This document constitutes an addendum to the September 1998, Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 404: Roller Coaster Lagoons and Trench, Tonopah Test Range, Nevada as described in the document Recommendations and Justifications for Modifications for Use Restrictions Established under the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (UR Modification document) dated February 2008. The UR Modification document was approved by NDEP on February 26, 2008. The approval of the UR Modification document constituted approval of each of the recommended UR modifications. In conformance with the UR Modification document, this addendum consists of: • This cover page that refers the reader to the UR Modification document for additional information • The cover and signature pages of the UR Modification document • The NDEP approval letter • The corresponding section of the UR Modification document This addendum provides the documentation justifying the modification of the UR for CAS TA-03-001-TARC Roller Coaster Lagoons. This UR was established as part of Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) corrective actions and was based on the presence of contaminants at concentrations greater than the action levels established at the time of the initial investigation …

This Correction Action Investigation Plan (CAIP) contains environmental sample collection objectives and logic for the Corrective Action Unit No. 426, which includes the Cactus Spring Waste Trenches, located at the Tonopah Test Range. The purpose of this investigation is to generate sufficient data to establish the types of waste buried in the trenches, identify the presence and nature of contamination, determine the vertical extent of contaminant migration below the Cactus Spring Waste Trenches, and determine the appropriate course of action for the site. The potential courses of action for the site are clean closure, closure in place (with or without remediation), or no further action. The scope of this investigation will include drilling and collecting subsurface samples from within and below the trenches. Sampling locations will be biased toward the areas most likely to be contaminated. The Cactus Spring Waste Trenches Site is identified as one of three potential locations for buried, radioactively contaminated materials from the Double Tracks Test. This test was the first of four storage-transportation tests conducted in 1963 as part of Operation Roller Coaster. The experiment involved the use of live animals to assess the inhalation intake of a plutonium aerosol.

For 13 years, low-level waste (LLW) generator fees and disposal volumes for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Operations Office (NNSA/NV) Radioactive Waste Management Sites (RWMSs) had been on a veritable roller coaster ride. As forecast volumes and disposal volumes fluctuated wildly, generator fees were difficult to determine and implement. Fiscal Year (FY) 2000 forecast projections were so low, the very existence of disposal operations at the Nevada Test Site (NTS) were threatened. Providing the DOE Complex with a viable, cost-effective disposal option, while assuring the disposal site a stable source of funding, became the driving force behind the development of the Waste Generator Access Fee at the NTS. On September 26, 2000, NNSA/NV (after seeking input from DOE/Headquarters [HQ]), granted permission to Bechtel Nevada (BN) to implement the Access Fee for FY 2001 as a two-year Pilot Program. In FY 2001 (the first year the Access Fee was implemented), the NTS Disposal Operations experienced a 90 percent increase in waste receipts from the previous year and a 33 percent reduction in disposal fee charged to the waste generators. Waste receipts for FY 2002 were projected to be 63 percent higher than FY 2001 and …

This report provides the results of the annual post-closure inspections conducted at the closed Corrective Action Units (CAUs) located on the Tonopah Test Range (TTR), Nevada. This report covers calendar year 2011 and includes inspection and repair activities completed at the following CAUs: (1) CAU 400: Bomblet Pit and Five Points Landfill (TTR); (2) CAU 407: Roller Coaster RadSafe Area (TTR); (3) CAU 424: Area 3 Landfill Complexes (TTR); (4) CAU 453: Area 9 UXO Landfill (TTR); and (5) CAU 487: Thunderwell Site (TTR) Inspections were conducted according to the post-closure plans in the approved Closure Reports. The post-closure inspection plan for each CAU is included in Appendix B. The inspection checklists are included in Appendix C, field notes are included in Appendix D, and photographs taken during inspections are included in Appendix E. The annual post-closure inspections were conducted May 3 and 4, 2011. Maintenance was performed at CAU 424, CAU 453, and CAU 487. At CAU 424, two surface grade monuments at Landfill Cell A3-3 could not be located during the inspection. The two monuments were located and marked with lava rock on July 13, 2011. At CAU 453, there was evidence of animal burrowing. Animal burrows were …

Many Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) Use Restrictions (URs) have been established at various corrective action sites (CASs) as part of FFACO corrective actions (FFACO, 1996; as amended January 2007). Since the signing of the FFACO in 1996, practices and procedures relating to the implementation of risk-based corrective action (RBCA) have evolved. This document is part of an effort to re-evaluate all FFACO URs against the current RBCA criteria (referred to in this document as the Industrial Sites [IS] RBCA process) as defined in the Industrial Sites Project Establishment of Final Action Levels (NNSA/NSO, 2006c). Based on this evaluation, the URs were sorted into the following categories: 1. Where sufficient information exists to determine that the current UR is consistent with the RCBA criteria 2. Where sufficient information exists to determine that the current UR may be removed or downgraded based on RCBA criteria. 3. Where sufficient information does not exist to evaluate the current UR against the RCBA criteria. After reviewing all the existing FFACO URs, the 49 URs addressed in this document have sufficient information to determine that these current URs may be removed or downgraded based on RCBA criteria. This document presents recommendations on modifications …

