Four fault tolerant architectures were evaluated for their potential reliability in service as control systems of nuclear power plants. The reliability analyses showed that human- and software-related common cause failures and single points of failure in the output modules are dominant contributors to system unreliability. The four architectures are triple-modular-redundant (TMR), both synchronous and asynchronous, and also dual synchronous and asynchronous. The evaluation includes a review of design features, an analysis of the importance of coverage, and reliability analyses of fault tolerant systems. An advantage of fault-tolerant controllers over those not fault tolerant, is that fault-tolerant controllers continue to function after the occurrence of most single hardware faults. However, most fault-tolerant controllers have single hardware components that will cause system failure, almost all controllers have single points of failure in software, and all are subject to common cause failures. Reliability analyses based on data from several industries that have fault-tolerant controllers were used to estimate the mean-time-between-failures of fault-tolerant controllers and to predict those failures modes that may be important in nuclear power plants. 7 refs., 4 tabs.