Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "This testimony discusses the results of our prior investigation of the Small Business Administration's (SBA) 8(a) Business Development Program. SBA's 8(a) program, named for a section of the Small Business Act, is a development program created to help small, disadvantaged businesses compete in the American economy and access the federal procurement market. To participate in the program, a firm must be certified as meeting several criteria, including: be a small business as defined by SBA; be unconditionally owned and controlled by one or more socially and economically disadvantaged individuals who are of good character and citizens of the United States; and show potential for success. Upon certification, firms can obtain federal contracts without competing fully and openly for the work. For example, agencies are permitted to enter into sole-source contracts after soliciting and negotiating with only one 8(a) company. They also can participate in restricted competitions for federal contracts, known as set-asides, open to only 8(a) companies. In March 2010, GAO issued two companion reports on the 8(a) program, one focused on internal control procedures and processes that SBA has implemented to ensure that only eligible firms participate …

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Securities lending can be a relatively straightforward way for plan sponsors and participants to increase their return on 401(k) investments. However, securities lending can also present a number of challenges to plan participants and plan sponsors. GAO was asked to explain how securities lending with cash collateral reinvestment works in relation to 401(k) plan investments, who bears the risks, and what are some of the challenges plan participants and plan sponsors face in understanding securities lending with cash collateral reinvestment. In this testimony, GAO discusses its recent work regarding securities lending with cash collateral reinvestment. GAO is making no new recommendations in this statement but continues to believe that the Department of Labor (Labor) can take action to help plan sponsors of 401(k) plans and plan participants to understand the role, risk, and benefits of securities lending with cash collateral reinvestment in relation to 401(k) plan investments. Specifically, GAO recommended that Labor provide more guidance to plan sponsors about fees and returns when plan assets are utilized in securities lending with cash collateral reinvestment, amend its participant disclosure regulation to include provisions specific to securities lending with cash …

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "On May 1, 2010, the U.S. Census Bureau (Bureau) will launch its massive follow-up effort with the roughly 48 million households that did not mail back their census forms (130 million forms were delivered). As part of this nonresponse follow-up effort, over 600,000 enumerators will fan out across the country, personally contacting nonresponding housing units as many as six times in an effort to ensure everyone is counted. As requested, GAO's testimony in Los Angeles (L.A.) focuses on the importance of census participation, paying particular attention to (1) the Bureau's preparedness for nonresponse follow-up in terms of workload and staffing levels, (2) why it will be critical for Angelenos and others across the country to cooperate with enumerators during nonresponse follow-up, and (3) key steps the Bureau needs to take moving forward to ensure nonresponse follow-up is timely and accurate. The testimony is based on previously issued and ongoing GAO work."

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "In March 2008, GAO designated the 2010 Census a high-risk area in part because of information technology (IT) shortcomings and uncertainty over the ultimate cost of the census, now estimated at around $15 billion. The U.S. Census Bureau (Bureau) has since made improvements to various IT systems and taken other steps to mitigate the risks to a successful census. However, last year, GAO noted that a number of challenges and uncertainties remained, and much work remained to be completed under very tight time frames. As requested, this testimony provides an update on the Bureau's readiness for an effective headcount, covering (1) the reliability of key IT systems; (2) a broad range of activities critical to an effective headcount, some of which were problematic in either earlier 2010 operations or in the 2000 Census, and (3) the quality of the Bureau's cost estimates. The testimony is based on previously issued and ongoing GAO work."

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "In March 2008, GAO designated the 2010 Census a high-risk area in part because of information technology (IT) shortcomings and uncertainty over the ultimate cost of the census, now estimated at around $15 billion. The U.S. Census Bureau (Bureau) has since made improvements to various IT systems and taken other steps to mitigate the risks of a successful census. However, last year, GAO noted that a number of challenges and uncertainties remained, and much work remained to be completed under very tight time frames. As requested, this testimony provides an update on the Bureau's readiness for an effective headcount, covering (1) the status of key IT systems; (2) steps the Bureau has taken to revise its cost estimates; and (3) the extent to which critical enumeration activities, particularly those aimed at hard-to-count populations, are on track. The testimony is based on previously issued and ongoing GAO work."