The calculation of downwind concentrations from non-traditional sources, such as explosions, provides unique challenges to dispersion models. The US Department of Energy has assigned the Atmospheric Release Advisory Capability (ARAC) at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) the task of estimating the impact of accidental radiological releases to the atmosphere anywhere in the world. Our experience includes responses to over 25 incidents in the past 16 years, and about 150 exercises a year. Examples of responses to explosive accidents include the 1980 Titan 2 missile fuel explosion near Damascus, Arkansas and the hydrogen gas explosion in the 1986 Chernobyl nuclear power plant accident. Based on judgment and experience, we frequently estimate the source geometry and the amount of toxic material aerosolized as well as its particle size distribution. To expedite our real-time response, we developed some automated algorithms and default assumptions about several potential sources. It is useful to know how well these algorithms perform against real-world measurements and how sensitive our dispersion model is to the potential range of input values. In this paper we present the algorithms we use to simulate explosive events, compare these methods with limited field data measurements, and analyze their sensitivity to input parameters. …

This document is part of an effort to re-evaluate all FFACO URs against the current RBCA criteria (referred to in this document as the Industrial Sites [IS] RBCA process) as defined in the Industrial Sites Project Establishment of Final Action Levels (NNSA/NSO, 2006c). Based on this evaluation, the URs were sorted into the following categories: 1. Where sufficient information exists to determine that the current UR is consistent with the RCBA criteria 2. Where sufficient information exists to determine that the current UR may be removed or downgraded based on RCBA criteria. 3. Where sufficient information does not exist to evaluate the current UR against the RCBA criteria. After reviewing all the existing FFACO URs, the 49 URs addressed in this document have sufficient information to determine that these current URs may be removed or downgraded based on RCBA criteria. This document presents recommendations on modifications to existing URs that will be consistent with the RCBA criteria.

This Correction Action Investigation Plan (CAIP) contains environmental sample collection objectives and logic for the CAU No. 426, which includes the Cactus Spring Waste Trenches, CAS No. RG-08-001-RG-CS. The Cactus Spring Waste Trenches are located at the Tonopah Test Range (TTR) which is part of the Nellis Air Force Range, approximately 255 kilometers (km) (140 miles [mi]) northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada, by air. The purpose of this investigation is to generate sufficient data to establish the types of waste buried in the trenches, identify the presence and nature of contamination, determine the vertical extent of contaminant migration below the Cactus Spring Waste Trenches, and determine the appropriate course of action for the site. The potential courses of action for the site are clean closure, closure in place (with or without remediation), or no further action.

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This report identifies all nuclear events in Nevada that are known to have sent radioactivity beyond the borders of the test range complex. There have been 177 such tests, representing seven different types: nuclear detonations in the atmosphere, nuclear excavation events, nuclear safety events, underground nuclear events that inadvertently seeped or vented to the atmosphere, dispersion of plutonium and/or uranium by chemical high explosives, nuclear rocket engine tests, and nuclear ramjet engine tests. The source term for each of these events is given, together with the data base from which it was derived (except where the data are classified). The computer programs used for organizing and processing the data base and calculating radionuclide production are described and included, together with the input and output data and details of the calculations. This is the basic formation needed to make computer modeling studies of the fallout from any of these 177 events.

Public concern regarding activities involving radioactive material generally focuses on the human health risk associated with exposure to ionizing radiation. This report describes the results of a risk analysis conducted to evaluate risk for excavation, handling, and transport of soil contaminated with transuranics at the Clean Slate sites. Transportation risks were estimated for public transport routes from the Tonopah Test Range (TTR) to the Envirocore disposal facility or to the Area 3 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS) at the Nevada Test Site (NTS) for both radiological risk and risk due to traffic accidents. Human health risks were evaluated for occupational and radiation-related health effects to workers. This report was generated to respond to this public concern, to provide an evaluation of the risk, and to assess feasibility of transport of the contaminated soil for disposal.

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After a brief introduction to the CEBAF accelerator, several recent results of the research programs in Hall A are discussed. All of those address the transition region between the meson-baryon and quark-gluon description of nuclear matter. Finally, the plans for upgrading CEBAF to 12 GeV are presented and the instrumentation under design for Hall A to carry out that research program is discussed.

