A letter report issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the U.S. Special Operations Command's (USSCOM) acquisition strategy for aircraft electronic warfare systems, focusing on the soundness of USSCOM's electronic warfare acquisition strategy in terms of correcting deficiencies and maximizing commonality in its aircraft survivability equipment."

A letter report issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the timeliness and accuracy of the Department of Defense's (DOD) health care claims processing procedures."

A letter report issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed travel-related issues at the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), focusing on: (1) how VA formulates its travel budget request; (2) whether VA's use of excess travel funds is in accordance with guidance from the Senate Appropriations Committee regarding the reprogramming of funds between programs, activities, or elements; (3) whether VA has adequate internal controls over the authority it grants to certain employees to authorize their own travel and approve their own travel vouchers; and (4) whether it has adequate control over employees who are issued limited open travel authorizations, which allow them to travel without additional authorization."

This report presents a complete response to the Tiger Team assessment that was conducted to Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) and at the US Department of Energy (DOE) Oak Ridge Operations Office (ORO) from October 2, 1990, through November 30, 1990. The action plans have undergone both a discipline review and a cross-cutting review with respect to root cause. In addition, the action plans have been integrated with initiatives being pursued across Martin Marietta Energy Systems, Inc., in response to Tiger Team findings at other DOE facilities operated by Energy Systems. The root cause section is complete and describes how ORNL intends to address the root cause of the findings identified during the assessment. This report is concerned with reactors safety and health findings, responses, and planned actions. Specific areas include: organization and administration; quality verification; operations; maintenance; training and certification; auxiliary systems; emergency preparedness; technical support; nuclear criticality safety; security/safety interface; experimental activities; site/facility safety review; radiological protection; personnel protection; fire protection; management findings, responses, and planned actions; self-assessment findings, responses, and planned actions; and summary of planned actions, schedules, and costs.

This report presents a complete response to the Tiger Team assessment that was conducted at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) and at the US Department of Energy (DOE) Oak Ridge Operations Office (ORO) from October 22, 1990, through November 30, 1990. The action plans have undergone both a discipline review and a cross-cutting review with respect to root cause. In addition, the action plans have been integrated with initiatives being pursued across Martin Marietta Energy Systems, Inc., in response to Tiger Team findings at other DOE facilities operated by Energy Systems. The root cause section is complete and describes how ORNL intends to address the root causes of the findings identified during the assessment. The action plan has benefited from a complete review by various offices at DOE Headquarters as well as review by the Tiger Team that conducted the assessment to ensure that the described actions are responsive to the observed problems.

This report presents a complete response to the Tiger Team assessment that was conducted at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) and at the US Department of Energy (DOE) Oak Ridge Operations Office (ORO) from October 22, 1990, through November 30, 1990. The action plans have undergone both a discipline review and a cross-cutting review with respect to root cause. In addition, the action plans have been integrated with initiatives being pursued across Martin Marietta Energy Systems, Inc., in response to Tiger Team findings at other DOE facilities operated by Energy Systems. The root cause section is complete and describes how ORNL intends to address the root causes of the findings identified during the assessment. The action plan has benefited from a complete review by various offices at DOE Headquarters as well as review by the Tiger Team that conducted the assessment to ensure that the described actions are responsive to the observed problems.

This preliminary analysis examined the HA-21I glovebox and its supporting systems for potential process hazards. Upon further analysis, the thermal stabilization system has been installed in gloveboxes HC-21A and HC-21C. The use of HC-21C and HC-21A simplified the initial safety analysis. In addition, these gloveboxes were cleaner and required less modification for operation than glovebox HA-21I. While this document refers to glovebox HA-21I for the hazards analysis performed, glovebox HC-21C is sufficiently similar that the following analysis is also valid for HC-21C. This hazards analysis document is being re-released as revision 1 to include the updated flowsheet document (Appendix C) and the updated design basis (Appendix D). The revised Process Flow Schematic has also been included (Appendix E). This Current revision incorporates the recommendations provided from the original hazards analysis as well. The System Design Description (SDD) has also been appended (Appendix H) to document the bases for Safety Classification of thermal stabilization equipment.