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The U.S. Census Bureau (Bureau) is tasked with conducting an accurate count of people living in dwellings known as group quarters as part of the 2010 Census. Group quarters consist of college dormitories, prisons, nursing homes, and other facilities typically owned or managed by an entity providing housing, services, or both for the residents. During the 2000 Census, for a variety of reasons, group quarters were sometimes counted more than once, missed, or included in the wrong location. As requested, this testimony will focus on (1) the extent to which the Bureau has strengthened its procedures for counting group quarters compared to the 2000 Census, and (2) particular challenges and opportunities for an accurate group quarters count in Brooklyn. The testimony is based on previously issued and ongoing GAO work in New York and elsewhere."

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "GAO added the 2010 Census to its list of high-risk programs in 2008 in part because of (1) long-standing weaknesses in the Census Bureau's (Bureau) information technology (IT) acquisition and contract management function, (2) difficulties in developing reliable life-cycle cost estimates, and (3) key operations that were not tested under operational conditions. These issues jeopardized the Bureau's readiness for the count. Moreover, societal trends, such as concerns over privacy, have made a cost-effective census an increasingly difficult challenge. At about $13 billion, 2010 was the costliest U.S. Census in history. As requested, this testimony focuses on lessons learned from the 2010 Census, and initiatives that show promise for producing a more cost-effective population count in 2020. This testimony is based on completed and ongoing work, including an analysis of Bureau documents, interviews with Bureau officials, and field observations of census operations in urban and rural locations across the country."

Correspondence issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "On May 10, 2010, the President resubmitted to Congress a proposed Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Russian Federation for Cooperation in the Field of Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (henceforth referred to as the U.S.-Russia nuclear cooperation agreement or the agreement) in accordance with the review requirements established under section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (AEA), as amended. The proposed agreement with Russia would, among other things, establish the legal basis for the Department of Energy (DOE) to work with Russia on large-scale development of nuclear energy. The United States has 25 agreements in force for peaceful nuclear cooperation with foreign countries, the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM), the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and Taiwan. Such agreements provide the framework and authorization for civilian nuclear cooperation but do not guarantee that cooperation will take place or that nuclear material or technology transfers will occur. On May 13, 2008, President Bush originally submitted the agreement to Congress with the statutorily required presidential determination that this agreement would promote, and would not constitute an unreasonable risk …

Other written product issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "This document is a listing of technical changes related to the 2011 Government Auditing Standards."

Other written product issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "This document summarizes major changes in the 2011 Government Auditing Standards."

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "In preparing for the 2020 Census, the U.S. Census Bureau (Bureau) has launched several initiatives aimed at organizational transformation, some of which show particular promise. For example, the Bureau is attempting to develop Bureau-wide, or "enterprise," standards, guidance, or tools in areas such as risk management and information technology (IT) investment management to reduce duplicative efforts across the Bureau. Although the Bureau has made progress in these and other areas, if the Bureau is to transform itself to better control costs and deliver an accurate national headcount in 2020, several areas will require continued oversight: cost estimation, integrated long-term planning, and stakeholder involvement. For example, while the Bureau has made progress with long-term planning by implementing some elements of GAO's recommendation that it develop a road map for 2020 planning, it still needs to pull together remaining planning elements, such as milestones for decisions and estimates of cost, into its roadmap."

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Overall, the U.S. Census Bureau’s (Bureau) planning efforts for 2020 are off to a good start, as the Bureau made noteworthy progress within each of the four lessons learned from the 2010 Census. Still, additional steps will be needed within each of the lessons learned in order to sustain those reforms."

