In view of the great public apprehension about plutonium and nuclear weapons we should explore ways to prevent, limit, or mitigate possible plutonium dispersals. This review is primarily a tutorial on what is known about plutonium dispersal in fires. It concludes that in most types of fires involving plutonium the amount released will not be an immediate danger to life. Indeed, in many cases very few personnel will receive more than the lung burden allowed by current regulations for plutonium workers. However, the dangers may be significant in special situations, unusual terrains, certain meteorological conditions, and very high burn temperatures.

This is a summary of a report that presents selected results from a secondary analysis of public opinion surveys, taken at the national and state/local levels, relevant to energy and environmental policy choices. The data base used in the analysis includes about 2,000 items from nearly 600 separate surveys conducted between 1979 and 1992. Answers to word-for-word questions were traced over time, permitting trend analysis. Patterns of response were also identified for findings from similarly worded survey items. The analysis identifies changes in public opinion concerning energy during the past 10 to 15 years.

In the late 1950s and early 1960s, a series of tests was conducted at or near the Nevada Test Site to study issues involving plutonium-bearing devices. These tests resulted in the dispersal of about 5 TBq of {sup 239,240}Pu on the surficial soils at the test locations. Access to the sites is strictly controlled; therefore, it does not constitute a threat to human health at the present time. However, because the residual {sup 239} Pu decays slowly (half-life of 24,110 y), the sites could indeed represent a long-term hazard if they are not remediated and if institutional controls are lost. To investigate the magnitude of the potential health risks for this no-remediation case, we defined three basic exposure scenarios that could bring individuals in contact with {sup 239,240}Pu at the sites: (1) a resident living in a subdivision located at a test site, (2) a resident farmer, and (3) a worker at a commercial facility. Our screening analyses indicated that doses to organs are dominated by the intemal deposition of Pu via the inhalation pathway, and thus our risk assessment focused on those factors that affect inhalation exposures and associated doses, including inhalation rates, activity patterns, tenure at a residence …

During the period from 1954 through 1963, a number of tests were conducted on the Nevada Test Site (NTS) and Tonopah Test Range (TTR) to determine the safety of nuclear devices with respect to storage, handling, transport, and accidents. These tests were referred to as ``safety shots.`` ``Safety`` in this context meant ``safety against fission reaction.`` The safety tests were comprised of chemical high explosive detonations with components of nuclear devices. The conduct of these tests resulted in the dispersion of plutonium, and some americium over areas ranging from several tens to several hundreds of hectares. Of the various locations used for safety tests, the site referred to as ``Plutonium Valley`` was subject to a significant amount of plutonium contamination. Plutonium Valley is located in Area 11 on the eastern boundary of the NTS at an elevation of about 1036 m (3400 ft). Plutonium Valley was the location of four safety tests (A,B,C, and D) conducted during 1956. A major environmental, health, and safety concern is the potential for inhalation of Pu{sup 239,240} by humans as a result of airborne dust containing Pu particles. Thus, the wind transport of Pu{sup 239,240} particles has been the subject of considerable research. This …

The Hydrologic Database is an electronic filing cabinet containing water-related data for the Nevada Test Site (NTS). The purpose of the database is to enhance research on hydrologic issues at the NTS by providing efficient access to information gathered by a variety of scientists. Data are often generated for specific projects and are reported to DOE in the context of specific project goals. The originators of the database recognized that much of this information has a general value that transcends project-specific requirements. Allowing researchers access to information generated by a wide variety of projects can prevent needless duplication of data-gathering efforts and can augment new data collection and interpretation. In addition, collecting this information in the database ensures that the results are not lost at the end of discrete projects as long as the database is actively maintained. This document is a guide to using the database.