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This note describes a TURTLE model of the AP2 beamline. This model was created by D. Johnson and improved by J. Hangst. The authors of this note have made additional improvements which reflect recent element and magnet setting changes. The magnet characteristics measurements and survey data compiled to update the model will be presented. A printout of the actual TURTLE deck may be found in appendix A.

This document presents the results and documentation of the nondestructive ultrasonic examination of tank 241-AZ-101. A tank inspection supplier was retained to provide and use an ultrasonic examination system (equipment, procedures, and inspectors) to scan a limited area of double-shell tank 241-AZ-101 primary tank wall and welds. The inspection found one reportable indication of thinning and no reportable pitting, corrosion, or cracking.

The 244-CR vault contains four tanks: two 40,000-gallon carbon steel tanks and two 15,000-gallon stainless steel tanks. On occasion, the waste from 201-C Semiworks was routed through the tanks in 244-CR. This had the potential for mixing the organics from 201-C Semiworks and a residual heel in 244-CR which may be acidic. The purpose of this study is to determine if there is a possibility that a reactive waste could be present in 244-CR vault.

This document presents the results and documentation of the nondestructive ultrasonic examination of tank 241-AN-105. A tank inspection supplier was retained to provide and use an ultrasonic examination system (equipment, procedures, and inspectors) to scan a limited area of double-shell tank 241-AN-105 primary tank wall primary knuckle, and secondary tank bottom. The inspection found some indication of general and local wall thinning with no cracks detected.

This document presents the results and documentation of the nondestructive ultrasonic examination of tank 241-AN-106. A tank inspection supplier was retained to provide and use an ultrasonic examination system (equipment, procedures, and inspectors) to scan a limited area of double-shell tank 241-AN-106 primary tank wall and welds. The inspection found no reportable indications of thinning, pitting, corrosion, or cracking.

A letter report issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO identified issues that could enhance compliance with the Kyoto Protocol or any climate change agreement, focusing on the: (1) clarity of the protocol's goals and procedures; (2) use of incentives that encourage compliance to supplement punitive measures to punish noncompliance; and (3) role of environmental and industry groups."

The Savannah River Site contains approximately 1500 monitoring wells from which groundwater samples are collected. Many of these samples are sent off-site for various analyses, including the determination of trace volatile organic compounds (VOCs). This report describes accomplishments that have been made during the past year which will ultimately allow VOC analysis to be performed on-site using gas chromatography-mass spectrometry. Through the use of the on-site approach, it is expected that there will be a substantial cost savings. This approach will also provide split-sample analysis capability which can serve as a quality control measure for off-site analysis.

The Consolidated Incinerator Facility (CIF) at the Savannah River Site (SRS) burns low-level radioactive wastes and mixed wastes as method of treatment and volume reduction. The CIF generates secondary waste, which consists of ash and off-gas scrubber solution. Currently the ash is stabilized/solidified in the Ashcrete process. The scrubber solution (blowdown) is sent to the SRS Effluent Treatment Facility (ETF) for treatment as waste water. In the past, the scrubber solution was also stabilized/solidified in the Ashcrete process as blowcrete and will continue to be treated this way for listed waste burns and scrubber solution that do not meet the Effluent Treatment Facility (ETF) Waste Acceptance Criteria (WAC).

