Confidence issues create potential risks for the public in any emergency situation. They do so because credibility and associated perceptions of legitimacy and competency of organizations are determinants of human behavior in disasters. Credibility, however, is only one of numerous factors that shape response of people or organizations to a threatening event. The purposes of this paper are to review what is known about the way in which credibility and related constructs influence emergency response, discuss how this knowledge applies to radiological emergency planning, and suggest how credibility-induced risk can be minimized in emergency planning and response.

A series of human factors evaluations were undertaken to better understand the contributing factors to human error in the teletherapy environment. Teletherapy is a multidisciplinary methodology for treating cancerous tissue through selective exposure to an external beam of ionizing radiation. A team of human factors specialists, assisted by a panel of radiation oncologists, medical physicists, and radiation therapists, conducted site visits to radiation oncology departments at community hospitals, university centers, and free-standing clinics. A function and task analysis was initially performed to guide subsequent evaluations in the areas of system-user interfaces, procedures, training and qualifications, and organizational policies and practices. The present work focuses solely on training and qualifications of personnel (e.g., training received before and during employment), and the potential impact of organizational factors on the performance of teletherapy. Organizational factors include such topics as adequacy of staffing, performance evaluations, commonly occurring errors, implementation of quality assurance programs, and organizational climate.

Post hoc analyses have demonstrated clearly that macro-system, organizational processes have played important roles in such major catastrophes as Three Mile Island, Bhopal, Exxon Valdez, Chernobyl, and Piper Alpha. How can managers of such high-consequence organizations as nuclear power plants and nuclear explosives handling facilities be sure that similar macro-system processes are not operating in their plants? To date, macro-system effects have not been integrated into risk assessments. Part of the reason for not using macro-system analyses to assess risk may be the impression that standard organizational measurement tools do not provide hard data that can be managed effectively. In this paper, I argue that organizational dimensions, like those in ISO 9000, can be quantified and integrated into standard risk assessments.

Relationships between countries generally exist somewhere in the grey area between war and peace. Crisis prevention activities are important in this area, and should have two goals: stabilizing tense situations that could push countries toward war, and supporting or reinforcing efforts to move countries toward peace. A Crisis Prevention Center (CPC) should facilitate efforts to achieve these goals. Its functions can be grouped into three broad, interrelated categories: establishing and facilitating communication among participating countries; supporting negotiations and consensus-building on regional security issues; and supporting implementation of agreed confidence and security building measures. Technology will play a critical role in a CPC. Technology is required for establishing communication systems to ensure the timely flow of information between countries and to provide the means for organizing and analyzing this information. Technically-based cooperative monitoring can provide an objective source of information on mutually agreed issues, thereby supporting the implementation of confidence building measures and treaties. Technology can be a neutral subject of interaction and collaboration between technical communities from different countries, thereby providing an important channel for improving relationships. Potential first steps for a CPC in the Middle Ease could include establishing communication channels and a dedicated communications center in each country, …

This report presents an overview of effectiveness of management control of safety. It reviews several modern management control theories as well as the general functions of management and relates them to safety issues at the corporate and at the process safety management (PSM) program level. Following these discussions, structured technique for assessing management of the safety function is suggested. Seven modern management control theories are summarized, including business process reengineering, the learning organization, capability maturity, total quality management, quality assurance and control, reliability centered maintenance, and industrial process safety. Each of these theories is examined for-its principal characteristics and implications for safety management. The five general management functions of planning, organizing, directing, monitoring, and integrating, which together provide control over all company operations, are discussed. Under the broad categories of Safety Culture, Leadership and Commitment, and Operating Excellence, key corporate safety elements and their subelements are examined. The three categories under which PSM program-level safety issues are described are Technology, Personnel, and Facilities.

This report is a description of the Department of Energy organization and projects. The topics of the report include: (1) DOE organization and overview; (2) Headquarters Offices: Congressional, Intergovernmental and Public Affairs; Conservation and Renewable Energy; Contract Appeals; Defense Programs; Economic Regulatory Administration; Energy Information Administration; Energy Research; Environment, Safety and Health; Fossil Energy; General Counsel; Hearings and Appeals; Inspector General; International Affairs and Energy Emergencies; Management and Administration; Minority Economic Impact; New Production Reactors; Nuclear Energy; Policy, Planning and Analysis; Radioactive Waste Management; (3) Operations Offices: Albuquerque Operations Office; Chicago Operations Office; Idaho Operations Office; Nevada Operations Office; Oak Ridge Operations Office; Richland Operations Office; San Francisco Operations Office; Savannah River Operations Office; Laboratories; and (4) Power Administrations: Bonneville Power Administration; Western Area Power Administration.

