A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Joint Strike Fighter restructuring continued throughout 2011 and into 2012, adding to cost and schedule. The new program baseline projects total acquisition costs of $395.7 billion, an increase of $117.2 billion (42 percent) from the prior 2007 baseline. Full rate production is now planned for 2019, a delay of 6 years from the 2007 baseline. Unit costs per aircraft have doubled since start of development in 2001. Critical dates for delivering warfighter requirements remain unsettled because of program uncertainties. While the total number of aircraft DOD plans to buy has not changed, it has for 3 straight years reduced near-term procurement quantities, deferring aircraft and costs to future years. Since 2002, the total quantity through 2017 has been reduced by three-fourths, from 1,591 to 365. Affordability is a key challenge–annual acquisition funding needs average about $12.5 billion through 2037 and life-cycle operating and support costs are estimated at $1.1 trillion. DOD has not thoroughly analyzed program impacts should funding expectations be unmet."

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The Department of State (State) faces persistent experience gaps in overseas Foreign Service positions, particularly at the midlevels, and these gaps have not diminished since 2008. In fiscal years 2009 and 2010, State increased the size of the Foreign Service by 17 percent. However, these new hires will not have the experience to reach midlevels until fiscal years 2014 and 2015. GAO found that 28 percent of overseas Foreign Service positions were either vacant or filled by upstretch candidates—officers serving in positions above their grade—as of October 2011, a percentage that has not changed since 2008. Midlevel positions represent the largest share of these gaps. According to State officials, the gaps have not diminished because State increased the total number of overseas positions in response to increased needs and emerging priorities. State officials noted the department takes special measures to fill high-priority positions, including those in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan."

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Compared to the initial test audits and the more recent collaborative audits, the majority of the Medicaid Integrity Group’s (MIG) audits conducted under the National Medicaid Audit Program (NMAP) were less effective because they used Medicaid Statistical Information System (MSIS) data. MSIS is an extract of states’ claims data and is missing key elements, such as provider names, that are necessary for auditing. Since fiscal year 2008, 4 percent of the 1,550 MSIS audits identified $7.4 million in potential overpayments, 69 percent did not identify overpayments, and the remaining 27 percent were ongoing. In contrast, 26 test audits and 6 collaborative audits—which used states’ more robust Medicaid Management Information System (MMIS) claims data and allowed states to select the audit targets—together identified more than $12 million in potential overpayments. Furthermore, the median amount of the potential overpayment for MSIS audits was relatively small compared to test and collaborative audits."