Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "In summary, based on our work to date, we have found that"

Correspondence issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "GPOs are subject to certain federal laws that HHS, DOJ, and FTC are responsible for enforcing. According to HHS Office of Inspector General (HHS-OIG) officials, since 2004, the office has not routinely exercised its authority to request and review disclosures related to GPOs’ contract administrative fees, but it has collected information on GPOs’ contract administrative fees while conducting audits of hospitals’ cost reports. While HHS-OIG is responsible for enforcing the Anti-Kickback statute, the law and regulation do not require routine monitoring of GPO written agreements and disclosures. HHS-OIG officials told us that even if they requested this information from GPOs, it would not necessarily be sufficient to determine whether a GPO violated the Anti-Kickback statute. Officials from HHS-OIG also told us that, since 2004, it participated in two case investigations with DOJ that involved allegations that certain GPOs did not comply with safe harbor requirements and violated the Anti-Kickback statute. Officials told us that HHS-OIG has not imposed administrative penalties on any GPOs since 2004. DOJ and FTC have investigated complaints related to federal antitrust laws, and we identified one lawsuit filed by DOJ against a GPO in …

Correspondence issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Labor and IGs from employing departments and agencies have consistently reported similar FECA program management challenges, such as oversight and information technology, and have linked these to increased program costs through improper payments. For example, one IG reported in 2007 that its department could not appropriately manage its long-term rolls and contain improper payments because staff assigned to this task spent no more than 10 percent of their time managing cases. Additionally, citing ongoing program weaknesses—mostly related to oversight—IGs have reported avoidable costs at employing departments and agencies, which one department reported were as high as $41 million in 2011. Above and beyond the actions departments and agencies can take to address these challenges, some IGs have also reported that legislative reform is necessary to better manage the program. In an effort to alleviate the impact of management challenges, IGs collectively made over 200 recommendations since 1994, mainly to improve FECA’s oversight, and most of these recommendations have been implemented."

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "For the third consecutive year, the Department of Housing and Urban Development’s (HUD) Federal Housing Administration (FHA) reported that the capital ratio for the Mutual Mortgage Insurance Fund—the ratio of the fund’s economic value to insurance obligations—has not met the 2 percent statutory minimum. FHA cites declines in the fund’s economic value due to higher-than-expected defaults, claims, and losses. At the same time, the other component of the ratio, insurance obligations, grew rapidly. The fund’s condition also worsened from a budgetary perspective, with balances in the fund’s capital reserve account reaching new lows. If the account were depleted, FHA would require more funds to help cover costs on insurance issued to date. FHA has indicated that it will narrowly avoid this scenario in fiscal year 2012. FHA enhanced methods for assessing the fund’s financial condition but has not fully addressed GAO’s 2010 recommendation for improving the reliability of its estimates. It relies on a single economic forecast, which does not fully account for variability in future house prices and interest rates. The approach GAO recommended would simulate numerous economic paths for house prices and interest rates would improve …

Correspondence issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "According to the Army’s Fiscal Year 2011 Report on the Prioritization of Funds for Equipment Readiness and Strategic Capability, issued in September 2011, the report addressed the requirements of the John Warner NDAA for Fiscal Year 2007 rather than the amended requirements stipulated in the Ike Skelton NDAA for Fiscal Year 2011. The report does include some information that addresses aspects of the updated reporting requirements. For example, the 2011 NDAA requires the Army to include a description of the status of the development of doctrine on how modular combat, functional, and support forces will train, be sustained, and fight. In addressing the old reporting requirements in the 2007 NDAA, the Army’s 2011 report discusses modifications to the modularity plan due to finalization of organizational designs and the need to reprioritize due to the emergence of higher-priority force-protection programs. However, the report does not mention the status of the development of doctrine on how modular combat, functional, and support forces will train, be sustained, and fight, as required by the current law."

A statement of record issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "FAA’s pilot training requirements for certification of commercial pilots are not aligned with airline operations or emphasize skills that airlines consider important for greater aviation safety."

Correspondence issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The following is a list of the specific data elements that we requested DOD provide an updated status as of December 31, 2011, for each of the ERPs."

Correspondence issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The full spectrum training mile metric is similar in some ways to the tank mile metric and dissimilar in other ways. Both metrics measure training activity of nondeployed units associated with recommended training events based on the Army's approved training strategy. Specifically, they both calculate the average number of miles a unit is expected to drive its vehicles on an annual basis for training that occurs during the reset and train/ready stages of the Army’s Force Generation (ARFORGEN) cycle."

