A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The abuse of anabolic steroids by teenagers--that is, their use without a prescription--is a health concern. Anabolic steroids are synthetic forms of the hormone testosterone that can be taken orally, injected, or rubbed on the skin. Although a 2006 survey funded by the National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA) found that less than 3 percent of 12th graders had abused anabolic steroids, it also found that about 40 percent of 12th graders described anabolic steroids as "fairly easy" or "very easy" to get. The abuse of anabolic steroids can cause serious health effects and behavioral changes in teenagers. GAO was asked to examine federally funded efforts to address the abuse of anabolic steroids among teenagers and to review available research on this issue. This report describes (1) federally funded efforts that address teenage abuse of anabolic steroids, (2) available research on teenage abuse of anabolic steroids, and (3) gaps or areas in need of improvement that federal officials and other experts identify in research that addresses teenage anabolic steroid abuse. To do this work, GAO reviewed federal agency materials and published studies identified through a literature …

A chapter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "In December 2007, the Congress expanded the renewable fuel standard (RFS), which requires rising use of ethanol and other biofuels, from 9 billion gallons in 2008 to 36 billion gallons in 2022. To meet the RFS, the Departments of Agriculture (USDA) and Energy (DOE) are developing advanced biofuels that use cellulosic feedstocks, such as corn stover and switchgrass. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) administers the RFS. This report examines, among other things, (1) the effects of increased biofuels production on U.S. agriculture, environment, and greenhouse gas emissions; (2) federal support for domestic biofuels production; and (3) key challenges in meeting the RFS. GAO extensively reviewed scientific studies, interviewed experts and agency officials, and visited five DOE and USDA laboratories."

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "As the number of biological labs increases, so too do the safety risks for lab workers. Data on these risks--collected through a safety reporting system (SRS) from reports of hazards, incidents, and accidents--can support safety efforts. However, no such system exists for all biological labs, and a limited system--managed by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS)--applies to only a subset of these labs. While a national SRS has been proposed, design and implementation are complex. In this context, GAO was asked to identify lessons from (1) the literature and (2) case studies; and to apply those lessons to (3) assess CDC and APHIS's theft, loss, or release (TLR) system for select agents, such as anthrax, and (4) suggest design and implementation considerations for a labwide SRS. To do its work, GAO analyzed SRS literature; conducted case studies of SRSs in aviation, commercial nuclear, and health care industries; and interviewed agency officials and biosafety specialists."

A letter report issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "Twenty-one percent of grant-eligible applicants who did not use the District of Columbia's tuition assistance grant (TAG) funding to attend a participating college or university may have encountered such barriers as college entrance requirements and the absence of minority outreach programs. Whether enrollment caps at colleges posed a barrier for applicants is unclear. In the program's first year, 516 of the nearly 2,500 eligible applicants did not use the grants. About 21 percent of the institutions in which applicants expressed interest restrict the number of out-of-state students that they will accept, although the extent to which this played a role in limiting access to these institutions is unclear. Enrollment at the University of the District of Columbia (UDC) changed little during the TAG program's first year. The TAG program and UDC appeared to serve different freshmen populations, which may account for the TAG program's minimal impact on UDC enrollment. Although concerns about TAG program administration were largely resolved with the revision of program regulations in December 2000, other administrative issues may hinder program operations, including the determination of applicant eligibility and the distribution of information on …

A letter report issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO determined the potential cost of equipping and maintaining the capability of cities to respond to a terrorist incident involving a chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear device (CBRN), focusing on the: (1) views of federal, state, and local officials on equipment they believed would provide various levels of capability to respond to a CBRN incident; and (2) potential procurement and sustainment costs of these items."

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Effective tax rates (ETR) differ from statutory tax rates in that they attempt to measure taxes paid as a proportion of economic income, while statutory rates indicate the amount of tax liability (before any credits) relative to taxable income, which is defined by tax law and reflects tax benefits and subsidies built into the law. Lacking access to detailed data from tax returns, most researchers have estimated ETRs based on data from financial statements. A common measure of tax liability used in past estimates has been the current tax expense--either federal only or worldwide (which comprises federal, foreign, and U.S. state and local income taxes). The most common measure of income for these estimates has been some variant of pretax net book income. GAO was able to compare book tax expenses to tax liabilities actually reported on corporate income tax returns."