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Because of delays and cost increases, the General Services Administration (GSA) canceled the authorized 41-courtroom Los Angeles (L.A.), California, courthouse project in 2006. Since then, GSA and the judiciary have been slow to agree upon how to proceed with the project, for which about $366 million in appropriated funds remains available. In 2012, with the judiciary’s support, GSA issued a request for proposal for contractors to design and build a 24-courtoom, 32-chamber courthouse, which would be used in conjunction with 25 existing courtrooms in the Roybal Courthouse. However, this new plan will not address one of the principal justifications for the original project—that the L.A. Court be centralized at one site. Instead, it would increase the distance between the Roybal Courthouse and the planned second court location and the distance to the federal detention center from which prisoners must be transported."

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The General Mining Act of 1872 helped foster the development of the West by giving individuals exclusive rights to mine gold, silver, copper, and other hardrock minerals on federal land. However, miners often abandoned mines, leaving behind structures, safety hazards, and contaminated land and water. Four federal agencies--the Department of the Interior's Bureau of Land Management (BLM) and Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement (OSM), the Department of Agriculture's Forest Service, and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)--fund the cleanup of some of these hardrock mine sites. From 2005 through 2009, GAO issued a number of reports and testimonies on various issues related to abandoned and current hardrock mining operations. This testimony summarizes some of the key findings of these reports and testimonies focusing on the (1) number of abandoned hardrock mines, (2) availability of information collected by federal agencies on general mining activities, (3) amount of funding spent by federal agencies on cleanup of abandoned mines, and (4) value of financial assurances for mining operations on federal land managed by BLM. In 2005, GAO recommended that BLM strengthen the management of its financial assurances, which BLM generally …

Correspondence issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Al Qaeda, the Taliban, and other extremists have used safe havens along Pakistan's Western Frontier (border) region to attack Pakistani, Afghan, U.S., and coalition troops; plan and train for attacks against U.S. interests and the U.S. homeland; destabilize Pakistan, a nuclear-armed U.S. ally; and spread radical Islamic ideologies that threaten U.S. interests. A key U.S. national security objective is to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda and its violent extremist affiliates in Pakistan and to deny them a safe haven. Since 2002, the United States has provided over $18 billion in assistance and reimbursement to Pakistan including (1) reimbursements to the Pakistani government for costs incurred in direct support of U.S. counterterrorism operations; (2) security assistance such as grants to Pakistan for the acquisition of military equipment; and (3) development, economic, and humanitarian assistance. Since 2006, this assistance has included $1.5 billion to improve the counterterrorism and counterinsurgency capabilities of Pakistani security forces operating along the country's border with Afghanistan, including $400 million for the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund (PCF) and $700 million for the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capabilities Fund (PCCF). The President has requested an additional $1.2 billion for …

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The Department of Defense (DOD) is the government's largest buying entity and has recognized that rebuilding the acquisition workforce is a strategic priority. The federal government's current budget and long-term fiscal pressures underscore the importance of a capable and well-functioning workforce. GAO and others have long recognized that the size and capabilities of the workforce across the government warrant the attention of the Congress. This statement discusses (1) DOD's progress in addressing challenges faced in rebuilding the capacity of the acquisition workforce, and (2) insights into the efforts by the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) to rebuild its contract oversight capacity. This statement is drawn from our broad body of work on DOD contract management and acquisition workforce as well as a report issued earlier this month on DCMA's efforts to rebuild capacity. We also obtained updated information from DOD with regard to its acquisition workforce competency assessments and workforce hiring.."

Correspondence issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The H-2A visa program allows U.S. employers that anticipate a shortage of domestic agricultural workers to hire foreign workers on a temporary basis. GAO issued a report on the process employers follow in applying for these workers and made several recommendations to the Department of Labor (Labor) for improving that process In pursuing work on that report, GAO found that the number of applications submitted by employers for H-2A worker positions, the number of H-2A worker positions requested, and the number of worker positions approved by Labor cited in Labor's annual reports from fiscal year 2006 and FY 2012 sometimes differed from the numbers reported by Labor in the data it makes available to the public on its website. GAO also found that much of the data Labor reported from applications submitted on behalf of multiple employers for this same period contained inconsistencies and that Labor lacked internal controls to monitor and prevent these inconsistencies. As a result, GAO was unable to rely on the data to draw conclusions about trends in usage of the H-2A program and, in some cases, found the data to be unreliable in …

Correspondence issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Since the fall of 2010, State has sanctioned 13 foreign firms under the ISA—2 for investments in Iran’s energy sector and 11 for supplying refined petroleum products."

