The French nation has been prolific of consummate diplomatists all through history, but her annals record no more brilliant achievement than that of Theophile Delcassé and Paul Cambon when they brought Great Britain into a French alliance. Even those who disapprove the consequences of their act must admit the skill and the pertinacity with which the two statesmen pursued their purpose. Their difficulties were stupendous; British governments had for years stood aloof from Continental agreements, but precedent was forced to give way before the perspicacity and perseverance of these two French statesmen. Delcassé had contributed the Entente Cordiale to the French cause in 1904. This understanding pledged British diplomatic support to France in her imperialistic venture in Morocco-nothing more; but it also provided a foundation upon which Cambon could exercise his talents in leading Great Britain into a trap. The result of these activities was the equivalent of an Anglo-French alliance. The French, to accomplish their purpose, led the British into a series of military and naval conversations as a means of working out plans of joint operations whereby the latter could assist the former in case of a Franco-German war. The conversations had their official beginning in 1906 and …

After conquering Belgium and the Rhineland in 1794, the French Army of the Sambre and Meuse faced severe logistical, disciplinary, and morale problems that signaled the erosion of its capabilities. The army’s degeneration resulted from a revolution in French foreign policy designed to conquer the natural frontiers, a policy often falsely portrayed as a diplomatic tradition of the French monarchy. In fact, the natural frontiers policy – expansion to the Rhine, the Pyrenees, and the Alps – emerged only after the start of the War of the First Coalition in 1792. Moreover, the pursuit of natural frontiers caused more controversy than previously understood. No less a figure than Lazare Carnot – the Organizer of Victory – viewed French expansion to the Rhine as impractical and likely to perpetuate war. While the war of conquest provided the French state with the resources to survive, it entailed numerous unforeseen consequences. Most notably, the Revolutionary armies became isolated from the nation and displayed more loyalty to their commanders than to the civilian authorities. In 1797, the Sambre and Meuse Army became a political tool of General Lazare Hoche, who sought control over the Rhineland by supporting the creation of a Cisrhenan Republic. Ultimately, …

Jacques-Antoine-Hippolyte, comte de Guibert (1743-1790) dedicated his life and career to creating a new doctrine for the French army. Little about this doctrine was revolutionary. Indeed, Guibert openly decried the anarchy of popular participation in government and looked askance at the early days of the Revolution. Rather, Guibert’s doctrine marked the culmination of an evolutionary process that commenced decades before his time and reached fruition in the Réglement of 1791, which remained in force until the 1830s. Not content with military reform, Guibert demanded a political and social constitution to match. His reforms required these changes, demanding a disciplined, service-oriented society and a functional, rational government to assist his reformed military. He delved deeply, like no other contemporary writer, into the linkages between society, politics, and the military throughout his career and his writings. Guibert exerted an overwhelming influence on military thought across Europe for the next fifty years. His military theories provided the foundation for military reform during the twilight of the Old Regime. The Revolution, which adopted most of Guibert’s doctrine in 1791, continued his work. A new army and way of war based on Guibert’s reforms emerged to defeat France’s major enemies. In Napoleon’s hands, Guibert’s army …

This thesis examines the struggle between King Louis XI and the great feudal houses of the fifteenth century such as Burgundy, Brittany, Anjou, Armagnac, Bourbon, and Foix. It attempts to provide a detailed narrative based on the primary sources and the excellent studies on individual feudal princes produced by a number of French historians, supplemented by a critical analysis of the traditional view of Louis XI as the "vainquer de la grande féodalité."

This thesis presents a diplomatic history of the United States and France for the period 1776-1898. This study, due to the enormous amount of foreign diplomacy, is by no means exhaustive. The author has tried to limit the diplomacy of the United States with the other nations to a minimum and omitted all relations except in instances which are closely related to the diplomacy of France and the United States.

This study explores Franco-Papal relations, and their effect on the French Church and State, from Henri IV's conversion to Roman Catholicism in 1593 until his death in 1610. Because Henri IV's primary concern, even in matters involving the Papacy or the Gallican Church, was to protect his kingdom from Habsburg encroachment, he was willing either to abandon his Protestant allies abroad, or to adopt reform measures, such as the decrees of the Council of Trent, that might weaken his own authority or disturb the peace of his kingdom. This caused repeated conflicts with the Counter-Reformation Popes Clement VIII and Paul V, to whom the primary enemy was always the infidel and the heretic. Nevertheless both sides realized that they needed each other to maintain their independence of Spain.

Biography of Marie Antoinette, starting with the death of Charles VI, emperor of Austria, in 1770. It includes a description of her childhood, her life as queen, and her trial and execution. Each chapter heading includes a short summary of events.