Putin's military forces invaded Ukraine on February 24, 2022, sparking a renewed academic interest in Russia's current regime. Several scholars suggested that a critical period in the construction of the current regime occurred between 1999-2013 during Putin's first two presidencies followed by the Medvedev presidency. This is when the basic institutions of the current Russian political system were changed to recentralize state authority and prevent Russian Federation from looming disintegration. One such institution was the budgetary process. Signed into law in 1998, Russian Budget Code established how funds were disbursed from the "center" to the federal "subjects" and other entities. Many scholars have pointed out that one specific mechanism, namely "Intergovernmental Transfers", can be used to achieve the political goals of a regime by rewarding supporters, swinging the competitive electoral districts, or appeasing the opposition or separatist regions. The goal of this dissertation to investigate under what conditions a non-democratic regime, like Russia, uses these strategies for political effect? Do those strategies change over time? In this work, I develop a basic theoretical framework outlining such conditions and test it using the municipal-level data gathered from the Russian Federal State Statistics Service and Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation.