This website contains information about the Commission on Wartime Contracting (CWC), which was established to study contracting for military activities in Iraq and Afghanistan such as waste, fraud, abuse, and mismanagement of contracts. The site provides information about the commission's activities and copies of its reports, including two interim reports, five special reports, and a final report on "Transforming Wartime Contracting."

This report provides background, discussing constitutional provisions allocating war powers between Congress and the President, and presenting a historical overview of relevant court cases.

This report begins by discussing the current legal framework governing U.S. military operations in Iraq. The report then provides a general background as to the types of international agreements that are binding upon the United States, as well as considerations affecting whether they take the form of a treaty or an executive agreement. Next, the report discusses historical precedents as to the role that security agreements have taken, with specific attention paid to past agreements entered with Afghanistan, Germany, Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines. The report then discusses the oversight role that Congress plays with respect to entering and implementing international agreements involving the United States. Finally, the report describes legislation proposed in the 110th Congress to ensure congressional participation in the conclusion of a security agreement between the United States and Iraq.

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This report examines logistical support contracts for troop support services in Iraq primarily administered through the U.S. Army's Logistics Civil Augmentation Program(LOGCAP).

This report examines logistical support contracts for troop support services in Iraq, primarily administered through the U.S. Army's Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP).

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This report discusses the Department of Defense (DOD) fuel costs in Iraq. It analyzes the disparity between the higher price of fuel supplied to the United States Central Command compared to Iraq's civilian population that has been a point of contention.

Since the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the average price of fuels purchased for military operations in Iraq has steadily increased. The disparity between the higher price of fuel supplied to the United States Central Command compared to Iraq's civilian population has been a point of contention. Several factors contribute to the disparity, including the different types of fuel used by the military compared to Iraqi civilians, the Iraqi government's price subsidies, and the level pricing that the DOD's Defense Logistics Agency charges for military customers around the world. The Iraqi government has been pressured to reduce its fuel subsidy and black market fuel prices remain higher than the official subsidized price.

This report outlines Iran's activities and influence in Iraq. Iran is materially assisting major Shiite Muslim political factions in Iraq, most of which have longstanding ideological, political, and religious ties to Tehran, and their armed militias.

Iran is materially assisting and influencing major Shiite Muslim factions in Iraq, most of which have ideological, political, and religious ties to Tehran. Among these factions is that of hardline anti-U.S. cleric Moqtada Al Sadr, whose Mahdi Army militia, according to some observers, serves as a proxy force for Tehran against the United States.

Iran is materially assisting and influencing major Shiite Muslim factions in Iraq, most of which have ideological, political, and religious ties to Tehran. Among these factions is that of hardline anti-U.S. cleric Moqtada Al Sadr, whose Mahdi Army militia, according to some observers, serves as a proxy force for Tehran against the United States.

Iran is materially assisting and attempting to influence, in most cases against the United States, major Shiite Muslim factions in Iraq, most of which have ideological, political, and religious ties to Tehran. The Administration asserts that Tehran is actively directing, training, and arming Shiite militiamen linked, to varying degrees, to hardline anti-U.S. cleric Moqtada Al Sadr. Some analysts see a virtual "proxy war" between the United States and Iran inside Iraq.

Iran is materially assisting all major Shiite Muslim political factions in Iraq, most of which have longstanding ideological, political, and religious ties to Tehran, and their armed militias. The Administration notes growing involvement by Tehran in actively directing training, and arming Shiite militiamen linked, to varying degrees, to hardline cleric Moqtada Al Sadr. Some analysis goes so far as to see a virtual "proxy war" between the United States and Iran inside Iraq.

With a conventional military and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) threat from Saddam Hussein's regime removed, Iran seeks to ensure that Iraq can never again become a threat to Iran, either with or without U.S. forces present in Iraq. By supporting armed Shiite factions, Iran's influence in Iraq has at times hindered U.S. efforts to stabilize Iraq, and has heightened the U.S. threat perception of Iran generally. However, Iran faces difficult choices in Iraq now that its protege Shiite factions, formerly united, are competing and often fighting each other.

Iran is materially assisting and influencing major Shiite Muslim factions in Iraq, most of which have ideological, political, and religious ties to Tehran. The Shiite faction of paramount concern to the Administration is that of Moqtada Al Sadr, whose Mahdi Army militia has periodically battled U.S. and Iraqi government forces, although it is currently relatively quiescent.

This report reviews proposed legislation and contracts, analyzes the positions of various Iraqi political actors, and discusses potential implications for U.S. foreign policy goals in Iraq.

This report reviews policy proposals and interim contracts, analyzes the positions of various Iraqi political actors, and discusses potential implications for U.S. foreign policy goals in Iraq.

This report reviews policy proposals and interim contracts, analyzes the positions of various Iraqi political actors, and discusses potential implications for U.S. foreign policy goals in Iraq.

Iraq's political system, the result of a U.S.-supported election process, continues to be riven by sectarianism and ethnic and factional infighting. The Administration is optimistic that the passage of key laws in 2008, including a law to govern provincial elections to be held in early 2009, will sustain recent reductions in violence.

Iraq's political system, the result of a U.S.-supported election process, continues to be riven by sectarianism and ethnic and factional infighting. The Administration asserts that the passage of key laws in 2008 will help heal remaining rifts and continue to reduce violence. Others see the schisms widening as Iraqi leaders wrangle over unresolved issues that are complicating the holding of provincial elections.

Iraq's current government, the result of a U.S.-supported election process designed to produce democracy, continues to be riven by sectarianism and factional infighting. However, the Administration says that the passage of some key laws in 2008 represents major progress on national reconciliation and that planned provincial elections will help heal remaining communal rifts.

Iraq's political system, the result of a U.S.-supported election process, continues to be riven by sectarianism and ethnic and factional infighting. The Administration is optimistic that the passage of key laws in 2008, including a law to govern provincial elections to be held in early 2009, will sustain recent reductions in violence.

Iraq's current government, the result of a U.S.-supported election process designed to produce democracy, is instead a sectarian government incapable of reconciliation. The Administration says that the passage of some key laws represents progress on national reconciliation, and is a result of the U.S. "troop surge." Others say that combat among Shiite groups since March 2008, possibly motivated by provincial elections planned for October 2008, shows that force will not stabilize Iraq.