The Nevada Test Site (NTS) is located in southwestern Nevada, about 105 km (65 mi) northwest of the city of Las Vegas. A series of tests was conducted in the late 1950s and early 1960s at or near the NTS to study issues involving plutonium-bearing devices. These tests resulted in the dispersal of about 5 TBq of [sup 239,24O]Pu on the surficial soils at the test locations. Additionally, underground tests of nuclear weapons devices have been conducted at the NTS since late 1962; ground water beneath the NTS has been contaminated with radionuclides produced by these tests. These two important problems have been selected for assessment. Regarding the plutonium contamination, because the residual [sup 239]Pu decays slowly (half-life of 24,110 y), these sites could represent a long-term hazard if they are not remediated and if institutional controls are lost. To investigate the magnitude of the potential health risks for this no-remediation case, three basic exposure scenarios were defined that could bring individuals in contact with [sup 239,24O]Pu at the sites: (1) a resident living in a subdivision, (2) a resident farmer, and (3) a worker at a commercial facility -- all located at a test site. The predicted cancer risks …

The Nevada Test Site (NTS) is located in southwestern Nevada, about 105 km (65 mi) northwest of the city of Las Vegas. A series of tests was conducted in the late 1950s and early 1960s at or near the NTS to study issues involving plutonium-bearing devices. These tests resulted in the dispersal of about 5 TBq of {sup 239,24O}Pu on the surficial soils at the test locations. Additionally, underground tests of nuclear weapons devices have been conducted at the NTS since late 1962; ground water beneath the NTS has been contaminated with radionuclides produced by these tests. These two important problems have been selected for assessment. Regarding the plutonium contamination, because the residual {sup 239}Pu decays slowly (half-life of 24,110 y), these sites could represent a long-term hazard if they are not remediated and if institutional controls are lost. To investigate the magnitude of the potential health risks for this no-remediation case, three basic exposure scenarios were defined that could bring individuals in contact with {sup 239,24O}Pu at the sites: (1) a resident living in a subdivision, (2) a resident farmer, and (3) a worker at a commercial facility -- all located at a test site. The predicted cancer risks …

Final report describing the HURRICANE PEAK 1 (HP1) Structural Response Experiment including background information, test procedures and results, conclusions, and appendices.

This report presents selected results from a secondary analysis of public opinion surveys, taken at the national and state/local levels, relevant to energy and environmental policy choices. The data base used in the analysis includes about 2000 items from nearly 600 separate surveys conducted between 1979 and 1992. Answers to word-for-word questions were traced over time, permitting trend analysis. Patterns of response were also identified for findings from similarly worded survey items. The analysis identifies changes in public opinion concerning energy during the past 10 to 15 years.

This report presents selected results from a secondary analysis of public opinion surveys, taken at the national and state/local levels, relevant to energy and environmental policy choices. The data base used in the analysis includes about 2000 items from nearly 600 separate surveys conducted between 1979 and 1992. Answers to word-for-word questions were traced over time, permitting trend analysis. Patterns of response were also identified for findings from similarly worded survey items. The analysis identifies changes in public opinion concerning energy during the past 10 to 15 years.

The Task Force on Radioactive Waste Management was created in April 1991 by former Secretary James D. Watkins, who asked the group to analyze the critical institutional question of how the Department of Energy (DOE) might strengthen public trust and confidence in the civilian radioactive waste management program. The panel met eight times over a period of 27 months and heard formal presentations from nearly 100 representatives of state and local governments, non-governmental organizations, and senior DOE Headquarters and Field Office managers. The group also commissioned a variety of studies from independent experts, contracted with the National Academy of Sciences and the National Academy of Public Administration to hold workshops on designing and leading trust-evoking organizations, and carried out one survey of parties affected by the Department`s radioactive waste management activities and a second one of DOE employees and contractors.

The annual report of the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission`s Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data (AEOD) is devoted to the activities performed during 1992. The report is published in two separate parts. NUREG-1272, Vol. 7, No. 1, covers power reactors and presents an overview of the operating experience of the nuclear power industry from the NRC perspective, including comments about the trends of some key performance measures. The report also includes the principal findings and issues identified in AEOD studies over the past year and summarizes information from such sources as licensee event reports, diagnostic evaluations, and reports to the NRC`s Operations Center. NUREG-1272, Vol. 7, No. 2, covers nonreactors and presents a review of the events and concerns during 1992 associated with the use of licensed material in nonreactor applications, such as personnel overexposures and medical misadministrations. Both reports also contain a discussion of the Incident Investigation Team program and summarize both the Incident Investigation Team and Augmented Inspection Team reports. Each volume contains a list of the AEOD reports issued for 1981--1992.

This report contains discussions on the following topics: Target Physics; Nova Experiments; Nova Laser Science and Technology; Target Science and Technology; Advanced Drivers; and ICF Applications.