Correspondence issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "In response to a Congressional request for information on waivers related to TANF, we addressed the following questions:"

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), a separately organized agency within the Department of Energy (DOE), has successfully ensured that the nuclear weapons stockpile remains safe and reliable by using state-of-the-art facilities as well as the skills of top scientists. Nevertheless, DOE’s and NNSA’s ineffective oversight of its contractors has contributed to many safety and security problems. As work carried out at NNSA’s sites involves dangerous nuclear materials such as plutonium and highly enriched uranium, stringent safety procedures and security requirements must be observed. In response to numerous serious safety incidents over several decades, DOE has taken steps to improve safety oversight. Recently, laboratory and other officials have raised concerns, however, that federal oversight has become excessive and overly burdensome. To address these concerns, DOE completed a safety and security reform effort to streamline or eliminate many DOE directives. However, GAO reported in April 2012 that the benefits of this reform effort are unclear because DOE did not determine if the original directives were, in fact, burdensome. In addition, the reform effort did not fully address safety concerns GAO and others identified in the areas of quality assurance, …

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "From fiscal years 2005 through 2011, the physical condition of the Coast Guard's legacy vessels was generally poor. A primary Coast Guard measure of a vessel's condition--the operational percent of time free of major casualties--shows that the high endurance cutters, medium endurance cutters, and patrol boats generally remained well below target levels from fiscal years 2005 through 2011."

Correspondence issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Since our 2004 report, Open World has taken a number of steps to address our recommendations on financial management controls, and has also generally followed leading financial management practices. For example, to address our recommendations, Open World (1) contracted with an independent public accountant to perform an assessment of its ability to be audited; (2) developed Financial Procedures and Directives guidance that covers key activities such as grants; (3) developed the Grant Procedures document, which enhanced accountability for its grantees; (4) submitted its financial statements to an annual financial statement audit since fiscal year 2005, resulting in clean audit opinions since fiscal year 2006; (5) established an audit committee, comprised of independent members that have financial and programmatic knowledge, which also reviews management's annual assessment of its internal controls; and (6) developed guidelines for grantees to calculate and report the estimated value of U.S. volunteers' contributed services, and also disclosed this value as part of its annual budget justification. Open World's financial management controls also generally followed leading practices for financial accountability. For example, Open World (1) developed appropriate policies, procedures, techniques, and mechanisms with respect to each …

Correspondence issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "According to DOD data, over 500,000 passengers used the space-available travel program from fiscal years 2009 through 2011. DOD data show that the five most-used air terminals have limited seats available. Specifically, seats for the three most-traveled destinations from each terminal were near capacity in Fiscal Year 2011. While there were some unused seats for space-available travel, these may be seats on routes with less-desirable destinations or during less-popular travel months. Additionally, DOD officials indicated that existing challenges with usage of the space-available travel program, adherence to DOD's original intent for the program, and air terminal logistics and maintenance would be exacerbated if the number of eligible passengers were to increase."

Correspondence issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "In summary, we found that DOD's fiscal year 2013 corrosion budget report to Congress (1) included some, but not all of the six mandated elements; (2) included a funding request that equals DOD's fiscal year 2013 stated requirements for corrosion activities and projects; and (3) lacked information needed to calculate the potential cost avoidance. First, DOD included three of the six mandated elements, did not include two of the elements, and one of the elements was not applicable this year. For example, DOD included the most recent annual corrosion reports of the military departments, attached in an annex. However, it did not include the funds requested in the budget compared to the funding requirements for the fiscal year covered by the report or the previous fiscal year. Second, DOD officials stated that the fiscal year 2013 budget request and the fiscal year 2013 funding requirements for activities and projects are the same this year--$9.1 million. According to these officials, DOD does not have any fiscal year 2013 unfunded requirements for corrosion activities and projects. Third, we did not calculate the cost avoidance DOD could achieve with its fiscal …

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "GAO's work has shown that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), through its component agencies, particularly the Coast Guard and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), have made substantial progress in implementing various programs that, collectively, have improved maritime security. In general, GAO's work on maritime security programs falls under four areas: (1) security planning, (2) port facility and vessel security, (3) maritime domain awareness and information sharing, and (4) international supply chain security. DHS has, among other things, developed various maritime security programs and strategies and has implemented and exercised security plans. For example, the Coast Guard has developed Area Maritime Security Plans around the country to identify and coordinate Coast Guard procedures related to prevention, protection, and security response at domestic ports. In addition, to enhance the security of U.S. ports, the Coast Guard has implemented programs to conduct annual inspections of port facilities. To enhance the security of vessels, both CBP and the Coast Guard receive and screen advance information on commercial vessels and their crews before they arrive at U.S. ports and prepare risk assessments based on this information. Further, DHS and its component …

