The following casualty data was compiled by the Department of Defense (DOD), as tallied from the agency's press release. Table 1 provides statistics on fatalities during Operation Iraqi Freedom, which began on March 19, 2003, and is ongoing, as well as on the number of fatalities since May 1, 2003, plus statistics on those wounded, but not killed, since March 19, 2003. More frequent updates are available at DOD's website at [http://www.defenselink.mil/news/] under "Casualty Update." A detailed casualty summary that includes data on deaths by cause, as well as statistics on soldiers wounded in action, is available at the following DOD website: [http://siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/personnel/CASUALTY/castop.htm].

The following casualty data was compiled by the Department of Defense (DOD), as tallied from the agency's press release. Table 1 provides statistics on fatalities during Operation Iraqi Freedom, which began on March 19, 2003, and is ongoing, as well as on the number of fatalities since May 1, 2003, plus statistics on those wounded, but not killed, since March 19, 2003. More frequent updates are available at DOD's website at [http://www.defenselink.mil/news/] under "Casualty Update." A detailed casualty summary that includes data on deaths by cause, as well as statistics on soldiers wounded in action, is available at the following DOD website: [http://siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/personnel/CASUALTY/castop.htm].

The following casualty data was compiled by the Department of Defense (DOD), as tallied from the agency's press release. Table 1 provides statistics on fatalities during Operation Iraqi Freedom, which began on March 19, 2003, and is ongoing, as well as on the number of fatalities since May 1, 2003, plus statistics on those wounded, but not killed, since March 19, 2003. More frequent updates are available at DOD's website at [http://www.defenselink.mil/news/] under "Casualty Update." A detailed casualty summary that includes data on deaths by cause, as well as statistics on soldiers wounded in action, is available at the following DOD website: [http://siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/personnel/CASUALTY/castop.htm].

The following casualty data was compiled by the Department of Defense (DOD), as tallied from the agency's press release. Table 1 provides statistics on fatalities during Operation Iraqi Freedom, which began on March 19, 2003, and is ongoing, as well as on the number of fatalities since May 1, 2003, plus statistics on those wounded, but not killed, since March 19, 2003. More frequent updates are available at DOD's website at [http://www.defenselink.mil/news/] under "Casualty Update." A detailed casualty summary that includes data on deaths by cause, as well as statistics on soldiers wounded in action, is available at the following DOD website: [http://siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/personnel/CASUALTY/castop.htm].

The following casualty data was compiled by the Department of Defense (DOD), as tallied from the agency's press release. Table 1 provides statistics on fatalities during Operation Iraqi Freedom, which began on March 19, 2003, and is ongoing, as well as on the number of fatalities since May 1, 2003, plus statistics on those wounded, but not killed, since March 19, 2003. More frequent updates are available at DOD's website at [http://www.defenselink.mil/news/] under "Casualty Update." A detailed casualty summary that includes data on deaths by cause, as well as statistics on soldiers wounded in action, is available at the following DOD website: [http://siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/personnel/CASUALTY/castop.htm].

Construction of the New Embassy Compound (NEC) in Baghdad is completed and, as of early August 2008, about 50% of post staff have moved in. Construction problems and additional requirements, including adding space at the embassy compound for General Patraeus and his staff, as requested in a mid-2007 report by State's then- Director of Management and Planning, delayed the opening by a year and raised the cost from the original $592 million estimate to about $736 million. The Department of State has a goal of having all U.S. government personnel moved in by the end of 2008.

Iraq's political system, the result of a U.S.-supported election process, continues to be riven by sectarianism and ethnic and factional infighting. The Administration asserts that the passage of key laws in 2008 will help heal remaining rifts and continue to reduce violence. Others see the schisms widening as Iraqi leaders wrangle over unresolved issues that are complicating the holding of provincial elections.

Iraq's current government, the result of a U.S.-supported election process designed to produce democracy, continues to be riven by sectarianism and factional infighting. However, the Administration says that the passage of some key laws in 2008 represents major progress on national reconciliation and that planned provincial elections will help heal remaining communal rifts.

Iraq's political system, the result of a U.S.-supported election process, continues to be riven by sectarianism and ethnic and factional infighting. The Administration is optimistic that the passage of key laws in 2008, including a law to govern provincial elections to be held in early 2009, will sustain recent reductions in violence.

Iraq's current government, the result of a U.S.-supported election process designed to produce democracy, is instead a sectarian government incapable of reconciliation. The Administration says that the passage of some key laws represents progress on national reconciliation, and is a result of the U.S. "troop surge." Others say that combat among Shiite groups since March 2008, possibly motivated by provincial elections planned for October 2008, shows that force will not stabilize Iraq.

The Kurdish-inhabited region of northern Iraq is relatively peaceful and prospering economically, but the Iraqi Kurds' political autonomy and political strength in post- Saddam Iraq is causing friction with Arab leaders in Iraq, Turkey, and Iran. However, an overall reduction in violence in Iraq, coupled with continued U.S. political influence over the Kurds, is likely to prevent a destabilizing escalation of the Iraqi Kurd-Arab disputes. Also see CRS Report RL31339, Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and Security, by Kenneth Katzman.

