The “oil-for-food” program (OFFP) was the centerpiece of a long-standing U.N. Security Council effort to alleviate human suffering in Iraq while maintaining key elements of the 1991 Gulf war-related sanctions regime. In order to ensure that Iraq remained contained and that only humanitarian needs were served by the program, the program imposed controls on Iraqi oil exports and humanitarian imports. All Iraqi oil revenues legally earned under the program were held in a U.N.-controlled escrow account and were not accessible to the regime of Saddam Hussein.

This report discusses suspicions of an Iranian nuclear weapons program, and Iran’s current plans — to construct seven nuclear power plants (1000 MW each) by 2025.

Following years of authoritarian rule and economic sanctions, the United States and the international community agreed in the spring of 2003 that efforts should be made to introduce economic reform and democratic government to post-war Iraq. More recently, the Bush Administration has asserted a “victory” strategy composed of eight objectives, five of which are to: transition Iraq to security self-reliance, help Iraqis form a national compact for democratic government, help Iraq build government capacity and provide essential services, help Iraq strengthen its economy, and help Iraq strengthen the rule of law and promote civil rights. To meet these ends, a large-scale reconstruction assistance program has been undertaken by the United States in Iraq. This report describes recent developments in this assistance effort.

The issue of women’s rights in Iraq has taken on new relevance, following the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, efforts to reconstruct Iraq, and recent elections for a Transitional National Assembly (TNA). Over the past three years, the Bush Administration has reiterated its interest in ensuring that Iraqi women participate in politics and ongoing reconstruction efforts in Iraq. There has also been a widening debate regarding the extent to which the U.S.-led reconstruction efforts have been able to enhance women’s rights in Iraq and encourage their participation in Iraq’s governing institutions.

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Operation Iraqi Freedom succeeded in overthrowing Saddam Hussein, but Iraq remains violent and unstable because of Sunni Arab resentment and a related insurgency, as well as increasing sectarian violence. According to its November 30, 2005, “Strategy for Victory,” the Bush Administration indicates that U.S. forces will remain in Iraq until the country is able to provide for its own security and does not serve as a host for radical Islamic terrorists. This report discusses the background of the issue and examines several security challenges, response, and other policy options for the U.S.

Following years of authoritarian rule and economic sanctions, the United States and the international community agreed in the spring of 2003 that efforts should be made to rehabilitate economic infrastructure and introduce representative government to post-war Iraq, among other objectives. More recently, the Bush Administration has asserted a “victory” strategy composed of eight objectives, five of which are to: transition Iraq to security self-reliance, help Iraqis form a national compact for democratic government, help Iraq build government capacity and provide essential services, help Iraq strengthen its economy, and help Iraq strengthen the rule of law and promote civil rights. To meet these ends, a large-scale assistance program has been undertaken by the United States in Iraq. This report describes recent developments in this assistance effort.

This report examines a number of issues being considered by Congress as the FY2007 National Defense Authorization Act evolves. In each case, a brief synopsis is provided that includes background information, a comparison of the House and Senate provisions, if any, and a brief discussion of the issue. Where appropriate, other CRS products are identified to provide more detailed background information and analysis of the issue. For each issue, a CRS analyst is identified and contact information is provided.

This report discusses Iraqi government in the wake of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). Elections in 2005 for a transitional National Assembly and government (January 30, 2005), a permanent constitution (October 15), and a permanent (four year) Council of Representatives and government (December 15) were concluded despite insurgent violence and attracted progressively increasing Sunni participation. However, escalating sectarian violence and factional infighting have delayed formation of a new government.

Operation Iraqi Freedom succeeded in overthrowing Saddam Hussein, but Iraq remains unstable because of Sunni Arab resentment and a related insurgency, now compounded by Sunni-Shiite violence that some believe is a civil war. This report discusses the background of the issue and examines several security challenges, response, and other policy options for the U.S.

This report is on Nuclear Arms Control: The Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty.

Operation Iraqi Freedom succeeded in overthrowing Saddam Hussein, but Iraq remains unstable because of Sunni Arab resentment and a related insurgency, compounded by burgeoning sectarian violence. According to its November 30, 2005, “Strategy for Victory,” the Bush Administration indicates that U.S. forces will remain in Iraq until the country is able to provide for its own security and does not serve as a host for radical Islamic terrorists. This report discusses the background of the issue and examines several security challenges, response, and other policy options for the U.S.