The facilities, activities, processes, and experiments managed by Martin Marietta Energy Systems, Inc., often involve materials and processes that are hazardous, sensitive, or costly. The risk that may be inherent in these operations is made acceptable by ensuring that they satisfy requirements established by law and regulation, good design, and good operating practices. Configuration management (CM) is an management process intended to ensure that these operations conform to these requirements. The configuration management concept was developed primarily in the aerospace and nuclear power industries in response to events caused when equipment was not kept in the configuration its designers intended. Some of the events resulted in significant environmental disasters. Investigators found that the events were often caused by breakdowns of management controls. These breakdowns allowed improper changes that left equipment unable to perform as required or as documents indicated it would. The configuration management concept was developed to systematically address these breakdowns. Energy Systems and the Department of Energy (DOE) have generally recognized the need for effective configuration management. Health and safety can be better protected; environmental permits, laws, regulations, and orders can be more consistently complied with; and investments in equipment and special programs, such as safety analyses or …

The facilities, activities, processes, and experiments managed by Martin Marietta Energy Systems, Inc., often involve materials and processes that are hazardous, sensitive, or costly. The risk that may be inherent in these operations is made acceptable by ensuring that they satisfy requirements established by law and regulation, good design, and good operating practices. Configuration management (CM) is an management process intended to ensure that these operations conform to these requirements. The configuration management concept was developed primarily in the aerospace and nuclear power industries in response to events caused when equipment was not kept in the configuration its designers intended. Some of the events resulted in significant environmental disasters. Investigators found that the events were often caused by breakdowns of management controls. These breakdowns allowed improper changes that left equipment unable to perform as required or as documents indicated it would. The configuration management concept was developed to systematically address these breakdowns. Energy Systems and the Department of Energy (DOE) have generally recognized the need for effective configuration management. Health and safety can be better protected; environmental permits, laws, regulations, and orders can be more consistently complied with; and investments in equipment and special programs, such as safety analyses or …

The Department of Energy`s (DOE) non-nuclear facilities generally require only a qualitative accident analysis to assess facility risks in accordance with DOE Order 5481.1B, Safety Analysis and Review System. Achieving a meaningful qualitative assessment of risk necessarily requires the use of suitable non-numerical assessment criteria. Typically, the methods and criteria for assigning facility-specific accident scenarios to the qualitative severity and likelihood classification system in the DOE order requires significant judgment in many applications. Systematic methods for more consistently assigning the total accident scenario frequency and associated consequences are required to substantiate and enhance future risk ranking between various activities at Sandia National Laboratories (SNL). SNL`s Risk Management and National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) Department has developed an improved methodology for performing qualitative risk assessments in accordance wi the DOE order requirements. Products of this effort are an improved set of qualitative description that permit (1) definition of the severity for both technical and programmatic consequences that may result from a variety of accident scenarios, and (2) qualitative representation of the likelihood of occurrence. These sets of descriptions are intended to facilitate proper application of DOE criteria for assessing facility risks.

The importance and need for full compliant implementation of NIMS nationwide was clearly demonstrated during the Hurricane Katrina event, which was clearly expressed in Secretary Chertoff's October 4, 2005 letter addressed to the State's governors. It states, ''Hurricane Katrina was a stark reminder of how critical it is for our nation to approach incident management in a coordinated, consistent, and efficient manner. We must be able to come together, at all levels of government, to prevent, prepare for, respond to, and recover from any emergency or disaster. Our operations must be seamless and based on common incident management doctrine, because the challenges we face as a nation are far greater than capabilities of any one jurisdiction.'' The NIMS is a system/architecture for organizing response on a ''national'' level. It incorporations ICS as a main component of that structure (i.e., it institutionalizes ICS in NIMS). In a paper published on the NIMS Website, the following statements were made: ''NIMS represents a core set of doctrine, principles, terminology, and organizational processes to enable effective, efficient and collaborative incident management at all levels. To provide the framework for interoperability and compatibility, the NIMS is based on a balance between flexibility and standardization.'' Thus …

Clearly, there is sufficient motivation from Washington for the Hanford community to pay particular attention to the risks associated with the substantial volumes of radiological, hazardous, and mixed waste at Hanford. But there is also another reason for emphasizing risk: Hanford leaders have come to realize that their decisions must consider risk and risk reduction if those decisions are to be technically sound, financially affordable, and publicly acceptable. The 560-square miles of desert land is worth only a few thousand dollars an acre (if that) -- hardly enough to justify the almost two billion dollars that will be spent at Hanford this year. The benefit of cleaning up the Hanford Site is not the land but the reduction of potential risk to the public and the environment for future generations. If risk reduction is our ultimate goal, decisions about priority of effort and resource allocation must consider those risks, now and in the future. The purpose of this paper is to describe how Hanford is addressing the issues of risk assessment, risk management, and risk-based decision making and to share some of our experiences in these areas.

