase mercenary troops to fight in South Vietnam. "Mercenaries in Service to America: The 'More Flags' Foreign Policy of the United States," presents the available history of …

Today linguistic hybridity is often conceptualized as translanguaging. The present study of translanguaging was a linguistic ethnography, which meant investigating cultural issues as well as linguistic practices. The focus was on bilingual speakers of Vietnamese and English, two "named" languages that differ considerably in morphology, syntax, and orthography. This study, conducted over four and a half months, was situated in the Vietnamese Student Organization of a U.S. university, and it included 37 participants. The research was intended to answer two questions: what forms of translanguaging did these bilinguals use? and what reasons did they provide for instances of translanguaging? In capturing the language use of this community, my role was participant-observer, which entailed observing and audio-recording conversations in three kinds of settings: group meetings, social gatherings, and Facebook communications. Additional insights came from discourse-based interviews, focused on instances of translanguaging by 10 individuals. In the group meetings and Facebook conversations, it was conventional for the major language to be English, whereas in the social gatherings it was Vietnamese. My attention in analyzing these interactions was on patterns of translanguaging that occurred within sentences and those occurring outside sentence boundaries. Overall, most translanguaging occurred intra-sententially, as single words from one language …

Between 1960 and 1968 the United States conducted intensive psychological operations (PSYOP) in Vietnam. To date, no comprehensive study of the psychological war there has been conducted. This dissertation fills that void, describing the development of American PSYOP forces and their employment in Vietnam. By looking at the complex interplay of American, North Vietnamese, National Liberation Front (NLF) and South Vietnamese propaganda programs, a deeper understanding of these activities and the larger war emerges. The time period covered is important because it comprises the initial introduction of American PSYOP advisory forces and the transition to active participation in the war. It also allows enough time to determine the long-term effects of both the North Vietnamese/NLF and American/South Vietnamese programs. Ending with the 1968 Tet Offensive is fitting because it marks both a major change in the war and the establishment of the 4th Psychological Operations Group to manage the American PSYOP effort. This dissertation challenges the argument that the Northern/Viet Cong program was much more effective that the opposing one. Contrary to common perceptions, the North Vietnamese propaganda increasingly fell on deaf ears in the south by 1968. This study also provides support for understanding the Tet Offensive as a …