Plutonium aerosol monitoring was conducted for one month near the 1992 operation of a stationary sorting system used to {open_quotes}mine{close_quotes} contaminated soil on Johnston Atoll. Pairs of high volume cascade impactors and a high volume air sampler were located at each of three locations of the process stream: the {open_quotes}spoils pile{close_quote} that was the feedstock, the {open_quotes}plant area{close_quotes} near the-hot soil gate of the sorter, and the {open_quotes}clean pile{close_quotes} conveyer area where sorted clean soil was moved. These locations were monitored only during the working hours, while air monitoring was also done at an upwind, uncontaminated {open_quotes}background{close_quotes} area 24-hours per day. The three monitoring locations were extremely dusty, even though there were frequent rains during the period of operation. Total suspended particulate mass loadings were 178 {mu}g/m{sup 3} at the spoils pile, 93 {mu}g/m{sup 3} at the plant area, and 79 {mu}g/m{sup 3} at the clean pile during this period, when background mass loadings were 41 {mu}g/m{sup 3}. There was no practical difference in the aerosol specific activity between the three locations, however, which had a median value of 3.64 pCi/g (135 Bq/kg). The aerosol specific activity is enhanced by a factor of 3 over the specific activity of the …

Moving divertor plates could help solve some of the problems of the tokamak divertor through mechanical ingenuity rather than plasma physics. These plates would be passively heated on each pass through the tokamak and cooled and reprocessed outside the tokamak. There are many design options using varying plate shapes, orientations, motions, coatings, and compositions.

1.1 Purpose This Closure Report presents the information obtained from investigative actions performed to justify the decision for clean closure of CAU 430 through "No Further Action." The investigative actions were performed per the Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration Plan, CA UNO. 430: Buried Depleted Uranium Artille~ Round No. 1, Tonopah Test Range (DOE/NV, 1996a) (hereafter referred to as the SAFER Plan). The Buried DU Artillery Round No. 1 is located approximately 1.1 kilometers (km) (0.7 mile [mi]) south of Avenue 13 in the test area south of Area 9 (Figure 1-2). The site was thought to consist of a potentially unexploded W-79 Joint Test Assembly (JTA) test artillery projectile with high explosives (HE) and DU. The DU was substituted for Special Nuclear Material to prevent a nuclear explosion and yet retain the physical characteristics of uranium for ballistic and other mechanical tests. The projectile was reportedly buried in one pit, approximately 5 to 10 feet (ft) deep (Smith, 1993; Smith, 1996; Quas, 1996). The exact location of the burial pit is unknown; however, three disturbed areas (Sites A, B, and C) were identified through geophysical surveys, site visits, and employee interviews as possible locations of the test projectile (Figure …

Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 430 consists of the Buried Depleted Uranium (DU) Artillery Round No. 1. This Closure Report presents the information obtained from investigate actions performed to justify the decision for clean closure of CAU 430 through ``No Further Action``. The site was thought to consist of a potentially unexploded W-79 Joint Test Assembly (JTA) test artillery projectile with high explosives (HE) and DU. The DU was substituted for Special Nuclear Materials to prevent a nuclear explosion and yet retain the physical characteristics of uranium for ballistic and other mechanical tests. The projectile was reportedly buried in one pit, approximately 5 to 10 feet (ft) deep. The objectives of the activities were to prepare the site for closure through locating and identifying the projectile, destroying the projectile and any remaining components, collecting soil samples to detect residual contamination resulting from projectile destruction, and finally, remediating residual contamination. This report contains the following five sections. Section 1.0 introduces the CAU and scope of work. Section 2.0 of this report presents the closure activities performed as part of this investigation. Waste disposition is discussed in Section 3.0. Closure investigation results are presented in Section 4.0, and references are presented in Section …

The Pre/Post-Strike Atmospheric Assessment System was proposed to show the importance of local meteorological conditions in the vicinity of a site suspected of storing or producing toxic agents and demonstrate a technology to measure these conditions, specifically wind fields. The ability to predict the collateral effects resulting from an attack on a facility containing hazardous materials is crucial to conducting effective military operations. Our study approach utilized a combination of field measurements with dispersion modeling to better understand which variables in terrain and weather were most important to collateral damage predictions. To develop the PAAS wind-sensing technology, we utilized a combination of emergent and available technology from micro-Doppler and highly coherent laser systems. The method used for wind sensing is to probe the atmosphere with a highly coherent laser beam. As the beam probes, light is back-scattered from particles entrained in the air to the lidar transceiver and detected by the instrument. Any motion of the aerosols with a component along the beam axis leads to a Doppler shift of the received light. Scanning in a conical fashion about the zenith results in a more accurate and two-dimensional measurement of the wind velocity. The major milestones in the benchtop system …