A letter report issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "U.S. dairy farmers produced 167.7 billion pounds of unprocessed, raw milk in 2000. Federal and state dairy programs influence the minimum prices paid to farmers for raw milk. These prices are based on how the raw milk is to be used. Minimum prices set for raw milk to be used for making drinking milk (fluid milk) are higher than those for milk used for manufacturing cheese, butter, and other dairy products. About 70 percent of the raw milk produced in the United States is regulated under the U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA) federal milk marketing order program. The 1996 farm bill established another pricing program -- the Northeast Interstate Dairy Compact (NEDC) -- which is run by a commission that sets a minimum price for raw milk sold as fluid milk in six New England states. The NEDC works in conjunction with federal and state dairy programs to establish an alternative minimum price for raw milk in the Compact states. When the monthly NEDC minimum price exceeds the federal marketing order or state minimum price, the NEDC price becomes the minimum price. Congress is now considering …

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The Department of Defense (DOD) is embarking on a number of efforts to enhance warfighting and the way the department conducts business. Major investments are being made to develop improved weapon systems to combat various threats to U.S. security. While the weapons that DOD ultimately develops have no rival in superiority, weapon systems acquisition remains a long-standing high-risk area. GAO's reviews over the past 30 years have found consistent problems with weapon acquisitions such as cost increases, schedule delays, and performance shortfalls. In addition, DOD faces several budgetary challenges that underscore the need to deliver its new major weapon programs within estimated costs and to obtain the most from those investments. DOD can help resolve these problems by using a more knowledge-based approach for developing new weapons. This report provides congressional and DOD decision makers with an independent, knowledge-based assessment of selected defense programs that identifies potential risks and needed actions when a program's projected attainment of knowledge diverges from the best practice. It can also highlight those programs that employ practices worthy of emulation by other programs. GAO plans to update and issue this report …

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "In the last 5 years, the Department of Defense (DOD) has doubled its planned investments in new weapon systems from about $700 billion in 2001 to nearly $1.4 trillion in 2006. While the weapons that DOD develops have no rival in superiority, weapon systems acquisition remains a long-standing high risk area. GAO's reviews over the past 30 years have found consistent problems with weapon acquisitions such as cost increases, schedule delays, and performance shortfalls. In addition, DOD faces several budgetary challenges that underscore the need to deliver its new weapon programs within estimated costs and to obtain the most from these investments. This report provides congressional and DOD decision makers with an independent, knowledge-based assessment of selected defense programs that identifies potential risks and needed actions when a program's projected attainment of knowledge diverges from the best practices. Programs for the assessments were selected based on several factors including, (1) high dollar value, (2) stage in acquisition, and (3) congressional interest. The majority of the 52 programs covered in this report are considered major defense acquisition programs by DOD. This report also highlights higher level issues …

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The Department of Defense (DOD) 2012 portfolio of 86 major defense acquisition programs is estimated to cost a total of $1.6 trillion, reflecting decreases in both size and cost from the 2011 portfolio. Those decreases are largely the result of more programs exiting than entering the portfolio, as well as reductions in procurement quantities due to program cancelations and restructurings. Notably a majority of programs in the portfolio gained buying power in the last year as their acquisition unit costs decreased. DOD's 10 costliest programs, excluding the Missile Defense Agency's Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS), drive most of the portfolio's cost performance and funding needs. The majority (65 percent) of the funding that DOD estimates it will need to complete its current programs is associated with those 10 programs, and almost all of that funding is for procurement."

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "This is GAO's seventh annual assessment of selected Department of Defense (DOD) weapon programs. The report examines how well DOD is planning and executing its weapon acquisition programs, an area that has been on GAO's high-risk list since 1990. This year's report is in response to the mandate in the joint explanatory statement to the Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing Appropriations Act, 2009. The report includes (1) an analysis of the overall performance of DOD's 2008 portfolio of 96 major defense acquisition programs and a comparison to the portfolio performance at two other points in time--5 years ago and 1 year ago; (2) an analysis of current cost and schedule outcomes and knowledge attained by key junctures in the acquisition process for a subset of 47 weapon programs--primarily in development--from the 2008 portfolio; (3) data on other factors that could impact program stability; and (4) an update on changes in DOD's acquisition policies. To conduct our assessment, GAO analyzed cost, schedule, and quantity data from DOD's Selected Acquisition Reports for the programs in DOD's 2003, 2007, and 2008 portfolios. GAO also collected data from program …

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "This is GAO's eighth annual assessment of selected Department of Defense (DOD) weapon programs. The report examines how well DOD is planning and executing its weapon acquisition programs, an area that has been on GAO's high-risk list since 1990. This year's report is in response to the mandate in the joint explanatory statement to the DOD Appropriations Act, 2009. The report includes (1) observations on DOD's efforts to manage its portfolio of major defense acquisition programs; (2) an assessment of the knowledge attained by key junctures in the acquisition process for a subset of 42 weapon programs from the 2009 portfolio; (3) data on other factors that can affect program execution; and (4) examples of how DOD is implementing recent acquisition reforms. To conduct the assessment, GAO analyzed data on the composition of DOD's portfolio of major defense acquisition programs. GAO did not analyze the cost and schedule performance of the portfolio because DOD did not issue timely or complete Selected Acquisition Reports for the second consecutive presidential transition. GAO expects to resume its portfolio analysis in next year's assessment. GAO also collected data from program …