Correspondence issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "DHS reported taking some steps to assess the realignment of its regional/field office structure. Since submitting an initial plan to Congress in 2004 that outlined regionalization, consolidation, and colocation opportunities, DHS officials said the agency considered the potential implementation of a unified regional field office structure through two major initiatives--the 2004 I-Staff review and the department's 2010 BUR. However, the I-Staff Regional Concept of Operations was not finalized or adopted, and in April 2012 a senior DHS official involved in the BUR effort stated that DHS no longer intends to implement the BUR recommendation related to regionalization because it is no longer the department's preferred approach. DHS had limited or no documentation related to either of these reviews, including the resulting key decisions from the efforts. As a result, we are unable to determine the extent to which DHS has fully considered the realignment of its regional/field office structure, including costs and benefits, since 2004. Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government calls for clear documentation of significant events, which include assumptions and methods surrounding key decisions, and the standards also state that this documentation should be …

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Future overseas contingencies are inherently uncertain, but effective planning for operational contract support can help reduce the risks posed by those uncertainties. The Department of Defense (DOD) has made an effort to emphasize the importance of operational contract support at the strategic level through new policy and guidance and ongoing efforts. For example, in January 2011, the Secretary of Defense issued a memorandum outlining actions and indicating a need to influence a cultural shift in how the department manages contracted support in a contingency environment. DOD has also recognized the need to translate strategic requirements into plans at the operational level, but GAO's past work has shown that DOD's progress in anticipating contractor support in sufficient detail in operation plans has been slow. As a result, DOD has risked not fully understanding the extent to which it will be relying on contractors to support combat operations and being unprepared to provide the necessary management and oversight of deployed contractor personnel. One way to help address this risk is to ensure military commanders and senior leaders are cognizant of the roles contractors have in supporting DOD's efforts and the …

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "In summary, we found that 68 of the 71 programs that responded to our survey reported that they experienced funding instability, faced workforce shortfalls, or that their planned capabilities changed after initiation. Most respondentsreported a combination of these challenges. We have previously reported that these challenges increase the likelihood acquisition programs will cost more and take longer to deliver capabilities than expected. Although DHS largely does not have reliable cost estimates and realistic schedules to accurately measure program performance, we used our survey results, cost information DHS provided to Congress, and an internal DHS review to identify 42 programs that experienced cost growth, schedule slips, or both. Further, using DHS's future-years funding plans - which aggregate funding levels to produce total project costs - we gained insight into the magnitude of the cost growth for 16 of the 42 programs. The total project costs for these 16 programs increased from $19.7 billion in 2008 to $52.2 billion in 2011, an aggregate increase of 166 percent."

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The November 2011 memorandum that discussed the management of the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) program was prepared based primarily on the observations of the former Director of the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Infrastructure Security Compliance Division (ISCD), a division of the Office of Infrastructure Protection (IP) within the National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD). The memorandum was intended to highlight various challenges that have hindered ISCD efforts to implement the CFATS program. According to the former Director, the challenges facing ISCD included not having a fully developed direction and plan for implementing the program, hiring staff without establishing need, and inconsistent ISCD leadership—factors that the Director believed place the CFATS program at risk. These challenges centered on three main areas: (1) human capital issues, including problems hiring, training, and managing ISCD staff; (2) mission issues, including problems reviewing facility plans to mitigate security vulnerabilities; and (3) administrative issues, including concerns about NPPD and IP not supporting ISCD’s management and administrative functions."

