Nuclear stopping and energy deposition into the central rapidity region of ultrarelativistic heavy-ion collisions are studied through the application of a model incorporating hydrodynamic baryon flow coupled to a self-consistent field calculated in the flux tube model. Ultrarelativistic heavy ion collisions are modeled in which the nuclei have passed through each other and as a result are charged and heated.

The emittance of the beams in both high energy, electron-positron colliders and synchrotron light sources is limited by collective beam interactions with the structure of the damping (or storage) rings. A novel linear damper offers the possibility of reducing the emittance by another factor of a few. The underlying physical principle is that high energy, high current, low emittance beams can emit copious hard gammas as synchrotron radiation and cool in the presence of megagauss magnetic fields. These fields can be provided by the beam itself in the presence of a low density gas.

The power conditioning system for the High Average Power Laser program at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) is described. The system has been operational for two years. It is high voltage, high power, fault protected, and solid state. The power conditioning system drives flashlamps that pump solid state lasers. Flashlamps are driven by silicon control rectifier (SCR) switched, resonant charged, (LC) discharge pulse forming networks (PFNs). The system uses fiber optics for control and diagnostics. Energy and thermal diagnostics are monitored by computers.

This paper describes a model for evaluating the late (after-the-fact) detection capability of material control and accountability (MCandA) systems against insider theft or diversion of special nuclear material. Potential insider cover-up strategies to defeat activities providing detection (e.g., inventories) are addressed by the model in a tractable manner. For each potential adversary and detection activity, two probabilities are assessed and used to fit the model. The model then computes the probability of detection for activities occurring periodically over time. The model provides insight into MCandA effectiveness and helps identify areas for safeguards improvement. 4 refs., 4 tabs.

This paper describes analytic tools we developed to quantify the effectiveness of safeguards against theft of special nuclear material by insiders. These tools help identify vulnerabilities in existing safeguards, suggest potential improvements, and help assess the benefits of these upgrades prior to implementation. Alone, these tools are not sufficient for safeguards planning, since the cost of implementing all suggested upgrades almost always exceeds the available resources. This paper describes another tool we developed to allow comparsion of benefits of various upgrades to identify those upgrade packages that achieve the greatest improvement in protection for a given cost and to provide a priority ranking among cost-effective packages, thereby helping decision-makers select the upgrades to implement and highlight the mount of residual risk. 5 refs., 3 figs.