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "This report is GAO's sixth annual assessment of selected weapon programs. Since 2000, the Department of Defense (DOD) has roughly doubled its planned investment in new systems from $790 billion to $1.6 trillion in 2007, but acquisition outcomes in terms of cost and schedule have not improved. Total acquisition costs for major defense programs in the fiscal year 2007 portfolio have increased 26 percent from first estimates, compared with 6 percent in 2000. Programs have also often failed to deliver capabilities when promised. DOD's acquisition outcomes appear increasingly suboptimal, a condition that needs to be corrected given the pressures faced by the department from other military and major nondiscretionary government demands. This report provides congressional and DOD decision makers with an independent, knowledge-based assessment of defense programs, identifying potential risks when a program's projected attainment of knowledge diverges from best practices. The programs assessed--most of which are considered major acquisitions by DOD--were selected using several factors: high dollar value, acquisition stage, and congressional interest. This report also highlights overall trends in DOD acquisition outcomes and issues raised by the cumulative experience of individual programs. GAO updates …

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "This is GAO's ninth annual assessment of Department of Defense (DOD) weapon system acquisitions, an area that is on GAO's high-risk list. The report is in response to the mandate in the joint explanatory statement to the DOD Appropriations Act, 2009. It includes observations on the performance of DOD's 2010 portfolio of 98 major defense acquisition programs; data on selected factors that can affect program outcomes; an assessment of the knowledge attained by key junctures in the acquisition process for a subset of 40 programs, which were selected because they were in development or early production; and observations on the implementation of acquisition reforms. To conduct this review, GAO analyzed cost, schedule, and quantity data from DOD's Selected Acquisition Reports and collected data from program offices on performance requirements and software development; technology, design, and manufacturing knowledge; and the implementation of DOD's acquisition policy and acquisition reforms. GAO also compiled one- or two-page assessments of 71 weapon programs. These programs were selected based on their cost, stage in the acquisition process, and congressional interest. DOD disagreed with GAO's use of total program cost growth as a …

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "This report is GAO's fifth annual assessment of selected weapon programs. From 2001 to the present, the Department of Defense (DOD) has doubled its planned investment in new systems from approximately $750 billion to almost $1.5 trillion. While DOD expects these systems to transform military operations, their acquisition remains a high-risk area. GAO's reviews of weapons over three decades have found consistent cost increases, schedule delays, and performance shortfalls. The nation's growing long-range fiscal challenges may ultimately spur Congress to pressure DOD to cut spending on new weapons and to redirect funding to other priorities. In response, DOD might be compelled to deliver new weapon programs within estimated costs and to obtain the most from its investments. This report provides congressional and DOD decision makers with an independent, knowledge-based assessment of selected defense programs, identifying potential risks and needed actions when a program's projected attainment of knowledge diverges from the best practices. Programs assessed were selected using several factors: high dollar value, acquisition stage, and congressional interest. This report also highlights issues raised by the cumulative experiences of individual programs. GAO updates this report annually under …

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The total estimated cost of the Department of Defense’s (DOD) 2011 portfolio of 96 major defense acquisition programs stands at $1.58 trillion. In the past year, the total acquisition cost of these programs has grown by over $74.4 billion or 5 percent, of which about $31.1 billion can be attributed to factors such as inefficiencies in production, $29.6 billion to quantity changes, and $13.7 billion to research and development cost growth. DOD’s portfolio is dominated by a small number of programs, with the Joint Strike Fighter accounting for the most cost growth in the last year, and the largest projected future funding needs. The majority of the programs in the portfolio have lost buying power in the last year as their program acquisition unit costs have increased. The number of programs in the portfolio has decreased from 98 to 96 in the past year and, looking forward, is projected to decrease again next fiscal year to its lowest level since 2004."

A letter report issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "During the 1990-1991 Persian Gulf War, health problems prevented the deployment of a significant number of Army reservists. To help correct this problem the Congress passed legislation that required reservists to undergo periodic physical and dental examinations. The National Defense Authorization Act for 2002 directed GAO to review the value and advisability of providing examinations. GAO also examined whether the Army is collecting and maintaining information on reservist health. GAO obtained expert opinion on the value of periodic examinations and visited seven Army reserve units to obtain information on the number of examinations that have been conducted."

