A letter report issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "Since 1994, the United States has appropriated $227 million to support two multilateral science centers in Russia and Ukraine. The science centers pay scientists who once developed nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and missile systems for the Soviet Union to conduct peaceful research. By employing scientists at the science centers, the United States seeks to reduce the risks that these scientists could be tempted to sell their expertise to terrorists. This report examines the (1) selection procedures the State Department uses to fund projects that meet program objectives and (2) monitoring procedures the State Department uses to verify that scientists are working on the peaceful research they are paid to produce. GAO found that State lacks complete information on the total number and locations of senior scientists and has not been granted access to senior scientists at critical research institutes under the Russian Ministry of Defense. GAO also found that State has designed an interagency review process to select and fund research proposals submitted by weapons scientists to the science centers in Russia and Ukraine. The overall goal is to select projects that reduce proliferation risks …

A letter report issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "According to the current National Military Strategy the United States should be prepared to fight and win two nearly simultaneous wars in different parts of the world. Military policy calls for each of the services to acquire and maintain enough war material inventories to sustain a two-war scenario until the industrial base can resupply our armed forces. Because of limitations in the Army's process for determining war reserve spare parts requirements, however, the accuracy of the war reserve spare parts requirements and funding needs are uncertain. These limitations include (1) not using the best available data on the rate at which spare parts would be consumed during wartime for its war reserve spare parts requirements calculations, (2) having a potential mismatch between the Army's process for determining spare parts requirements for war reserves and how the Army plans to repair equipment on the battlefield, and (3) lacking a fact-based assessment of industrial base capacity to provide needed parts for the two-war scenario. Uncertainties are likely to persist for some time as the Army contemplates a significant transformation of its forces and other changes are considered affecting …