This study examines the determinant and consequences of having a chief operating officer (COO). Specifically, we investigate chief executive officer (CEO) related factors that affect the choice to employ a COO and look into the impact of having a COO on firm operational efficiency using a data envelopment analysis (DEA)-based measure. Although prior literature has extensively investigated the role of CEOs and chief finance officers (CFOs) on firm outcomes, few studies focus on the impact of COOs. Thus, this study explores characteristics associated with the likelihood that a firm will have a COO. This research also sheds light on the effect of COOs on firm operational efficiency because the core duties of COOs include optimizing operational performance and improving cost efficiency. Our results imply that CEO busyness, CEO ability, CEO demographic characteristics, and CEO network size have a significant impact on the decision to employ a COO. We also find that firms that have a COO have a lower level of operational efficiency than firms that do not. This result implies that the cost of having a COO outweighs the benefit of having one. The effects last for three years on average. Further, we find that firms with a COO …

This dissertation examines whether managers influence corporate boards of directors in their auditor selection, change, and compensation decisions. This topic is important because it addresses concerns that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) is not effective in eliminating managerial influence over auditor engagement decisions and that it may provide a false sense of security to investors. These concerns are based on the implicit assumption that managers prefer weaker governance oversight and lower audit quality. However, empirical research testing associations between managerial influence and audit-related decisions post-SOX is scarce and generally guided by agency theory. Incorporating agency, stewardship, and resource dependence perspectives, I find that managerial preferences for auditor selection are not aligned. Specifically, CEOs positively influence the selection of higher quality auditors, whereas CFOs have the opposite effect. Further, CEOs who hold powerful roles as chairs of their companies' boards of directors appear to mitigate the negative influence of CFOs and inside directors on audit quality. CEOs serving in dual roles also oppose auditor turnover when lower earnings quality prompt higher demand for audit effort. Finally, my study provides some evidence that management exercises downward pressures on audit fees, suggesting that managers utilize their authority beyond the regulations established by …

Prior literature suggests that CEOs capitalize on their position within the hierarchy of all business executives, resulting in various – both positive and negative – firm outcomes. Using a novel data set on golf outings to measure the quality of a CEO's informal (vs. formal) network, as measured by the CEO's network centrality, this study examines whether well-connected CEOs generate private gains through insider trades. Results suggest that, among golfing CEOs, CEOs with higher quality informal networks generate significantly higher insider trading profits on sales of their firms' stock, consistent with more famous, powerful, and influential CEOs possessing superior information. The paper continues by delineating a channel through which private information flow to network participants by documenting significantly different golf patterns of CEOs during the two weeks before material firm events become public while showing that CEOs generate noticeably higher insider trading profits from stock trades executed during the two weeks following these golf outings. This study highlights a setting in which shareholders are at risk of wealth transfer and illustrates the potential limitations of regulation concerning insider trading.