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Congress has appropriated billions of dollars for equipment repair, replacement, and recapitalization, collectively known as equipment reset. Because of the potential for equipment reset costs to affect the Department of Defense's (DOD) future budget requirements and related readiness concerns, GAO initiated this review under the Comptroller General's authority. GAO's objectives were to determine the extent to which the Army and Marine Corps (1) track and report equipment reset expenditures in a way that confirms that funds appropriated for reset are expended for that purpose and (2) can be assured that their reset strategies will sustain equipment availability while meeting ongoing operational requirements. GAO reviewed equipment reset policies and analyzed related budget data."

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The Department of Defense's (DOD) ability to provide superior capabilities to the warfighter is dependent on its ability to incorporate rapidly evolving, cutting-edge microelectronic devices into its defense systems. While many commercial microelectronics advances apply to defense systems, DOD has some unique microelectronics needs not met by industry. Therefore, to maintain military superiority, DOD has the challenge of exploiting state-of-the-art commercial microelectronics technology and focusing its research investments in areas with the highest potential return for defense systems. Given the importance of advanced microelectronics to defense systems and the rapid changes in these technologies, Congress asked GAO to (1) identify and describe DOD and federally funded research and development center (FFRDC) facilities that receive funding from DOD for microelectronics production or research prototyping and (2) describe how DOD coordinates investments in microelectronics research."

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The Department of Defense (DOD) relies on thousands of suppliers to provide weapons, equipment, and raw materials to meet U.S. national security objectives. Yet, increased globalization in the defense industry and consolidation of the defense supplier base into a few prime contractors has reduced competition and single-source suppliers have become more common for components and subsystems. For this report, GAO (1) assessed DOD's efforts to monitor the health of its defense supplier base, and (2) determined how DOD identifies and addresses gaps that might exist in its supplier base. To conduct its work, GAO reviewed supplier-base-related laws, regulations, and guidelines; met with officials from DOD's Office of Industrial Policy, defense contractors, and other DOD officials; and surveyed 20 major DOD weapon acquisition program officials on potential supplier-base gaps."

A chapter report issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "Concerns have been raised that the economic models used by the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) and the U.S. International Trade Commission do not account for all the factors that affect cattle prices and producer incomes. GAO reviewed USDA's livestock model to determine whether it incorporates imports, market concentration, marketing agreements, and forward contracts. In reviewing best modeling practices, GAO's expert panel concluded that domestic cattle demand and supply were the fundamental forces driving cattle prices and producer incomes. The panel identified issues necessary to develop a comprehensive modeling system that predicts cattle prices and producer incomes. The panel recommended the collection of better data to quantify several important factors omitted from the model. The panel also wanted to see a more complete characterization of the supply and demand relationships connecting the cattle producer to the final consumer. The panel's emphasis on a more complete characterization of the cattle and beef industry underscores the idea that the demand for cattle is ultimately driven by consumer demand for beef and other demand and supply forces linking cattle producers to feedlots, meatpackers, and retailers."

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Each year, billions of dollars in dual-use items--items that have both commercial and military applications--as well as defense items are exported from the United States. To protect U.S. interests, the U.S. government controls the export of these items. A key function in the U.S. export control system is enforcement, which aims to prevent or deter the illegal export of controlled items. This report describes the roles, responsibilities, and authorities of export control enforcement agencies, identifies the challenges these agencies face, and determines if information on enforcement outcomes is provided to the export control agencies. GAO's findings are based on an examination of statutes, interagency agreements, and procedures; interviews with enforcement officials at selected field locations and headquarters; and an assessment of enforcement information."

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Agencies use a risk-based approach, including workload and threat assessment data, to allocate resources, but most do not fully track those used for export control enforcement activities. As their missions are broader than export controls, agencies can use staff resources for other activities based on need, making tracking resources used solely for export control enforcement difficult. Only Commerce’s Office of Export Enforcement allocates its resources exclusively to export control enforcement as that is its primary mission. Other agencies, such as State and the Treasury, have relatively few export control enforcement staff to track. While several agencies acknowledge the need to better track export enforcement resources and have taken steps to do so, they do not know the full extent of their use of these resources and do not use this information in resource allocation decisions. In some cities, agencies are informally leveraging export enforcement resources through voluntarily created local task forces that bring together enforcement resources to work collectively on export control cases."

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "In 2008 and 2009, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) provided emergency assistance that required the Secretary of the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) to make a determination of systemic risk under the systemic risk exception of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (FDI Act). The FDI Act requires GAO to review each determination made. For the three determinations made to date, this report examines (1) steps taken by FDIC, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Federal Reserve), and Treasury to invoke the exception; (2) the basis of the determination and the purpose of resulting actions; and (3) the likely effects of the determination on the incentives and conduct of insured depository institutions and uninsured depositors. To do this work, GAO reviewed agency documentation, relevant laws, and academic studies; and interviewed regulators and market participants."