The Laboratory has developed this Emergency Management Plan (EMP) to assist in emergency planning, preparedness, and response to anticipated and actual emergencies. The Plan establishes guidance for ensuring safe Laboratory operation, protection of the environment, and safeguarding Department of Energy (DOE) property. Detailed information and specific instructions required by emergency response personnel to implement the EMP are contained in the Emergency Management Plan Implementing Procedure (EMPIP) document, which consists of individual EMPIPs. The EMP and EMPIPs may be used to assist in resolving emergencies including but not limited to fires, high-energy accidents, hazardous material releases (radioactive and nonradioactive), security incidents, transportation accidents, electrical accidents, and natural disasters.

In a matter of minutes, a natural disaster completely changes people`s lives. For example, 9,750 lives were lost in the 1993 Latur, India earthquake, 106,000 homes were destroyed in the 1995 Hanshin-Awajii (Kobe) Japan earthquake, and over 8000 jobs/businesses were either disrupted or terminated during Hurricane Andrew. Worldwide, economic disaster damages have tripled in the past 30 years - rising from $40 billion in the 1960`s to $120 billion in the 1980`s. Potential losses and recovery costs continue to rise because of rapid population growth, urban expansion, and increased new construction concentrated in high-risk areas. In the U.S., economic losses from 1989 to 1994 resulting from hurricanes and earthquakes exceeded more than $100 billion. With the exception of floods, severe windstorms annually cause more damage than earthquakes because they occur more frequently. On average, 350 lives are lost every year as a result of windstorms. Over the last decade, nearly 90% of the property losses have resulted from windstorms and about 4% from earthquakes. The unexpected vulnerability of many homes, the high number of pay-outs by insurance companies, and the resulting difficulties of getting affordable insurance coverage following Hurricane Andrew in Florida further emphasized the need for the United States …

The importance and necessity for a fully developed and implemented National Incident Management System (NIMS) has been demonstrated in recent years by the impact of national events such as Hurricane Katrina in 2005. Throughout the history of emergency response to major disasters, especially when multiple response organizations are involved, there have been systemic problems in the consistency and uniformity of response operations. Identifying national standards that support the development and implementation of NIMS is key to helping solve these systemic problems. The NIMS seeks to provide uniformity and consistency for incident management by using common terminology and protocols that will enable responders to coordinate their efforts to ensure an efficient response.

The Department of Energy (DOE) Fire Protection Program is delineated in a number of source documents including; the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), DOE Policy Statements and Orders, DOE and national consensus standards (such as those promulgated by the National Fire Protection Association), and supplementary guidance, This Handbook is intended to bring together in one location as much of this material as possible to facilitate understanding and ease of use. The applicability of any of these directives to individual Maintenance and Operating Contractors or to given facilities and operations is governed by existing contracts. Questions regarding applicability should be directed to the DOE Authority Having Jurisdiction for fire safety. The information provided within includes copies of those DOE directives that are directly applicable to the implementation of a comprehensive fire protection program. They are delineated in the Table of Contents. The items marked with an asterisk (*) are included on the disks in WordPerfect 5.1 format, with the filename noted below. The items marked with double asterisks are provided as hard copies as well as on the disk. For those using MAC disks, the files are in Wordperfect 2.1 for MAC.

This document describes post-Natural Phenomena Hazard (NPH) emergency response training that was provided to two teams of Project Hanford Management Contractors (PHMC) staff that will be used to assess potential structural damage that may occur as a result of a significant natural phenomena event. This training supports recent plans and procedures to use trained staff to inspect structures following an NPH event on the Hanford Site.

If a large scale RDD event where to occur in New York City, the magnitude of the problem would likely exceed the capabilities of City and State to effectively respond to the event. New York State could request Federal Assistance if the United States President has not already made the decision to provide it. The United States Federal Government has a well developed protocol to respond to emergencies. The National Response Framework (NRF) describes the process for responding to all types of emergencies including RDD incidents. Depending on the location and type of event, the NRF involves appropriate Federal Agencies, e.g., Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Department of Energy (DOE), Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), United States Coast Guard (USCG), Department of Defense (DOD), Department of Justice (DOJ), Department of Agriculture (USDA), and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). The Federal response to emergencies has been refined and improved over the last thirty years and has been tested on natural disasters (e.g. hurricanes and floods), man-made disasters (oil spills), and terrorist events (9/11). However, the system has never been tested under an actual RDD event. Drills have been conducted with Federal, State, and local agencies to examine the initial (early) phases of …

This background paper reviews current knowledge on warning systems and human response to warnings. It expands on an earlier paper prepared for a workshop on the Second Assessment on Natural Hazards, held in Estes Park, Colorado in July 1992. Although it has a North American perspective, many of the lessons learned are universally applicable. The paper addresses warning systems in terms of dissemination and does not cover physical science issues associated with prediction and forecast. Finally, it covers hazards with relatively short lead times -- 48 hours or less. It does not address topics such as long-term forecasts of earthquakes or volcanic eruptions or early famine warning systems.

