A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "In 1995, GAO first designated the Department of Defense's (DOD) business systems modernization program as "high-risk," and continues to do so today. In 2004, Congress passed legislation reflecting prior GAO recommendations for DOD to adopt a corporate approach to information technology (IT) business system investment management. To support GAO's legislative mandate to review DOD's efforts, GAO assessed whether the department's corporate investment management approach comports with relevant federal guidance. In doing so, GAO applied its IT Investment Management framework and associated methodology, focusing on the framework's stages related to the investment management provisions of the Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996."

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) Business Systems Modernization (BSM) program is a multibillion-dollar, high-risk, highly complex effort that involves the development and delivery of a number of modernized information systems that are intended to replace the agency's aging business and tax processing systems. As required by law, IRS submitted its fiscal year 2007 expenditure plan, in September 2006, to congressional appropriations committees, requesting $167.3 million from the BSM account. GAO's objectives in reviewing the plan were to (1) determine whether it satisfied the conditions specified in the law, (2) determine IRS's progress in implementing prior GAO recommendations, and (3) provide any other observations about the plan and IRS's BSM program. To address these objectives, GAO analyzed the plan, reviewed related documentation, and interviewed IRS officials."

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "In 1995, we first designated the Department of Defense's (DOD) business systems modernization program as "high risk," and we continue to designate it as such today. To assist in addressing this high-risk area, Congress passed legislation consistent with prior GAO recommendations for Defense to develop a business enterprise architecture (BEA). In September 2006, DOD released version 4.0 of its BEA, which despite improvements over prior versions, was not aligned with component architectures. Subsequently, Defense issued a strategy for extending its BEA to the component military services and defense agencies. To support GAO's legislative mandate to review DOD's BEA, GAO assessed DOD's progress in defining this strategy by comparing it with prior findings and recommendations relevant to the strategy's content."

Other written product issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Since the founding of the republic and the ratification of the Constitution, the U.S. government has evolved to reflect changing circumstances at home and abroad. At the end of George Washington's presidency in 1797, there were four cabinet-level departments--most run by small staffs of civil servants--and five cabinet-level officials, including the Attorney General. Today, there are nearly 30 major federal departments and agencies with cabinet-level officials in the executive branch, and the federal workforce, including military personnel, now totals in the millions. In 1797, U.S. government spending represented about 2 percent of the U.S. economy and now it represents over 20 percent. A quick look at the federal budget reveals how much we have expanded beyond the Constitution's framers' original thoughts and our modest beginnings. In the coming decades, however, our ability to sustain even the constitutionally enumerated responsibilities of the federal government will come under increasing pressure. Without meaningful act on, by 2040 our government could only have the resources to do little more than mail out Social Security checks and pay interest on the massive and growing national debt. This is obviously an unacceptable …

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The Architect of the Capitol (AOC), through the Capitol Power Plant, operates five walkable utility tunnels containing steam and chilled water pipes associated with serving the heating and cooling requirements of the U.S. Capitol and over 20 surrounding facilities. In our work last fall, we addressed conditions in the tunnels and AOC's plans for addressing them. The Office of Compliance (OOC), which is responsible for advancing safety, health, and workplace rights in the legislative branch, and the tunnel workers had raised concerns about health and safety issues in the tunnels. As a result of these concerns, in January 2006, OOC issued citations for and asked AOC to address a potential asbestos hazard and heat stress conditions in the tunnels. In addition, in February 2006, OOC filed a complaint against AOC concerning hazards in the tunnels, including falling concrete, an inadequate communication system for these confined spaces, and inadequate escape exits (egresses). According to OOC officials, these conditions had been brought to AOC's attention by OOC inspectors as early as 1999, but AOC had not made sufficient progress in addressing them, and conditions in the tunnels had deteriorated further. …

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The purpose of this testimony is to assist the Committees in monitoring progress on the Capitol Visitor Center (CVC) project. This testimony will focus on (1) the Architect of the Capitol's (AOC) construction progress since the last CVC hearing on March 13, 2007; and (2) the project's expected cost at completion and funding status. GAO's remarks are based on our review of schedules and financial reports for the CVC project and related records maintained by AOC and its construction management contractor, Gilbane Building Company; observations on the progress of work at the CVC construction site; and discussions with the CVC team (AOC and its major CVC contractors), AOC's Chief Fire Marshal, and representatives from the U.S. Capitol Police."

