This study has attempted to explain the dramatic challenges to the existing party system that occurred in Canada and the United States in the early 1990s. The emergence of new political movements with substantial power at the ballot box has transformed both party systems. The rise of United We Stand America in the United States, and the Reform Party in Canada prompts scholars to ask what forces engender such movements. This study demonstrates that models of economic voting and key models of party system change are both instrumental for understanding the rise of new political movements.

The purpose of the study is to empirically determine the relevance of PPP theory under the traditional arbitrage and the efficient markets (EPPP) frameworks during the recent floating period of the 1980s. Monthly data was collected for fifteen industrial nations from January 1980 to December 1986. The models tested included the short-run PPP, the long-run PPP, the EPPP, the EPPP with deviations from expectations, the forward rates as unbiased estimators of future spot rates, the EPPP and the forward rates, and the EPPP with forward rates and lagged values. A generalized regression method called Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) was employed to test the models. The results support the efficient markets approach to PPP but fail to support the traditional PPP in both the short term and the long term. Moreover, the forward rates are poor and biased predictors of the future spot rates. The random walk hypothesis is generally supported.

This study has two purposes: first, to test the validity of the personal attribute model in explaining judicial voting behavior outside its original cultural context; second, to explain the variation in justice's voting behavior in the Canadian Supreme Court. For the most part, the result arrived in this study supports the validity of the model in cross-cultural analysis. The result of multiple regression analysis shows that four variables, region, judicial experience prior to appointment, political party of appointing Prime Minister, and tenure account for 60 percent of the variations in justice's voting behavior. This result, hence, provides an empirical finding to the development of the personal attribute model in explaining justices' voting behavior.