The Kurdish-inhabited region of northern Iraq is relatively peaceful and prospering economically, but the Iraqi Kurds' political autonomy and political strength in post- Saddam Iraq is causing friction with Arab leaders in Iraq, Turkey, and Iran. However, an overall reduction in violence in Iraq, coupled with continued U.S. political influence over the Kurds, is likely to prevent a destabilizing escalation of the Iraqi Kurd-Arab disputes. Also see CRS Report RL31339, Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and Security, by Kenneth Katzman.

The Kurdish-inhabited region of northern Iraq is relatively peaceful and prospering economically, but the Iraqi Kurds' political autonomy and political strength in post- Saddam Iraq is causing friction with Arab leaders in Iraq, Turkey, and Iran. However, an overall reduction in violence in Iraq, coupled with continued U.S. political influence over the Kurds, is likely to prevent a destabilizing escalation of the Iraqi Kurd-Arab disputes. Also see CRS Report RL31339, Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and Security, by Kenneth Katzman.

A 1996 amendment to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) enables American victims of international terrorist acts supported by certain States designated by the State Department as supporters of terrorism - Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Sudan, Syria, and previously Iraq and Libya - to bring suit in U.S. courts to seek monetary damages. This report, which will be updated, provides an overview of these issues and relevant legislation (H.R. 5167).

A 1996 amendment to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) enables American victims of international terrorist acts supported by certain States designated by the State Department as supporters of terrorism - Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Sudan, Syria, and previously Iraq and Libya - to bring suit in U.S. courts to seek monetary damages. This report, which will be updated, provides an overview of these issues and relevant legislation (H.R. 5167).

Iran is materially assisting and influencing major Shiite Muslim factions in Iraq, most of which have ideological, political, and religious ties to Tehran. Among these factions is that of hardline anti-U.S. cleric Moqtada Al Sadr, whose Mahdi Army militia, according to some observers, serves as a proxy force for Tehran against the United States.

Iran is materially assisting and influencing major Shiite Muslim factions in Iraq, most of which have ideological, political, and religious ties to Tehran. Among these factions is that of hardline anti-U.S. cleric Moqtada Al Sadr, whose Mahdi Army militia, according to some observers, serves as a proxy force for Tehran against the United States.

Iran is materially assisting and attempting to influence, in most cases against the United States, major Shiite Muslim factions in Iraq, most of which have ideological, political, and religious ties to Tehran. The Administration asserts that Tehran is actively directing, training, and arming Shiite militiamen linked, to varying degrees, to hardline anti-U.S. cleric Moqtada Al Sadr. Some analysts see a virtual "proxy war" between the United States and Iran inside Iraq.

Iran is materially assisting all major Shiite Muslim political factions in Iraq, most of which have longstanding ideological, political, and religious ties to Tehran, and their armed militias. The Administration notes growing involvement by Tehran in actively directing training, and arming Shiite militiamen linked, to varying degrees, to hardline cleric Moqtada Al Sadr. Some analysis goes so far as to see a virtual "proxy war" between the United States and Iran inside Iraq.

With a conventional military and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) threat from Saddam Hussein's regime removed, Iran seeks to ensure that Iraq can never again become a threat to Iran, either with or without U.S. forces present in Iraq. By supporting armed Shiite factions, Iran's influence in Iraq has at times hindered U.S. efforts to stabilize Iraq, and has heightened the U.S. threat perception of Iran generally. However, Iran faces difficult choices in Iraq now that its protege Shiite factions, formerly united, are competing and often fighting each other.

Iran is materially assisting and influencing major Shiite Muslim factions in Iraq, most of which have ideological, political, and religious ties to Tehran. The Shiite faction of paramount concern to the Administration is that of Moqtada Al Sadr, whose Mahdi Army militia has periodically battled U.S. and Iraqi government forces, although it is currently relatively quiescent.

Varying media estimates of military forces in Iraq have raised concerns about the actual number of troops deployed in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). Last year, a major announcement on a surge in troop deployments to Iraq by President Bush included a planned gradual increase of more than 20,000 U.S. troops on the ground in Baghdad and Anbar province over several months. Since the "new strategy for Iraq" speech by the President in January 2007, troop deployments gradually increased during the months of February through October 2007 but decreased beginning in November 2007. This report provides solely Department of Defense (DOD) statistical information on U.S. forces serving in Iraq. It also provides brief official information on the military units schedule for the next rotation of duty into Iraq.

This report presents various governmental and non-governmental estimates of Iraqi police and security forces fatalities. The Department of Defense (DOD) regularly updates total U.S. military deaths and wounded statistics from Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), as reflected in CRS Report RS21578, Iraq: U.S. Casualties, and has released the monthly pattern of Iraqi security forces deaths. For information on Iraqi civilian deaths, see CRS Report RS22537, Iraqi Civilian Deaths Estimates. Because these estimates are based on varying time periods and have been created using differing methodologies, readers should exercise caution when using them and should look on them as guideposts rather than as statements of fact.

This report presents various governmental and nongovernmental estimates of Iraqi civilian dead and wounded. The Department of Defense (DOD) regularly updates total U.S. military death and wounded statistics from Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). However, no Iraqi or U.S. government office regularly releases publicly available statistics on Iraqi civilian deaths or civilians who have been wounded. Statistics on Iraqi civilian dead and wounded are sometimes available through alternative sources, such as nonprofit organizations, or through statements made by officials to the press. Because these estimates are based on varying time periods and have been created using differing methodologies, readers should exercise caution when using these statistics and should look on them as guideposts rather than as statements of fact.