Acceptance for test for RFAR installation for facility fire alarm and suppression system.

The purpose of this waste analysis plan (WAP) is to document the waste

During the second semi-annual period, promotion of oxygen desorption to enhance direct NO decomposition over Tb-Pt/Al{sub 2}O{sub 3} catalyst has been studied. Promotion of oxygen desorption at low temperatures holds the key to the development of an effective NO decomposition catalyst. Addition of Tb-oxide to Pt/Al{sub 2}O{sub 3} allows oxygen from dissociated NO to desorb at 593 K which is significantly lower than the reported oxygen desorption temperatures for Pt catalysts. Combined temperature-programmed desorption/reaction with in situ infrared study reveals that desorbed oxygen is produced from decomposition of chelating bidentate nitrato which may be resulted from the reaction of adsorbed oxygen on Pt and adsorbed NO on Tb-oxide. The Tb-promoted Pt/Al{sub 2}O{sub 3} catalyst which possess oxygen desorption capability at low temperatures shows the activity for decomposition of NO to N{sub 2}, N{sub 2}O, and O{sub 2} at 723 K.

This document is the 45-day laboratory report for tank 241-AN-105 push mode core segments collected between June 10, 1996 and June 28, 1996. The segments were subsampled and analyzed in accordance with the Tank 241-AN-105 Push Mode Core Sampling and analysis Plan (TSAP) and the Safety Screening Data Quality Objective (DQO). The analytical results are included in the data summary table. None of the samples submitted for Total Alpha Activity or Differential Scanning Calorimetry (DSC) analyses exceeded notification limits as stated in the Safety Screening DQO. Statistical evaluation on results by calculating the 95% upper confidence limit is not performed by the 222-S Laboratory and is not considered in this report. Primary safety screening results and the raw data from thermogravimetric analysis (TGA) and DSC analyses are included in this report.

Waste receipts to the double-shell tank system are analyzed and wastes through the year 2015 are projected based on generation trends of the past 12 months. A computer simulation of site operations is performed, which results in projections of tank fill schedules, tank transfers, evaporator operations, tank retrieval, and aging waste tank usage. This projection incorporates current budget planning and the clean-up schedule of the Tri-Party Agreement. Assumptions were current as of June 1996.

This evaluation designates the waste receipt, storage, assay, and shiping portions of WRAP I as a Limited Control Facility. The technical basis for this designation comes from CSERs in other facilities The limits and controls for this CSER come from other facilities. This is deemed sufficient, since any fissile material being received at WRAP I, will come from those facilities, and as long as the limits for limited control are maintained, the areas considered in this CSER can be designated appropriately.

Testing will determine if an ignition occurs during the drop of a Universal Sampler onto a push-mode bit in a flammable gas environment. Ten drops each of the sampler using both a push-mode and rotary mode insert onto a push-mode bit will be completed. If an ignition does not occur under the conditions set forth in this test, then a satisfactory level of confidence will be obtained which would allow field operations using these inserts and drill bit.

This is a probabilistic analysis of the rail car accidents at the 204- AR Waste Unloading Facility.

The overall objective of this report is to provide a technical basis to support a U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission determination to classify the low-activity waste from the Hanford Site single-shell and double-shell tanks as `incidental` wastes after removal of additional radionuclides and immobilization.The proposed processing method, in addition to the previous radionuclide removal efforts, will remove the largest practical amount of total site radioactivity, attributable to high-level waste, for disposal is a deep geologic repository. The remainder of the waste would be considered `incidental` waste and could be disposed onsite.

A series of analysis were performed to evaluate the pressurization of the Multi-Canister Overpack (MCO) during the stages of transport, processing and storage for expected operational and off normal events. The study examined both MCO sealing and venting issues. Computer models were developed for the MCO and its transport and storage environments using the GOTH and COBRA-TF computer codes. These thermal- hydraulic models included chemical corrosion and ranged in complexity from simple scoping models to full three-dimensional models. Results of the evaluation indicate that overpressurization of the MCO can occur within hours given the bounding reaction surface area and 3.0 Kg of residual water during shipping or 2.5 Kg of residual water during storage. Overpressurization can be prevented during shipping if the MCO reaction surface area is shown to be less than 80,000 cm{sup 2}. During storage the overpressurization can be prevented by limiting the available water.

This waste analysis plan (WAP) has been prepared for the Central Waste Complex which is located in the 200 West Area of the Hanford Facility, Richland, Washington. This WAP documents the methods used to characterize, and obtain and analyze representative samples of waste managed at this unit.

This document supports the development and presentation of the following accident scenario in the TWRS Final Safety Analysis Report: Unplanned Excavation/Drilling in Pond/Ditch/Crib. The calculations needed to quantify the risk associated with this accident scenario are included within.

ORIGEN2 calculations were performed for TRIGA spent fuel elements from the Hanford Neutron Radiography Facility. The calculations support storage and disposal and results include mass, activity,and decay heat. Comparisons with underwater dose-rate measurements were used to confirm and adjust the calculations.

Acceptance for test for RFAR installation for fire alarm suppression system.

Modicon Compact Programmable Logic Controller (PLC). The device configuration integrates the isolation and current- carrying capacities of mechanical relays with the logic and programming sophistication of the PLC. This revised document provides descriptions of components and tasks involved in the PLC system for controlling and monitoring the FGTEI. All control functions required by the PLC, and how they are implemented, are described in detail.