In recent years, explanations for the occurrence of civil war have mainly emphasized state weakness as providing an opportunity for greed-based rebellions. Yet, this explanation leaves many questions open, as it cannot distinguish between weak states that do and those that do not experience civil war. In this paper, I argue that abuses of personal integrity rights, committed or sponsored by the government, provide this missing link. The theory is illustrated and formalized in a game-theoretic model and then tested empirically, building on earlier work by Fearon and Laitin (2003a) and Sambanis (2004). The results show that repression is highly significant in both statistical and substantive terms. According to one model, the probability of civil war onset increases by a factor of almost 16 in highly repressive countries compared to countries with no repression. Further robustness tests across alternative civil war lists largely confirm the importance of human rights abuses in explaining the occurrence of civil war.

This work demonstrates the connections that exist in rhetoric and planning between the Irish plantation projects in the Ards, Munster , Ulster and the Jamestown colony in Virginia . The planners of these projects focused on the creation of internal stability rather than the mission to 'civilize' the natives. The continuity between these projects is examined on several points: the rhetoric the English used to describe the native peoples and the lands to be colonized, who initiated each project, funding and financial terms, the manner of establishing title, the manner of granting the lands to settlers, and the status the natives were expected to hold in the plantation. Comparison of these points highlights the early English colonial idea and the variance between rhetoric and planning.

Charles I, King of Spain, or Charles V, Holy Roman Emperor, was the most powerful ruler in Europe since Charlemagne. With a Germanic background, and speaking French, Charles became King of Spain in 1516. Yet secondary sources and available sixteenth century Spanish sources such as Spanish Royal Council records, local records of Castro Urdiales in Castile, and Charles's correspondence show that he continued the policies of his predecessors in Spain, Ferdinand of Aragon and Isabella of Castile. He strove to strengthen his power and unify Spain and his empire using Castilian strength, a Castilian model of government, Roman law, religion, his strong personality, and a loyal and talented bureaucracy. Charles desired to be another Charlemagne, but with his base of power in Spain.

Nathanael Greene spent the first five years of the American Revolution serving as a line and field officer in the Continental Army and developed a nuanced revolutionary strategy based on preserving the Continental Army and a belief that all forces should be long-service national troops. He carried these views with him to his command in the southern theater but developed a partisan approach due to problems he faced in the region. Greene effectively kept his army supplied to such an extent that it remained in the field to oppose the British with very little outside assistance. He reluctantly utilized a partisan strategy while simultaneously arguing for the creation of a permanent Continental force for the region.

From 1930 to 1955, Amon Carter, publisher of the Fort Worth Star-Telegram, exerted his power to create modern Fort Worth. Carter used his stature as the publisher of the city's major newspaper to build a modern city out of this livestock center. Between 1930 and 1955, Carter lobbied successfully for New Deal funds for Fort Worth, persuaded Consolidated Aircraft to build an airplane plant in the city, and convinced Burlington Railways to stay in the city. He also labored unsuccessfully to have the Trinity River Canal built and to secure a General Motors plant for Fort Worth. These efforts demonstrate that Carter was indeed the founder of modern Fort Worth.