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "At the last Capitol Visitor Center (CVC) hearing, GAO reported that our assessment of the project's schedule and expected cost at completion was somewhat constrained because the CVC team was still analyzing the impact on the project's schedule and cost of recently identified changes required for certain components of the fire protection and security systems. The impact of these changes on the project is not yet fully known. Therefore, GAO could not thoroughly assess the project's schedule or estimated cost at completion and are basing our views on the information available as of February 5, 2007, including the Architect Of the Capitol's (AOC) December 2006 schedule. To assist the Subcommittee on the Legislative Branch, House Committee on Appropriations in monitoring progress on the CVC project, GAO's remarks will focus on (1) the AOC construction progress since the last CVC hearing on November 15, 2006; and (2) the project's expected cost at completion and status of funding."

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Since the June 27, 2007, Capitol Visitor Center (CVC) hearing, the project's construction has progressed, and according to the latest schedule, Architect of the Capitol (AOC) is still projecting a June 27, 2008, completion date and a September 22, 2008 opening date. Work has advanced on the project's heating, ventilation, and air-conditioning (HVAC) system, interior wall stone and ceiling installation, and other interior and exterior construction work. However, some delays have occurred in activities on the project's critical path (i.e., the work on the fire alarm system) and on most of its near-critical paths, and further delays are possible. AOC was able to mitigate the delay in the project's critical path by reducing the time available for future fire alarm testing. This action may not produce the desired results, though, given the complexity of the requirements for fire alarm testing. Delays in near-critical activities such as the ceiling close-ins and the House and Senate expansion spaces have reduced the time reserved for contingencies along those near-critical paths, but have not yet affected the critical path. Furthermore, a number of risks to the project's schedule remain. These include potential …

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The purpose of this testimony is to assist the Committees in monitoring progress on the Capitol Visitor Center (CVC) project. This testimony will focus on (1) the Architect of the Capitol's (AOC) construction progress since the last CVC hearing on April 24, 2007; and (2) the project's expected cost at completion and funding status. GAO's remarks are based on our review of schedules and financial reports for the CVC project and related records maintained by AOC and its construction management contractor, Gilbane Building Company; our observations on the progress of work at the CVC construction site; and our discussions with the CVC team (AOC and its major CVC contractors), AOC's Chief Fire Marshal, and representatives from the U.S. Capitol Police. We also reviewed AOC's construction management contractor's periodic schedule assessments, potential change order log, and weekly reports on the progress of interior wall and floor stonework. In addition, we reviewed the contract modifications made to date."

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "We appreciate the opportunity to assist the Subcommittee in monitoring progress on the Capitol Visitor Center (CVC) project. GAO's remarks will focus on (1) the Architect of the Capitol's (AOC) construction progress since the last CVC hearing on February 16, 2007; and (2) the project's expected cost at completion and funding status. Today's remarks are based on our review of schedules and financial reports for the CVC project and related records maintained by AOC and its construction management contractor, Gilbane Building Company; our observations on the progress of work at the CVC construction site; and our discussions with the CVC team (AOC and its major CVC contractors), AOC's Chief Fire Marshal, and representatives from the U.S. Capitol Police. We also reviewed AOC's construction management contractor's periodic schedule assessments, potential change order log, and weekly reports on the progress of interior wall and floor stone installation. In addition, we reviewed the contract modifications made to date. At the last CVC hearing, we reported that our assessment of the project's schedule and expected cost at completion was still somewhat constrained because the CVC team was analyzing the impact on the …