This report presents a complete response to the Tiger Team assessment that was conducted to Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) and at the US Department of Energy (DOE) Oak Ridge Operations Office (ORO) from October 2, 1990, through November 30, 1990. The action plans have undergone both a discipline review and a cross-cutting review with respect to root cause. In addition, the action plans have been integrated with initiatives being pursued across Martin Marietta Energy Systems, Inc., in response to Tiger Team findings at other DOE facilities operated by Energy Systems. The root cause section is complete and describes how ORNL intends to address the root cause of the findings identified during the assessment. This report is concerned with reactors safety and health findings, responses, and planned actions. Specific areas include: organization and administration; quality verification; operations; maintenance; training and certification; auxiliary systems; emergency preparedness; technical support; nuclear criticality safety; security/safety interface; experimental activities; site/facility safety review; radiological protection; personnel protection; fire protection; management findings, responses, and planned actions; self-assessment findings, responses, and planned actions; and summary of planned actions, schedules, and costs.

This report is about the womens role in armed forces.

An Enraf Series 854 level gauge was installed on Tank 241-S-106 (S-106) during the first week of June 1994. On August 11, 1994, the gauge`s measuring wire broke. An investigation has been started to determine how the wire broke. This test plan identifies a qualification test that is part of this investigation. This test will also provide evidence as to the location and extent of potential corrosion on the measuring wire due to tank environment. The results from this testing will provide data for better material selections. This test will involve placing the existing Enraf Series 854 level gauge back into service with the same type of measuring wire (316 stainless steel) that originally broke on August 11, 1994. The gauge will be operated for 14 days. At the end of the 14-day test, the wire shall be sent to Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNL) for analysis.

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The purpose of this report is to compile date generated during the first annual tests and inspections of the Benificiai Uses Shipping System (BUSS) Cask. In addition, this report will verify that the testing criteria identified in chapter 8 of the BUSS Cask Safety Analysis Report for Packaging (SARP) was met. Section 8.2 ``Maintenance and Periodic Inspection Program`` of the BUSS Cask SARP requires that the following tests and inspections be performed on an annual basis: Hydrostatic pressure test; helium leak test; dye penetrant test on the trunnions and lifting lugs; and torque test on all bolts; impact limiter inspection and weight test. The first annual inspections and testing of the BUSS Cask were completed on May 5, 1994, and met the SARP criteria.

As part of the Multi-Functional Instrument Trees (MITs) a Validation Probe is being fabricated by Los Alamos National Laboratories (LANL). The Validation Probe assembly is equipped with a Winch, depth counter, and a Resistance Temperature Detector (RTD) which will render a means for verifying the temperature readings of which will render a means for verifying the temperature readings of the MIT thermocouples. The purpose of this Acceptance Test Procedure (ATP) is to provide verification that the Validation Probe functions properly and accordingly to LANL design and specification. This ATP will be used for all Validation Probes procured from LANL. The ATP consists of a receiving inspection, RTD ambient temperature; RTD electrical failure, RTD insulation resistance, and accurate depth counter operation inspections. The Validation Probe is composed of an intank probe, a cable and winching system, and a riser extension (probe guide) which bolts onto the MIT. The validation`s thermal sensor is an RTD that is housed in a 0.062 inch diameter, magnesium oxide fill, 316 stainless steel tube. The sheath configuration provides a means for spring loading the sensor firmly against the validation tube`s inner wall. A 45 pound cylindrical body is connected above the sheath and is used as …

This report summarizes work done at LLNL for the development of the aerocapacitor in a collaborative effort between LLNL, PowerOne and PolyStor. The overall goal was to demonstrate a cost competitive manufacturing process for the use of carbon aerogels in a capacitor component suitable for incorporation in power supplies. In this report the authors feature several categories of work, including progress specifically in the areas of collaboration with their industrial partners, in the construction and testing of the aerocapacitors, and in the development and characterization of the aerogel materials.

This document presents the results and documentation of the nondestructive ultrasonic examination of tank 241-AY-102. A tank inspection supplier was retained to provide and use an ultrasonic examination system (equipment, procedures, and inspectors) to scan a limited area of double-shell tank 241-AY-102 primary tank wall and welds. The inspection found some indication of insignificant general and local wall thinning with no cracks detected.