Correspondence issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "GAO published its third annual assessment of selected large-scale NASA projects. During this assessment we identified several issues that merit NASA's management attention. The federal government faces real fiscal limitations and will have to make difficult choices about upcoming priorities. This reality makes it more important than ever that NASA manage its programs and projects as efficiently and effectively as possible and within a budget that over recent years has remained relatively constant. It will also require that NASA make tough decisions about which projects to fund among core missions in science, aeronautics, and human space flight and exploration. Our work over the past three years has shown that NASA's major projects are frequently approved without evidence of a sound business case--ensuring a match between requirements and resources--and, therefore, cost more and take longer to develop than planned. Our March 2011 assessment found that 13 NASA projects that established baselines prior to fiscal year 2009 had experienced an average cost growth of almost 55 percent, with a combined increase in development costs of almost $2.5 billion from their baselines established at their Confirmation Review. While NASA has taken …

Correspondence issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Although the October 2012 and the August 2013 versions of the U.S. Civil-Military Strategic Framework for Afghanistan have similarities, the two versions differ in several aspects. These differences reflect, among other things, the U.S. government's heightened emphasis on the transition, through the end of 2014, of security responsibility for Afghanistan to Afghan security institutions and the Afghan National Security Forces as well as the transition in U.S. policy toward a more traditional diplomatic and development model. Both versions of the framework address four categories of U.S. efforts in support of U.S. national goals in Afghanistan, with security, the first category, as the foundation for the other three categories, or "pillars"--governance, rule of law, and socioeconomic development. Both versions also address the same crosscutting issues. Differences between the two versions include the following:"

Other written product issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "This document is an E-supplement to GAO-10-368. This e-supplement provides additional information on regional and provincial poverty and major crops produced in Afghanistan."

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "This testimony discusses oversight of U.S. assistance programs in Afghanistan. Strengthening the Afghan economy through development assistance efforts is critical to the counterinsurgency strategy and a key part of the U.S Integrated Civilian-Military Campaign Plan for Afghanistan. Since fiscal year 2002, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has awarded over $11.5 billion in support of development assistance programs in Afghanistan. Since 2003, GAO has issued several reports and testimonies related to U.S. security, governance, and development efforts in Afghanistan. In addition to reviewing program planning and implementation, we have focused on efforts to ensure proper management and oversight of the U.S. investment, which are essential to reducing waste, fraud, and abuse. Over the course of this work, we have identified improvements that were needed, as well as many obstacles that have affected success and should be considered in program management and oversight. While drawing on past work relating to U.S. development efforts in Afghanistan, this testimony focuses on findings in our most recent report released yesterday on the USAID's management and oversight of its agricultural programs in Afghanistan. It will address (1) the challenges the United States …

Correspondence issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins ""

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "In 2010, the United States pledged to provide at least 50 percent of its development aid directly through the Afghan government budget within 2 years. This direct assistance is intended to help develop the capacity of Afghan government ministries to manage programs and funds. Using bilateral agreements and multilateral trust funds, the United States more than tripled its direct assistance awards to Afghanistan in the first year of the pledge, going from over $470 million in fiscal year 2009 to over $1.4 billion in fiscal year 2010. The U.S. Agency for International Development's (USAID) most current reporting shows that for fiscal year 2012 the agency provided over $800 million in mission funds through direct assistance. In 2013, GAO reported that while USAID had established and generally complied with various financial and other controls in its direct assistance agreements, it had not always assessed the risks in providing direct assistance before awarding funds. USAID has taken steps in response to GAO's recommendations to help ensure the accountability of direct assistance funds provided to the Afghan government. Recently, the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) reported that USAID determined …