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Today's testimony will focus on (1) the Architect of the Capitol's (AOC) construction progress since the last CVC hearing on September 25, 2007, and (2) the project's expected cost at completion and funding status. Today's remarks are based on our review of schedules and financial reports for the CVC project and related records maintained by AOC and its construction management contractor, Gilbane Building Company; our observations on the progress of work at the CVC construction site; and our discussions with the CVC team (AOC and its major CVC contractors), AOC's Chief Fire Marshal, and representatives from the U.S. Capitol Police. We also reviewed AOC's construction management contractor's periodic schedule assessments, potential change order log, and weekly reports on construction progress. In addition, we reviewed the contract modifications made to date."

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Since the July 31, 2007, Capitol Visitor Center (CVC) hearing, the project's construction has progressed, and Architect of the Capitol (AOC) is now anticipating a November 2008, opening date. In addition, AOC and the sequence 2 contractor have signed a contract modification that extends the date for completing the majority of the sequence 2 work from September 15, 2006 to November 15, 2007. However, because delays have occurred on a number of near-critical paths, and risks to the project's schedule remain, we agree with the November 2008 opening date. AOC has increased its estimate of the cost to complete the CVC project's construction to about $621 million to cover the costs associated with extending the sequence 2 schedule and to provide for delays, change orders, and remaining uncertainties. We believe this estimate is reasonable, provided there are no unusual delays. To date, about $556.2 million has been approved for CVC construction, and AOC has $18.6 million more that it has not yet received approval to obligate. Of this amount, AOC plans to use about $6 million for construction and the remainder for operations. For fiscal year 2008, AOC …

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA) established a voluntary outpatient prescription drug benefit, which is administered by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS). CMS relies extensively on contractors to help it carry out its basic mission. Congress appropriated to CMS $1 billion for start-up administrative costs to implement provisions of MMA. Because CMS had discretion on how to use the appropriation, Congress asked GAO to determine (1) how CMS used the $1 billion MMA appropriation, (2) whether CMS's contracting practices and related internal controls were adequate to avoid waste and to prevent or detect improper payments, and (3) whether payments to contractors were properly supported as a valid use of government funds. To address objectives two and three above, our review extended beyond contract amounts paid with MMA funds."

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report states that the Department of Defense (DOD) must be prepared to respond to and mitigate the effects of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) attacks at home or overseas. Moreover, the Secretary of Defense directed the U.S. military to define the nature and potential requests for military capabilities needed to respond to 15 National Planning Scenarios issued by the Homeland Security Council. The Army's chemical units are key players in this mission. GAO was asked to evaluate the preparedness of the Army's chemical and biological units, including the extent to which (1) units tasked with providing chemical and biological defense support to combat units and commands are adequately staffed, equipped, and trained and (2) units also tasked with a homeland defense mission--especially National Guard and Reserve units--are adequately prepared for this mission. During this review, we analyzed readiness data and other preparedness indicators for 78 Army chemical units."

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "For the military to operate in environments contaminated by chemical and biological warfare agents, the Department of Defense (DOD) has developed collective protection equipment to provide a protected environment for group activities. GAO previously reported persistent problems in providing collective protection for U.S. forces in high threat areas overseas. In this report, GAO examined (1) current intelligence assessments of chemical and biological threats, (2) the extent to which DOD has provided collective protection at critical overseas facilities and major expeditionary warfighting assets, and (3) DOD's framework for managing installation protection policies and prioritizing critical installations for funding. In conducting this review, GAO developed criteria to identify critical sites in the absence of a DOD priority listing of such sites in overseas high threat areas--areas at high risk of terrorist or missile attack."