Correspondence issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Stakeholders—health care industry groups and experts in antitrust law—had different perspectives on the adequacy of three key aspects of antitrust guidance for health care provider collaboration. First, stakeholders’ perspectives differed on the sufficiency of guidance on clinical integration, which involves integrating clinical activities across providers in a collaborative arrangement. Clinical integration is one way for a collaborative arrangement to satisfy the requirement that the arrangement demonstrate the potential to yield significant benefits, such as reduced costs or improved quality, in order to be able to jointly negotiate prices. Five of the six experts and one of the four industry groups said that agency guidance was sufficient, while one expert and two industry groups asserted that agency guidance on clinical integration was inadequate. Second, stakeholders’ perspectives differed as to whether the agencies should permit greater use of exclusive collaborative arrangements, which restrict the ability of providers within a collaborative arrangement to contract with other arrangements or health plans. The use of exclusive arrangements has the potential to improve or reduce competition, depending on the circumstances. Four of the experts said that the agencies’ guidance on exclusive arrangements was reasonable, …

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study 2016 (MCRS-16) provided some useful information concerning air mobility systems—such as intratheater airlift, strategic airlift, and air refueling—but several weaknesses in the study raised questions about its ability to fully inform decision makers. In particular, the MCRS-16 did not provide decision makers with recommendations concerning shortfalls and excesses in air mobility systems. In evaluating capabilities, the MCRS-16 used three cases that it developed of potential conflicts or natural disasters and identified the required capabilities for air mobility systems. Based on data in the MCRS-16, GAO was able to discern possible shortfalls or potential capacity that could be considered excess or an operational reserve, even though the MCRS-16 was ambiguous regarding whether actual shortfalls or excess capabilities exist. It also did not identify the risk associated with potential shortfalls or excesses. Identifying the risk associated with specific mobility systems could help with decisions to allocate resources."

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "In summary, based on our work to date, we have found that"

Correspondence issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "DISH is cooperating with the Special Master’s examination, which consists of examining DISH’s compliance with the royalty payment and household eligibility requirements of the license under Section 119. Since beginning his examination, the Special Master has been holding regular meetings with representatives of DISH and NAB, which represents the four major networks and their affiliates. The Special Master requested, and DISH provided, information on DISH’s royalty calculations and payments to the Copyright Office. The Special Master told us that he is satisfied with the information provided by DISH to date and is currently in the process of reviewing the methodology DISH used for its royalty payments. To determine whether any problems exist with DISH’s services to eligible subscribers, and whether a more detailed examination of DISH’s records may be needed, DISH and NAB are collaborating on a survey of all major network-affiliated television broadcast stations nationwide. According to the parties, the survey is to be distributed twice: once in February 2012 and again in May 2012, to ensure that affiliated stations are not having issues with DISH’s services. The Special Master has been kept apprised of the development …

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "NASA plans to use international partner and new domestic commercial launch vehicles to access, utilize, and sustain the International Space Station from 2012 through 2020. However, the agency faces challenges in transporting cargo and crew to the ISS as well as ensuring the station is fully utilized. NASA’s decision to rely on the new commercial vehicles to transport cargo starting in 2012 and to transport crew starting in 2017 is inherently risky because the vehicles are not yet proven and are experiencing delays in development. Further, NASA does not have agreements in place for international partners to provide cargo services to the ISS beyond 2016. The agency will also face a decision regarding the need to purchase additional seats on the Russian Soyuz vehicle beyond 2016, likely before commercial vehicles have made significant progress in development, given the three-year lead time necessary for acquiring a seat. This decision is further complicated because restrictions prohibit NASA from making certain payments to Russia in connection with the ISS unless the President makes a determination. Further, NASA currently expects to transport all cargo needed by the ISS in 51 flights through …

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "We found that the Army could not readily identify a complete population of Army payroll accounts for fiscal year 2010, given existing procedures and systems. The Army and DFAS-IN did not have an effective, repeatable process for identifying the population of active duty payroll accounts. In addition, the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC), DOD’s central source for personnel information, did not have an effective process for comparing military pay account files to military personnel files to identify a valid population of military payroll transactions. For example, it took 3 months and repeated attempts before DFAS-IN could provide a population of service members who received active duty Army military pay in fiscal year 2010. Similarly, it took DMDC over 2 months to compare the total number of fiscal year 2010 active duty payroll accounts to its database of personnel files. "Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government" requires all transactions and other significant events to be clearly documented and the documentation readily available for examination. DOD’s "Financial Improvement and Audit Readiness (FIAR) Guidance" sets out key tasks essential to achieving audit readiness, including defining and identifying the population …

Correspondence issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "In summary, we found the following:"

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Federal agencies reported an estimated $115.3 billion in improper payments in fiscal year 2011, a decrease of $5.3 billion from the prior year reported estimate of $120.6 billion. According to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), the $115.3 billion estimate was attributable to 79 programs spread among 17 agencies. Ten programs accounted for about $107 billion or 93 percent of the total estimated improper payments agencies reported. The reported decrease in fiscal year 2011 was primarily related to 3 programs—decreases in program outlays for the Unemployment Insurance program, and decreases in reported error rates for the Earned Income Tax Credit program and the Medicare Advantage program. Further, OMB reported that agencies recaptured $1.25 billion in improper payments to contractors and vendors."

