This empirical study is concerned with the usefulness of proposed supplementary disclosures for oil and gas producers to financial analysts in valuing a company. It is concerned with what supplementary information is being used, to what extent it is being used and which type of information is used most. Three main research procedures are employed. In the first procedure, the Mann-Whitney U Test is applied to determine any significant difference between valuing an oil and gas producing company using basic financial statements and ratio data, and valuing the same company with this information plus the proposed disclosures. The second procedure involves applying the chi-square and Cramer's V statistics to determine whether the disclosure information caused switching in valuation method used for each of the cases. The third procedure tests for significant differences between financial ratios used for each case by employing the test of differences between two proportions. Additional evaluation attempts to determine analysts' perceived usefulness of each of the schedules of the proposed disclosures

The forces that shaped banking practices in the late 1970s and which fostered attempts by the banks to rapidly expand their markets are examined. Why, and to what extent, the Texas energy banks committed themselves to the oil industry in those years, as well as the effects of the oil industry's four-and-one-half year decline on the banks' financial strength is detailed. How banks structured loans to various energy borrowers and why these borrowers lost their ability to service their debts is analyzed. The changes that the Texas banks' painfully learned lessons will bring about in energy and other specialized lending is considered.