A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) uses the Air Transportation Oversight System (ATOS), which was developed around the principles of system safety, to oversee seven "legacy airlines" and nine other airlines. In this report, we refer to airlines that are not in ATOS as non-legacy airlines. Two other processes are used to oversee 99 non-legacy passenger airlines, which represent a fast-growing segment of the commercial aviation passenger industry and carried about 200 million passengers in 2004. The National Work Program Guidelines (NPG) establishes a set of inspection activities for non-legacy airlines. The Surveillance and Evaluation Program (SEP) uses principles of system safety to identify additional risk-based inspections for those airlines. GAO's objective was to assess the processes used by FAA to ensure the safety of non-legacy passenger airlines. GAO reviewed the strengths of FAA's inspection oversight for non-legacy passenger airlines and the issues that hinder its effectiveness."

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Mandated to screen all checked baggage using explosive detection systems at airports by December 31, 2003, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) deployed two types of screening equipment: explosives detection systems (EDS), which use computer-aided tomography X-rays to recognize the characteristics of explosives, and explosives trace detection (ETD) systems, which use chemical analysis to detect traces of explosive material vapors or residues. This testimony discusses (1) TSA's deployment of EDS and ETD systems and the impact of initially deploying these systems, (2) TSA and airport actions to install EDS machines in-line with baggage conveyor systems, and the federal resources made available for this purpose, and (3) actions taken by TSA to optimally deploy checked baggage screening systems."

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "In 2004, an estimated 23 billion pounds of air cargo was transported within the United States, about a quarter of which was transported on passenger aircraft. Within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is responsible for ensuring the security of commercial aviation, including the transportation of cargo by air. To evaluate the status of TSA's efforts to secure domestic air cargo, GAO examined (1) the extent to which TSA used a risk management approach to guide decisions on securing air cargo, (2) the actions TSA has taken to ensure the security of air cargo and the factors that may limit their effectiveness, and (3) TSA's plans for enhancing air cargo security and the challenges TSA and industry stakeholders face in implementing these plans."

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The U.S. Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS) has undergone a number of changes in recent years, including a 2003 transfer from the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) to the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Bureau (ICE), and a 2005 transfer from ICE back to TSA. A key aspect of federal air marshals' operating procedures is the discreet movement through airports as they check in for their flight, transit screening checkpoints, and board the aircraft. This report discusses FAMS's (1) transfer to ICE and key practices that could facilitate its return to TSA, and (2) management of mission-related incidents that affect air marshals' ability to operate discreetly."

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Training flight and cabin crew members to handle potential threats against domestic aircraft is an important element in securing our nation's aviation system. The responsibility for ensuring that crew members are prepared to handle these threats is a shared responsibility between the private sector--air carriers--and the federal government, primarily the Transportation Security Administration (TSA). This report addresses (1) actions TSA has taken to develop guidance and standards for flight and cabin crew member security training and to measure the effectiveness of the training, (2) how TSA ensures domestic air carriers comply with the training guidance and standards, and (3) efforts TSA has taken to develop and assess the effectiveness of its voluntary self-defense training program."

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is developing a new passenger prescreening program, known as Secure Flight. Under the Secure Flight program, TSA plans to take over, from commercial airlines, the responsibility for comparing identifying information of domestic airline passengers against information on known or suspected terrorists. TSA is also considering using commercial data as part of Secure Flight if the data are shown, through testing, to improve the results of these comparisons. In the 2005 Homeland Security Appropriations Act, Congress mandated that, prior to testing the use of commercial data for Secure Flight, TSA develop measures to assess the impacts of using commercial data on aviation security, and that GAO review the measures. In response to that mandate, we reviewed TSA's measures for commercial data testing and briefed congressional staff on January 11, 2005, on our findings. This report documents the results of our review, which we presented in that briefing."