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has taken actions to validate the science underlying its behavior-based passenger screening program, the Screening of Passengers by Observation Techniques, or SPOT, program, but more work remains. GAO reported in May 2010 that (1) TSA deployed SPOT before first determining whether there was a scientifically valid basis for using behavior and appearance indicators to reliably identify passengers who may pose a risk; and (2) it is unknown if the SPOT program has ever resulted in the arrest of anyone who is a terrorist, or who was planning to engage in terrorist related activity, although there is other evidence that terrorists have transited through SPOT airports. GAO recommended in May 2010 that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) convene an independent panel of experts to review the methodology of the ongoing validation study on the SPOT program to determine whether it is sufficiently comprehensive to validate the program. DHS concurred and subsequently revised its validation study to include an independent expert review. DHS's study, completed in April 2011, found that SPOT was more effective than random screening to varying degrees; however, DHS noted limitations …

Correspondence issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The distribution of grant funding per person in poverty in cities was not consistently aligned with overall poverty rates. Most cities, with the exception of those cities with the highest poverty rates, received roughly the same amount of economic development funding per person living in poverty. Further, when we examined how grant funds are distributed to cities based on their unemployment rates, we also found that some cities with higher unemployment rates received less funding per unemployed person than other cities with lower unemployment rates. However, we did find that a small number of cities (17 out of a total of 465 cities) with the highest unemployment rates received funding that was roughly 40 percent higher than the average for unemployed populations in all cities."

Correspondence issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "In our view, DOD's 2012 sustainable ranges report meets the annual statutory reporting requirements that DOD describe its progress in implementing its sustainable ranges plan and any additional actions taken or to be taken in addressing training constraints caused by limitations on the use of military lands, marine areas, and airspace. DOD's 2012 report also provides updates to several elements of the plan that the act required DOD to include in its original submission in 2004. These elements include (1) proposals to enhance training range capabilities and address any shortfalls in resources, (2) goals and milestones for tracking planned actions and measuring progress, and (3) projected funding requirements for implementing planned actions, among others. Taken together, these elements of DOD's 2012 sustainable ranges report describe the department's progress in implementing its comprehensive plan and addressing training constraints at its ranges, thus meeting the annual reporting requirements of the act."

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Delivering and demonstrating the Next Generation Air Transportation System's (NextGen) benefits: The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) must deliver capabilities that provide aircraft operators with a return on their investments in NextGen avionics to convince operators to continue making equipment investments. However, operators have expressed concerns that FAA has not produced the navigational procedures needed to achieve benefits from existing avionics, such as reduced fuel burn and flight time. To help produce more beneficial procedures, FAA is, among other things, involving air traffic controllers and other stakeholders in the design of new procedures."

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "In March 2012, GAO issued a report on the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services’ (CMS) Medicare Advantage (MA) quality bonus payment demonstration—a demonstration CMS initiated rather than implementing the quality bonus program established under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA). Compared to the PPACA quality bonus program, CMS’s demonstration increases the number of plans eligible for a bonus, enlarges the size of payments for some plans, and accelerates payment phase-in. CMS stated that the demonstration’s research goal is to test whether scaling bonus payments to quality scores MA plans receive increases the speed and degree of annual quality improvements for plans compared with what would have occurred under PPACA. GAO reported that CMS’s Office of the Actuary estimated that the demonstration would cost $8.35 billion over 10 years—an amount greater than the combined budgetary impact of all Medicare demonstrations conducted since 1995. In addition, GAO also found several shortcomings of the demonstration design that preclude a credible evaluation of its effectiveness in achieving CMS’s stated research goal. In July 2012, GAO sent a letter to the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS), the head …

Correspondence issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "DOD's fiscal year 2011 report partly addressed the required reporting elements and omitted some additional information that, while not required by law, would be useful for congressional oversight and decision making. Specifically, DOD's report addressed the first five required elements. However, information on the sixth element was incomplete because, while DOD highlighted concerns relative to the commands' theater objectives and strategies and prepositioned materiel and equipment, DOD's report did not provide a list of operation plans affected by a shortfall in prepositioned stocks and a description of actions taken to mitigate risk. In addition, DOD's report did not address the six elements added by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012. DOD officials said that those elements were not addressed in DOD's fiscal year 2011 report because the report was already drafted when the requirements were enacted last December, and they plan to address these elements in their next annual report. DOD's report also did not contain some additional information on prepositioned materiel and equipment, which we recommended in our May 2011 report because it would provide a fuller scope of DOD's prepositioning programs. For example, …

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) is responsible for governmentwide federal spectrum management, but GAO reported in 2011 that NTIA’s efforts in this area had been limited. In 2003, the President directed NTIA to develop plans identifying federal and nonfederal spectrum needs, and in 2008, NTIA issued the federal plan. GAO found it did not identify governmentwide spectrum needs and did not contain key elements and conform to best practices for strategic planning. Furthermore, NTIA’s primary spectrum management operations do not focus on governmentwide needs. Instead, NTIA depends on agency self-evaluation of spectrum needs and focuses on mitigating interference among spectrum users, with limited emphasis on overall spectrum management. Additionally, NTIA’s data management system is antiquated and lacks internal controls to ensure the accuracy of agency-reported data, making it unclear if reliable data inform decisions about federal spectrum use. NTIA is developing a new data management system, but implementation is years away."