This paper discusses the two components of the facilitative setting that are important for group formation. The first component, the ideological component, provides the basic ideas that are adopted by the emerging group. The ideological setting for group formation is produced by such things as antinuclear news coverage and concentration of news stories on hazardous waste problems, on ideas concerning the credibility of the federal government, and on the pervasivensee of ideas about general environmental problems. The organizational component of the facilitative setting provides such things as leadership ability, flexible time, resources, and experience. These are important for providing people, organization, and money to achieve group goals. By and large, the conditions conducive to group formation, growth, and survival are outside the control of decision-makers. Agencies and project sponsors are currently caught in a paradox. Actively involving the public in the decision-making process tends to contribute to the growth and survival of various interest groups. Not involving the public means damage to credibility and conflict with values concerning participatory democracy. Resolution in this area can only be achieved when a comprehensive, coordinated national approach to hazardous waste management emerges. 26 refs.

The radiological emergency response laws and regulations of the Southern States Energy Compact member states are in some cases disparate. Several states have very specific laws on radiological emergency response while in others, the statutory law mentions only emergency response to ``natural disasters.`` Some states have adopted extensive regulations on the topic; others have none. For this reason, any general overview must necessarily discuss laws and regulations in general terms.

Workplace safety has been historically neglected by organizations in order to enhance profitability. Over the past 30 years, safety concerns and attention to safety have increased due to a series of disastrous events occurring across many different industries (e.g., Chernobyl, Upper Big-Branch Mine, Davis-Besse etc.). Many organizations have focused on promoting a healthy safety culture as a way to understand past incidents, and to prevent future disasters. There is an extensive academic literature devoted to safety culture, and the Department of Energy has also published a significant number of documents related to safety culture. The purpose of the current endeavor was to conduct a review of the safety culture literature in order to understand definitions, methodologies, models, and successful interventions for improving safety culture. After reviewing the literature, we observed four emerging themes. First, it was apparent that although safety culture is a valuable construct, it has some inherent weaknesses. For example, there is no common definition of safety culture and no standard way for assessing the construct. Second, it is apparent that researchers know how to measure particular components of safety culture, with specific focus on individual and organizational factors. Such existing methodologies can be leveraged for future assessments. …

This annual report of the Water Science and Technology Board (WSTB) summarizes the activities of the Board and its subgroups during 1988, its sixth year of existence. Included are descriptions of current and recently completed projects, new activities scheduled to begin in 1989, and plans for the future. The report also includes information on Board and committee memberships, program operational features, and reports produced during the past several years. This annual report is intended to provide an introduction to the WSTB and summary of its program for the year.

Part I of this New Production Reactors (NPR) Program Plan: describes the policy basis of the NPR Program; describes the mission and objectives of the NPR Program; identifies the requirements that must be met in order to achieve the mission and objectives; and describes and assesses the technology and siting options that were considered, the Program's preferred strategy, and its rationale. The implementation strategy for the New Production Reactors Program has three functions: Linking the design, construction, operation, and maintenance of facilities to policies requirements, and the process for selecting options. The development of an implementation strategy ensures that activities and procedures are consistent with the rationale and analysis underlying the Program. Organization of the Program. The strategy establishes plans, organizational structure, procedures, a budget, and a schedule for carrying out the Program. By doing so, the strategy ensures the clear assignment of responsibility and accountability. Management and monitoring of the Program. Finally, the strategy provides a basis for monitoring the Program so that technological, cost, and scheduling issues can be addressed when they arise as the Program proceeds. Like the rest of the Program Plan, the Implementation Strategy is a living document and will be periodically revised to reflect …

More than 200 studies of warning systems and warning response were reviewed for this social science perspective and state-of-the-art assessment of communication of emergency public warnings. The major findings are as follows. First, variations in the nature and content of warnings have a large impact on whether or not the public heeds the warning. Relevant factors include the warning source; warning channel; the consistency, credibility, accuracy, and understandability of the message; and the warning frequency. Second, characteristics of the population receiving the warning affect warning response. These include social characteristics such as gender, ethnicity and age, social setting characteristics such as stage of life or family context, psychological characteristics such as fatalism or risk perception, and knowledge characteristics such as experience or training. Third, many current myths about public response to emergency warning are at odds with knowledge derived from field investigations. Some of these myths include the keep it simple'' notion, the cry wolf'' syndrome, public panic and hysteria, and those concerning public willingness to respond to warnings. Finally, different methods of warning the public are not equally effective at providing an alert and notification in different physical and social settings. Most systems can provide a warning given three …