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The screening of airport passengers and their checked baggage is a critical component in securing our nation's commercial aviation system. Since May 2003, GAO has issued six products related to screener training and performance. This report updates the information presented in the prior products and incorporates results from GAO's survey of 155 Federal Security Directors--the ranking Transportation Security Administration (TSA) authority responsible for the leadership and coordination of TSA security activities at the nation's commercial airports. Specifically, this report addresses (1) actions TSA has taken to enhance training for passenger and checked baggage screeners and screening supervisors, (2) how TSA ensures that screeners complete required training, and (3) actions TSA has taken to measure and enhance screener performance in detecting threat objects."

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Among its efforts to strengthen aviation security, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is developing a new passenger prescreening system--known as Secure Flight. As required by Congress, TSA is planning to assume, through Secure Flight, the prescreening function currently performed by the air carriers. This report assesses the (1) status of Secure Flight's development and implementation, (2) factors that could influence the effectiveness of Secure Flight, (3) processes used to oversee and manage the Secure Flight program, and (4) efforts taken to minimize the impacts on passengers and protect passenger rights. In conducting this assessment, we addressed the 10 specific areas of congressional interest related to Secure Flight outlined in Public Law 108-334."

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Mandated to screen all checked baggage using explosive detection systems at airports by December 31, 2003, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) deployed two types of screening equipment: explosives detection systems (EDS), which use computer-aided tomography X-rays to recognize the characteristics of explosives, and explosives trace detection (ETD) systems, which use chemical analysis to detect traces of explosive material vapors or residues. This report assesses (1) TSA's use of budgeted funds to install EDS and ETD systems and the impact of initially deploying these systems, (2) TSA and airport actions to install EDS machines in-line with baggage conveyor systems, and the federal resources made available for this purpose, and (3) actions taken by TSA to optimally deploy checked baggage screening systems."

Correspondence issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "We have been reviewing the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) efforts to develop and implement the Secure Flight program. The purpose of Secure Flight is to compare information on domestic airline passengers against information on known or suspected terrorists to identify passengers who should undergo additional security scrutiny. As we reported in February and March 2005, to develop Secure Flight, TSA has been conducting tests to compare data from airline reservation systems, such as name and flight number, with data from the government's consolidated terrorist watch lists, which include names of known and suspected terrorists. We also reported that TSA has been testing the use of selected data available from commercial data sources--private companies that maintain records on individual names, addresses, phone numbers, and other information--as a means of verifying the accuracy of passenger-provided data. In this letter, we report on key aspects of TSA's disclosure of its use of personal information during commercial data testing for Secure Flight as required by the Privacy Act, and TSA's actions to more fully disclose its use of personal information. We will continue our assessment of Secure …

A chapter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The Department of Defense (DOD) relies on a relatively small cadre of officials to develop and deliver weapon systems. In view of the importance of DOD's investment in weapon systems, we have undertaken an extensive body of work that examines DOD's acquisition issues from a perspective that draws lessons learned from the best commercial product development efforts to see if they apply to weapon system acquisitions. In response to a request from the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member of the Subcommittee on Readiness and Management Support, Senate Committee on Armed Services, this report assesses (1) how successful commercial companies position their program managers, (2) how DOD positions its program managers, and (3) underlying reasons for the differences. In compiling this report, GAO conducted a survey of program managers. See GAO-06-112SP."

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "In 1999, the Department of Health and Human Services' (HHS) Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) began funding jurisdictions' efforts to prepare for bioterrorism attacks through the Public Health Preparedness and Response for Bioterrorism program. After the events of September 11, 2001, and the 2001 anthrax incidents, program funds increased almost twentyfold. Citing jurisdictions' unexpended program funds, HHS reallocated some fiscal year 2004 funds to support other local and national bioterrorism initiatives. Jurisdictions and associations representing jurisdictions disputed HHS's assertion that large amounts of funds remain unused, noting that HHS did not acknowledge obligated funds that had not yet been expended. GAO was asked to provide information on (1) the extent to which jurisdictions had expended the fiscal year 2002 funds awarded for the program's third budget period as of August 30, 2003, and August 31, 2004, and the fiscal year 2003 funds awarded for the program's fourth budget period, as of August 30, 2004; (2) the extent to which fiscal year 2001, 2002, and 2003 funds awarded for the third and fourth budget periods remained unobligated as of August 30, 2004; and (3) factors …

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The U.S. Border Patrol, a component of the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) agency, a part of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), aims to apprehend persons who illegally enter the United States between official ports of entry, including potential terrorists, aliens, and contraband smugglers, thereby deterring or stopping illegal activity. The Patrol operates permanent and tactical (temporary) interior traffic checkpoints on major and secondary U.S. roads, mainly in the southwest border states where most illegal entries occur, as part of a multi-layer strategy to maximize detection and apprehension of illegal entrants. This report addresses (1) the role of interior checkpoints in the Patrol's strategy; (2) what is known about checkpoint costs and benefits; and (3) how checkpoints are evaluated and what performance measures indicate regarding their effectiveness."

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The Homeland Security Act of 2002 required that the Department of Homeland Security's on-site personnel in Saudi Arabia review all visa applications. The act also authorized the expansion of the Visa Security Program to other embassies and consulates to provide expert advice and training to consular officers, among other things. Given the congressional interest in effective implementation of the Visa Security Program, we assessed (1) the Visa Security Officers' activities in Saudi Arabia, and (2) DHS's plans to expand its Visa Security Program to other consular posts overseas."

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Issuing a U.S. visa to a foreign citizen in exchange for money or something of value is a crime that can facilitate entry into the United States of unqualified persons, including those who may wish to do our country harm. Internal controls make it difficult for an employee to commit visa malfeasance without being detected, but, despite these safeguards, visa malfeasance does occur. GAO examined (1) State's internal controls to prevent nonimmigrant visa malfeasance and if they are being implemented and (2) visa malfeasance cases from 2001-2004 and factors cited by State and the Department of Justice (Justice) that contributed to visa malfeasance and affected investigations and prosecutions."

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Three agencies of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) have primary responsibility for securing the nation's borders--the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). Together, they enforce security across 7,500 miles of land border between the United States and Mexico and Canada, and protect more than 361 seaports and 95,000 miles of coastline. To fulfill their missions, these agencies deploy a variety of valuable air and marine assets. In this report, GAO analyzed (1) what efforts DHS has undertaken to facilitate coordination of the air and marine assets of the three agencies and (2) how the agencies' local air and marine units have, in selected areas, coordinated the use of assets and what challenges they faced."

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "In February 2004, GAO reported that improvements were needed in the time taken to adjudicate visas for science students and scholars. Specifically, a primary tool used to screen these applicants for visas (the Visas Mantis program) was operating inefficiently. We found that it took an average of 67 days to process Mantis checks, and many cases were pending for 60 days or more. GAO also found that the way in which information was shared among agencies prevented cases from being resolved expeditiously. Finally, consular officers lacked sufficient program guidance. This report discusses the time to process Mantis checks and assesses actions taken and timeframes for improving the Mantis program."

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "In adjudicating a visa application, Department of State (State) consular officers are on the front line of defense against those whose entry would likely be harmful to U.S. national interests. In October 2002, we identified shortcomings and made recommendations on the role of national security in the visa process. This testimony discusses our report issued today on actions taken since our 2002 report to strengthen the visa process, as well as areas that deserve additional management actions. It also discusses our July 2005 report on the status of the assignment of Department of Homeland Security (DHS) personnel to U.S. consular posts overseas."