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "GAO has reported on actions that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has taken to improve the security of the Visa Waiver Program; but, additional risks remain. In May 2011, GAO reported that DHS implemented the Electronic System for Travel Authorization (ESTA), required by the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (9/11 Act), and took steps to minimize the burden associated with this requirement. DHS requires Visa Waiver Program travelers to submit biographical information and answers to eligibility questions through ESTA prior to travel. DHS made efforts to minimize the burden imposed by this requirement. For example, although travelers formerly filled out a Visa Waiver Program application form for each journey to the United States, ESTA approval is generally valid for 2 years. However, GAO reported that DHS had not fully evaluated security risks related to the small percentage of travelers without verified ESTA approval. In 2010, airlines complied with the requirement to verify ESTA approval for almost 98 percent of Visa Waiver Program passengers prior to boarding, but the remaining 2 percent—about 364,000 travelers—traveled under the program without verified ESTA approval. In May 2011, …

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Last year, GAO testified that though acquisition problems still existed in many space programs, the Department of Defense (DOD) was beginning to launch satellites that had long been lagging behind schedule and it had taken positive actions to instill better practices and more focused leadership for space. Progress has continued. Over the past year, DOD launched the first Navy Mobile User Objective System (MUOS) satellite; the first, after a nine-year delay, of six Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) geosynchronous earth orbit (GEO) satellites; and the first Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) satellite—all of which will bring important capability to the warfighter. While these launches represent solid progress, there have also been some drawbacks. For instance, the second Global Positioning System (GPS) IIF satellite experienced technical problems that could shorten its operational lifetime. The cost of the first two GPS III satellites is at least18 percent higher than first estimated, up to $1.6 billion today. A 1-year delay is expected by SBIRS program officials on production of the 3rd and 4th GEO satellites along with a $438 million cost overrun. And, a termination of the Defense Weather Satellite System …

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Reliance on a global supply chain introduces multiple risks to federal information systems and underscores the importance of threat assessments and mitigation. Supply chain threats are present at various phases of a system’s development life cycle and could create an unacceptable risk to federal agencies. Key supply chain-related threats include"

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins ""

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The Social Security Administration (SSA) has made several changes to improve the process it uses for updating its medical criteria, but continues to face challenges ensuring timely updates. SSA’s medical criteria for adults are in the form of listings of medical conditions and impairments organized under 14 body systems, which SSA periodically updates. To help ensure timely, periodic updates of a body system’s listings, SSA is moving away from comprehensively revising a body system’s listings toward a more targeted approach, wherein SSA selects for revision those impairment listings most in need of change. To date, SSA has completed comprehensive revisions of listings for 8 of the 14 body systems and now is in the process of reviewing them to determine whether and which targeted revisions are appropriate. In 2010, the SSA Commissioner set a 5-year cycle time for updating listings for each body system, replacing the agency’s prior practice of setting expiration dates for listings that ranged from 3 to 8 years and then frequently extending them. To further increase the timeliness and accuracy of decisions, SSA has sought recommendations from the Institute of Medicine and has acted …

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "HUD has made progress in implementing prior GAO recommendations on modernizing its IT environment; however more actions are needed. In 2009, GAO reported that HUD lacked key IT management controls; which are essential to achieving successful outcomes. Specifically,"

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The President’s 4-year initiative is a worthwhile effort designed to accelerate U.S. and international efforts to secure nuclear material worldwide. However, as GAO reported in December 2010, the governmentwide strategy approved by the National Security Council (NSC) for the initiative lacked specific details regarding how the initiative will be implemented. As a result, key details associated with the initiative are unclear, including its overall estimated cost, time frame for completion of work, and scope of planned work. In its 2010 report, GAO recommended, among other things, that NSC lead the interagency development of a more detailed implementation plan for the President’s 4-year initiative. NSC did not comment on GAO’s recommendations."

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has updated and strengthened its strategy for how it plans to address GAO’s high-risk designation and resolve the department’s management challenges. In January 2011, DHS provided GAO with its Integrated Strategy for High Risk Management, which summarized the department’s preliminary plans for addressing the high-risk area. GAO found that this strategy, which was later updated in June and December 2011, was generally responsive to the actions and outcomes needed to address GAO’s high-risk designation. For example, the January 2011 strategy generally identified multiple, specific actions and target completion time frames consistent with the outcomes GAO identified. However, the strategy did not address the root causes of problems, among other things. In its June 2011 strategy, DHS, among other things, identified 10 root causes that cut across the management areas and their integration. GAO identified ways the strategy could be strengthened, including consistently reporting the progress of its initiatives and corrective actions. In its most recent update, DHS better positioned itself to address its management challenges. For example, for the first time, DHS included ratings of the department’s progress addressing its high-risk outcomes. …