Correspondence issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The U.S. stockpile of 1,269 tons of VX nerve agent stored at the Newport Chemical Depot (Newport), Indiana, is one of nine stockpiles that the Department of Defense (DOD) must destroy in response to congressional direction initially provided in 1985. In addition, the stockpile must be destroyed to comply with the requirements of the Chemical Weapons Convention, which the United States became a party to in 1997. The stockpile at Newport is the first U.S. stockpile containing VX that will be destroyed by using neutralization--a process that mixes hot water and sodium hydroxide (a caustic chemical) with VX to change the chemical composition to a less toxic form. The resulting by-product is a liquid wastewater commonly referred to as hydrolysate that consists mostly of water but also has a caustic component and organic salts that need further treatment to meet Chemical Weapons Convention requirements and to meet federal and state environmental requirements for disposal. The Army, DOD's designated executive agent, began neutralizing Newport's VX stockpile on-site in May 2005 and, as of December 1, 2006, reports neutralizing about 34 percent of the stockpile. None of the generated hydrolysate--expected …

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Destruction of the nation's remaining stockpile of chemical weapons in a safe, efficient, and timely manner is essential to meet Chemical Weapons Convention treaty obligations and to reduce the risk of a potential catastrophic event. The Department of Defense (DOD) established the Chemical Demilitarization Program to manage the destruction of the remaining stockpile. GAO was asked to evaluate the (1) progress DOD and the Army have made in addressing GAO's prior recommendations to strengthen program management, (2) reasonableness of schedule milestones, (3) reliability of cost estimates, and (4) effectiveness of efforts to provide monetary incentives to the systems contractors. GAO reviewed relevant planning documents, schedules, cost estimates, and contracts; interviewed program and contractor officials; and visited chemical agent destruction sites."

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Chemicals play an important role in everyday life. However, some chemicals are highly toxic and need to be regulated. In 1976, the Congress passed the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) to authorize the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to control chemicals that pose an unreasonable risk to human health or the environment, but some have questioned whether TSCA provides EPA with enough tools to protect against chemical risks. Like the United States, the European Union (EU) has laws governing the production and use of chemicals. The EU has recently revised its chemical control policy through legislation known as Registration, Evaluation and Authorization of Chemicals (REACH) in order to better identify and mitigate risks from chemicals. GAO was asked to review the approaches used under TSCA and REACH for (1) requiring chemical companies to develop information on chemicals' effects, (2) controlling risks from chemicals, and (3) making information on chemicals available to the public. To review these issues, GAO analyzed applicable U.S. and EU laws and regulations and interviewed U.S. and EU officials, industry representatives, and environmental advocacy organizations. GAO is making no recommendations."

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Despite substantial federal and state investment, states have had difficulty ensuring the safety, well-being, and permanency of children in foster care. Ensuring these outcomes becomes even more difficult in the event of disasters such as Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, when children and families may become displaced across state lines. This testimony discusses (1) the issues that states reported as most important to resolve now and in the future to improve outcomes for children under their supervision (2) initiatives states reported taking to address these issues and how recent law provides support for additional state efforts and (3) federal action taken to assist states' efforts in developing child welfare disaster plans. This testimony is primarily based on our October 2006 report on state child welfare challenges (GAO-07-75) and our July 2006 report on state child welfare disaster planning (GAO-06-944). The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the Congress took action that addressed our July report recommendations. However, HHS disagreed with our October report recommendation to improve awareness of and access to federal social services by modifying the Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance or other means. We continue …

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Congress passed the Foster Care Independence Act of 1999 (FCIA), which doubled annual federal funds for independent living programs to $140 million. This testimony discusses (1) states' FCIA funding allocations, (2) services provided and remaining challenges, (3) state coordination of programs to deliver services, and (4) the states and the Department of Health and Human Services' (HHS) Administration for Children and Families' (ACF) progress toward meeting program accountability requirements. This testimony is primarily based on our 2004 report on FCIA (05-25), with updated information from our 2007 testimony on state child welfare challenges (07-850T). To conduct the 2004 work, we surveyed state independent living coordinators, conducted 4 state site visits, and reviewed states' plans and annual reports. Updated information from our 2007 testimony was taken primarily from a 2006 survey of state child welfare directors."

