This dissertation examines how the state-building process relates to civil-military relations and how political influence of the military affects state's conflict behavior. By doing so, this study aims to introduce a nuanced consideration of the well-known civil-military problematique, which might be summarized as the threat the military can constitute to the polity that it is created to protect. I treat this paradox by addressing the following research questions: Why do some militaries have a qualitatively higher level of influence in politics than others? Second, how does the military's influence in politics affect a state's domestic conflict behavior? And third, how does it affect state's international conflict behavior? I develop a theory that when the military is heavily involved in the state-building process, it gains an unusual place within politics, gets itself imprinted in the DNA of the state, and gains undue political power. I name such militaries as state-builder militaries and argue that such states experience qualitatively different civil-military relations, in which the military acts as an extremely Praetorian institution. I argue that state-builder militaries would be able to insulate their political power from the democratization process that the country might experience and behave as persistent interveners in politics. I …

This dissertation attempts to uncover systematic patterns regarding elite management in dictatorships. To do so, it describes how dictators manage their elites and what factors determine the outcomes of their decision. Although considerable literature has examined the various structural features of dictatorships and has identified different elite management strategies to explain the persistence of dictatorships, few, if any, have empirically tested any of the theoretical propositions generated by this increasingly large body of literature. This dissertation is the first empirical attempt to explore the elite management strategies of various dictatorships, ranging from the individual case of the most extreme dictatorship (North Korea) as well as different kinds of military dictatorships (South Korea), and global patterns of autocratic regimes. To address the main research question, "what determines the choice of the dictator's elite management strategies?" this dissertation identifies three key factors - dictator, elites, and structure. The relationship between dictators and elites is basically hostile. Conflicts between actors over power acquisition often emerge in violent ways. Nevertheless, dictators do not always treat elites with repression. They sometimes make efforts to embrace and cooperate with the other elites. The variation of their strategies toward elites is determined by various conditions. The results …