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "We found that SSA has taken concrete steps to incorporate modern concepts of disability into its determination criteria, but faces constraints to more fully considering assistive devices and workplace accommodations."

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The Department of Health and Human Services’ (HHS) use of special hiring authorities under 42 U.S.C. §§ 209(f) and (g) has increased in recent years, from 5,361 positions in 2006 to 6,697 positions in 2010, an increase of around 25 percent. Nearly all HHS Title 42 employees work in one of three HHS operating divisions: the National Institutes of Health (NIH), the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Title 42 employees at HHS serve in a variety of areas, including scientific and medical research support and in senior, director-level leadership positions. At NIH, one-quarter of all employees, and 44 percent of its researchers and clinical practitioners, were Title 42 appointees."

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the White House have acted to strengthen biosurveillance consistent with prior GAO recommendations made from December 2009 through October 2011.In August 2012, DHS issued a strategic plan for its National Biosurveillance Integration Center (NBIC) that officials say was written in coordination with federal partners and designed to respond to GAO’s December 2009 findings that NBIC did not have key resources to carry out its mission, in part due to collaboration issues it faced. In July 2012, the White House released the National Strategy for Biosurveillance, which describes guiding principles, core functions, and enablers for strengthening biosurveillance. In June 2010, GAO recommended a national biosurveillance strategy to provide a unifying framework for building and maintaining a national biosurveillance capability. In October 2011, GAO also recommended the strategy account for the need to leverage resources and respond to challenges while partnering with nonfederal entities. The July 2012 strategy partially responds to the issues GAO called for such a strategy to address, but does not fully address them, as discussed below. A strategic implementation plan is to be published within 120 days of strategy …

Correspondence issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "DOD's approach for determining its civilian senior leader workforce projections to meet future requirements incorporated the results of two separate assessments. In its 2010-2018 strategic workforce plan, DOD presented data that projected reductions of 178 civilian senior leader positions within its five career civilian senior leader workforces during fiscal years 2011 and 2012. To conduct its assessment for the strategic workforce plan, DOD used a computer modeling system that is managed by the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) and used by several agencies across the federal government. The system models significant career events, such as promotions, reassignments, and retirements, to produce projections. During this same time period, DOD also completed an efficiency initiative at the direction of the Secretary of Defense to, among other things, ensure that DOD's senior leader workforce is properly sized and aligned with DOD's mission and priorities. For its efficiency initiative, the department devised an internal DOD methodology in which it rank ordered positions in terms of higher and lower priority in order to identify reductions. This assessment identified a reduction of 178 civilian senior leader positions within DOD's civilian senior leader workforce for …

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Since 2001, Congress, the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), and executive branch agencies have taken action to address the government's human capital challenges. For example, in 2002, Congress passed legislation creating the CHCO Council, composed of the Chief Human Capital Officers (CHCO) of 24 executive agencies and chaired by the Director of OPM. In 2004, through the Federal Workforce Flexibility Act, Congress provided agencies greater hiring flexibilities. OPM issued guidance on hiring reforms, developed the Hiring Toolkit, and launched an 80-day model to speed the hiring process."

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The November 2011 memorandum that discussed the management of the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) program was prepared based primarily on the observations of the former Director of the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Infrastructure Security Compliance Division (ISCD), a division of the Office of Infrastructure Protection (IP) within the National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD). The memorandum was intended to highlight various challenges that have hindered ISCD efforts to implement the CFATS program. According to the former Director, the challenges facing ISCD included not having a fully developed direction and plan for implementing the program, hiring staff without establishing need, and inconsistent ISCD leadership--factors that the Director believed place the CFATS program at risk. These challenges centered on three main areas: (1) human capital issues, including problems hiring, training, and managing ISCD staff; (2) mission issues, including problems reviewing facility plans to mitigate security vulnerabilities; and (3) administrative issues, including concerns about NPPD and IP not supporting ISCD's management and administrative functions."