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "In August 1997, Congress created the State Children's Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) with the goal of significantly reducing the number of low-income uninsured children, especially those who lived in families with incomes exceeding Medicaid eligibility requirements. Unlike Medicaid, SCHIP is not an entitlement to services for beneficiaries but a capped allotment to states. Congress provided a fixed amount--$40 billion from 1998 through 2007--to states with approved SCHIP plans. Funds are allocated to states annually. States have 3 years to use each year's allocation, after which unspent funds may be redistributed to states that have already spent all of that year's allocation. GAO's testimony addresses trends in SCHIP enrollment and the current composition of SCHIP programs across the states, states' spending experiences under SCHIP, and considerations GAO has identified for SCHIP reauthorization. GAO's testimony is based on its prior work; analysis of the Current Population Survey, a monthly survey conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau (2003-2005); information from states' annual SCHIP reports (2002-2005); and SCHIP enrollment and expenditure data from the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (1998-2005)."

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "In August 1997, Congress created the State Children's Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) with the goal of significantly reducing the number of low-income uninsured children, especially those who lived in families with incomes exceeding Medicaid eligibility requirements. Unlike Medicaid, SCHIP is not an entitlement to services for beneficiaries but a capped allotment to states. Congress provided a fixed amount--approximately $40 billion from fiscal years 1998 through 2007--to states with approved SCHIP plans. Funds are allocated to states annually. Subject to certain exceptions, states have 3 years to use each year's allocation, after which unspent funds may be redistributed to states that have already spent all of that year's allocation. GAO's testimony addresses trends in SCHIP enrollment and the current composition of SCHIP programs across the states, states' spending experiences under SCHIP, and considerations GAO has identified for SCHIP reauthorization. GAO's testimony is based on its prior work, particularly testimony before the Senate Finance Committee on February 1, 2007 (see GAO-07-447T). GAO updated this work with the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services' (CMS) January 2007 approval of Tennessee's SCHIP program."

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "In August 1997, Congress created the State Children's Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) with the goal of significantly reducing the number of low-income uninsured children, especially those who lived in families with incomes exceeding Medicaid eligibility requirements. Unlike Medicaid, SCHIP is not an entitlement to services for beneficiaries but a capped allotment to states. Congress provided a fixed amount--approximately $40 billion from fiscal years 1998 through 2007--to states with approved SCHIP plans. Funds are allocated to states annually. Subject to certain exceptions, states have 3 years to use each year's allocation, after which unspent funds may be redistributed to states that have already spent all of that year's allocation. GAO's testimony addresses trends in SCHIP enrollment and the current composition of SCHIP programs across the states, states' spending experiences under SCHIP, and considerations GAO has identified for SCHIP reauthorization. GAO's testimony is based on its prior work, particularly testimony before the Senate Finance Committee on February 1, 2007 (see GAO-07-447T). GAO updated this work with the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services' (CMS) January 2007 approval of Tennessee's SCHIP program."

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Urban storm water runoff is a major contributor to the nation's degraded waters. Under the Clean Water Act, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) established a program requiring communities to obtain permits and implement activities to control storm water pollution. EPA's Phase I regulations (1990) applied to communities with populations of 100,000 or more, and its Phase II regulations (1999) covered smaller urban communities. Communities must report progress in meeting permit requirements. Some have raised concerns that storm water requirements impose an undue burden. To evaluate storm water program costs, EPA developed estimates for both phases. GAO was asked to (1) determine the progress in implementing the storm water program, (2) evaluate the extent to which the program burdens communities, (3) examine the accuracy of EPA's cost estimates, and (4) examine the data available for assessing program burden. GAO collected data for all states and a sample of 130 communities, among other steps."