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "GAO reported in October 2002 that the visa process needed to be strengthened as an antiterrorism tool and recommended that the Secretary of State, in consultation with appropriate agencies, (1) develop a clear policy on the role of national security in the visa process, (2) create more comprehensive guidance on how consular officers should screen against potential terrorists, (3) fundamentally reassess staffing requirements, and (4) revamp and expand consular training. This report examines State's and other agencies' progress in implementing changes to the visa process since 2002, in the areas of policy and guidance; consular resources, including staffing and training; and information sharing."

Correspondence issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The Department of Defense (DOD) submitted to the Congress on July 29, 2005 a report entitled Defense Commercial Communications Satellite Services Procurement Process. In response to direction from the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, we reviewed DOD's report to determine the extent to which it addressed the seven recommendations contained in our December 2003 report on how DOD procures fixed commercial satellite bandwidth services. On September 2, 2005, we briefed the Committee on the results of our review. This letter summarizes and transmits that briefing."

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Brownfields are properties whose re-use may be hindered by the threat of contamination. Cleaning up and redeveloping these properties can protect human health and the environment, and provide economic benefits. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) provides grants to state and local governments and others for site assessments, job training, revolving loans, cleanups, and for assisting state efforts. This testimony is based on GAO's report, Brownfield Redevelopment: Stakeholders Report That EPA's Program Helps to Redevelop Sites, but Additional Measures Could Complement Agency Efforts (GAO- 05-94, December 2, 2004). GAO (1) obtained stakeholders' views on EPA's contribution to brownfield cleanup and redevelopment, (2) determined the extent to which EPA measures program accomplishments, and (3) obtained views on options to improve or complement EPA's program. Stakeholders GAO surveyed included grant recipients, state program officials, interest groups, real estate developers, and others."

Correspondence issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "In connection with fulfilling our requirement to audit the financial statements of the U.S. government, we audited and reported on the Schedules of Federal Debt Managed by the Bureau of the Public Debt (BPD) for the fiscal years ended September 30, 2004 and 2003. As part of these audits, we performed a review of the general and application information security controls over key BPD financial systems. As we reported in connection with our audit of the Schedules of Federal Debt for the fiscal years ended September 30, 2004 and 2003, BPD maintained, in all material respects, effective internal control, including general and application information security controls, relevant to the Schedule of Federal Debt related to financial reporting and compliance with applicable laws and regulations as of September 30, 2004, that provided reasonable assurance that misstatements, losses, or noncompliance material in relation to the Schedule of Federal Debt would be prevented or detected on a timely basis. We found matters involving information security controls that we do not consider to be reportable conditions, but that nevertheless warrant BPD management's attention and action. This report presents the results of our …

Correspondence issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "As we and others have reported in the past, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has fundamental problems with its financial management operations that undermine its external financial reporting ability and thwart its efforts to effectively manage and oversee its major programs. In April 2000, NASA began addressing many of its financial and management challenges through its effort to implement a new integrated financial management system, known as the Integrated Financial Management Program (IFMP), which NASA expects to complete in fiscal year 2008. However, in April and November 2003--3 years into the IFMP implementation effort and with significant investment already made in the program--we issued a series of four reports that detailed weaknesses in NASA's acquisition and implementation strategy for IFMP. Specifically, we reported that NASA had not followed key best practices for acquiring and implementing IFMP and, therefore, was at risk of making a substantial investment in a financial management system that would fall far short of its stated goal of providing meaningful, reliable, and timely information to support effective day-to-day program management and external financial reporting. As part of the four reports we issued on …

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) Business Systems Modernization (BSM) program is a multibillion-dollar, high-risk, highly complex effort that involves the development and delivery of a number of modernized information systems intended to replace the agency's aging business and tax processing systems. As required by law, IRS submitted its fiscal year 2005 expenditure plan in April 2005 to congressional appropriations committees, requesting about $203 million from the BSM account. GAO's objectives in reviewing the plan were to (1) determine whether it satisfied the conditions specified in the law, (2) determine what progress IRS had made in implementing our prior recommendations, and (3) provide any other observations about the plan and IRS's BSM program."