This report identifies selected websites for maps of Iraq, including government, library, and organizational websites. Maps of the Middle East, Iraq, facilities used by U.S. forces in the Gulf, and U.S. government humanitarian assistance and reconstruction activities in Iraq are also provided.

Operation Iraqi Freedom succeeded in overthrowing Saddam Hussein, but Iraq remains unstable because of Sunni Arab resentment and a related insurgency, compounded by burgeoning sectarian violence. According to its November 30, 2005, “Strategy for Victory,” the Bush Administration indicates that U.S. forces will remain in Iraq until the country is able to provide for its own security and does not serve as a host for radical Islamic terrorists. This report discusses the background of the issue and examines several security challenges, response, and other policy options for the U.S.

Operation Iraqi Freedom succeeded in overthrowing Saddam Hussein, but Iraq remains unstable because of Sunni Arab resentment and a related insurgency, now compounded by Sunni-Shiite violence that some believe is a civil war. This report discusses the background of the issue and examines several security challenges, response, and other policy options for the U.S.

Operation Iraqi Freedom succeeded in overthrowing Saddam Hussein, but Iraq remains unstable because of Sunni Arab resentment and a related insurgency, compounded by burgeoning Sunni-Shiite violence. According to its November 30, 2005, “Strategy for Victory,” the Bush Administration indicates that U.S. forces will remain in Iraq until the country is able to provide for its own security. This report discusses security challenges, responses, and policy options.

Operation Iraqi Freedom succeeded in overthrowing Saddam Hussein, but Iraq remains unstable because of Sunni Arab resentment and a related insurgency, now compounded by Sunni-Shiite violence that some believe is a civil war. According to its November 30, 2005, “Strategy for Victory,” the Bush Administration indicates that U.S. forces will remain in Iraq until the country is able to provide for its own security. This report discusses security challenges, responses, and policy options.

Operation Iraqi Freedom succeeded in overthrowing Saddam Hussein, but Iraq remains unstable because of Sunni Arab resentment and a related insurgency, now compounded by Sunni-Shiite violence that some believe is a civil war. This report discusses the background of the issue and examines several security challenges, response, and other policy options for the U.S.

Following years of authoritarian rule and economic sanctions, the United States and the international community agreed in the spring of 2003 that efforts should be made to rehabilitate economic infrastructure and introduce representative government to post-war Iraq, among other objectives. More recently, the Bush Administration has asserted a “victory” strategy composed of eight objectives, five of which are to: transition Iraq to security self-reliance, help Iraqis form a national compact for democratic government, help Iraq build government capacity and provide essential services, help Iraq strengthen its economy, and help Iraq strengthen the rule of law and promote civil rights. To meet these ends, a large-scale assistance program has been undertaken by the United States in Iraq. This report describes recent developments in this assistance effort.

This report provides statistics on fatalities during Operation Iraqi Freedom, which began on March 19, 2003, as well as on the number of fatalities since May 1, 2003, plus statistics on those wounded, but not killed, since March 19, 2003.

Operation Iraqi Freedom succeeded in overthrowing Saddam Hussein, but Iraq remains unstable because of Sunni Arab resentment and a related insurgency, compounded by burgeoning sectarian violence. According to its November 30, 2005, “Strategy for Victory,” the Bush Administration indicates that U.S. forces will remain in Iraq until the country is able to provide for its own security and does not serve as a host for radical Islamic terrorists. This report discusses the background of the issue and examines several security challenges, response, and other policy options for the U.S.

This report provides casualty data compiled by the Department of Defense (DOD), as tallied from the agency’s press releases. Table 1 provides statistics on fatalities during Operation Iraqi Freedom, which began on March 19, 2003, and is ongoing, as well as on the number of fatalities since May 1, 2003, plus statistics on those wounded, but not killed, since March 19, 2003. Statistics may be revised as circumstances are investigated and as all records are processed through the U.S. military’s casualty system.

The major challenges to coalition forces are now quelling a persistent Iraqi resistance movement and training sufficient Iraqi forces to assume responsibility for the nations domestic security. This report discusses military planning and operations in Iraq.

This report discusses Iraqi Oil in the post-Saddam period. Iraq’s potential oil wealth remains largely unrealized. Substantial proven reserves exist, and there are likely more resources awaiting discovery. But oil production has been slow to fully recover and many obstacles stand in the way of achieving a stable export flow.