Progress is reported for a research program on the resuspension in the atmosphere of plutonium fallout deposited on the earth surface. The long-range goal of the resuspension studies is to produce a set of equations which can be used to predict the timedependent average concentration of resuspended material downwind from a source of any geometrical configuration and soil sunface characteristics. The experiments are conducted at the Nevada Test Site where plutonium-high explosive tests were performed during the period from 1954 to early 1958. The investigations have included: monitoring of soil samples for Pu; development of ultra-high volume air samplers, in-situ panticle spectrometers, particle counters, and a micrometeorology field laboratory; determination of Pu redistribution due to the rolling of soil particles pushed by winds (creep), the bouncing of wind-pushed particles (saltation), and transport by dust devils; and measurements of meteorological parameters. Results from these experiments will be used to establish a data bank on radioisotope distribution and meteorological conditions at NTS and to provide information of the relation between the source and the dose to man from existing radioactivity. (LCL)

This document is a reclamation plan for short-term and long-term stabilization of land disturbed by activities associated with interim clean-up of radionuclide-contaminated surface soil at Clean Slate 2 located northwest of the Nevada Test Site on the Nellis Air Force Range. Surface soils at Clean Slate 2 were contaminated as a result of the detonation of a device containing plutonium and depleted uranium using chemical explosives. Excavation of contaminated soils at Clean Slate 2 will follow procedures similar to those used during the cleanup of the Double Tracks and Clean Slate 1 sites. A maximum of approximately 33 cm (12 in) of the surface soils will be excavated and removed from the site. Near ground zero, where contamination levels are highest, approximately 2 m (7 ft) of soil may be removed. The maximum area to be excavated is estimated to be 18.4 hectares (45.4) acres. In addition to the disturbance associated with soil excavation, approximately 2.0 hectares (5.0) acres will be disturbed by the construction of staging areas and placement of support facilities. Short term stabilization consists of an application of a chemical soil stabilizer and long-term stabilizations involves the establishment of a permanent vegetative cover using selective native plant …

The OF-2 irradiation experiment was designed and built to test candidate High-Temperature Gas-Cooled Reactor (HTGR) fuel and fuel-rod matrix designs. The capsule was designed with two separate specimen cells, allowing for independent temperature control as well as independent fission gas release measurements. The OF-2 capsule is presently operating at the Oak Ridge Research Reactor (ORR). Initial fuel rod linear heat rates are between 16.4 and 23.0 kW/m (5 and 7 kW/ft) and fuel centerline temperatures are approximately 1150 and 1350/sup 0/C. Plans are to operate the capsule for nine ORR cycles to accumulate a maximum damage fluence of 9 x 10/sup 21/ neutrons/cm/sup 2/ (E > 0.18 MeV).

Nondestructive assay of fissile material plays an important role in nuclear fuel processing facilities. Information for product quality control, plant criticality safety, and nuclear materials accountability can be obtained from assay devices. All of this is necessary for a safe, efficient, and orderly operation of a production plant. Presented here is a design description and an operational evaluation of a device developed to nondestructively assay small samples of High-Temperature Gas-Cooled Reactor (HTGR) fuel. The measurement technique employed consists in thermal-neutron irradiation of a sample followed by pneumatic transfer to a high-efficiency neutron detector where delayed neutrons are counted. In general, samples undergo several irradiation and count cycles during a measurement. The total number of delayed-neutron counts accumulated is translated into grams of fissile mass through comparison with the counts accumulated in an identical irradiation and count sequence of calibration standards. Successful operation of the device through many experiments over a one-year period indicates high operational reliability. Tests of assay precision show this to be better than 0.25% for measurements of 10 min. Assay biases may be encountered if calibration standards are not representative of unknown samples, but reasonable care in construction and control of standards should lead to no more …

The DOE Notice of Availability for this environmental impact statement was published in the Federal Register on Friday, October 18, 1996 (61 FR 54437). The final environmental impact statement identifies potential adverse effects resulting from the four use alternatives evaluated and discusses measures that DOE considered for the mitigation of these potential adverse effects. The Secretary of Energy signed the Record of Decision on the management and operation of the Nevada Test Site and other DOE sites in the state of Nevada on December 9, 1996. These decisions will result in the continuation of the multipurpose, multi-program use of the Nevada Test Site, under which DOE will pursue a further diversification of interagency, private industry, and public-education uses while meeting its Defense Program, Waste Management, and Environmental Restoration mission requirements at the Nevada Test Site and other Nevada sites, including the Tonopah Test Range, the Project Shoal Site, the Central Nevada Test Area, and on the Nellis Air Force Range Complex. The Record of Decision also identifies specific mitigation actions beyond the routine day-to-day physical and administrative controls needed for implementation of the decisions. These specific mitigation actions are focused on the transportation of waste and on groundwater availability. This …