Attached is a secret draft of 300 Area expansion for the proposed ``X`` Program (600 MWD level for indefinite period) made up of the following: (1) assumptions; (2) present facilities and to what extent inadequate; (3) description of proposed work; (4) advantages to be gained and justification for proposed work; (5) why existing or alternate facilities cannot be used; (6) estimate of cost; and (7) attachments.

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NpC and Pu{sub 2}O{sub 3} have been identified by x-ray diffraction. NpC is face-centered cubic, NaCl structure with a = 5.004 {+-} 0.005 A Pu{sub 2}O{sub 3} is isomorphous with the hexagonal ''A form'' for the rare earth sesquioxides with a = 3.840 {+-} 0.004 A; c = 5.957 {+-} 0.006 A and has essentially the same atomic parameters at La{sub 2}O{sub 3}. The lattice dimensions are smaller than predicted for pure Pu{sub 2}O{sub 3}, implying that the average oxidation number of plutonium is between (III) and (IV).

It is the purpose of this document to describe the proposed modifications to the cooling water treatment process used in reactor areas B, D, F, DR and H.

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It is the purpose of this report to: Review the factors which should be considered in selecting either the 200 West Area or the 200 East Area of Hanford Works as the site for a proposed separations facility, particularly from the standpoint of economics, operating convenience, and assurance of continuity of production, and make recommendations as to the location of the proposed facility.

It is important that the design of the safety control system for RDA-DC3 be firmed up as soon as possible. This is necessary so that the detailed design of the graphite stack and other components can proceed. One design objective for RDA-DC-3 was the use of an all ball system for the safety system. The questionable feature of such a system from a mechanical and operating standpoint is the requirement that the balls be returned to the hoppers in about 10 minutes. This stringent requirement can be eliminated by having enough rods to provide control for shutdowns not involving severe emergencies and tripping balls only for those severe cases where rod control is not adequate. Any emergency which would trip the balls would be infrequent as well as so severe that the pile would be down for a period exceeding the minimum recovery time (about 30--45 minutes) and therefore would have to remain shut down for 30 hours or more. In such a case, the requirements for a ball return system can easily be met. The system proposed for RDA-DC-3 is a combination of about 60 ball slots with 35--40 rods.