Computerized alarm and access control systems must be treated as special entities rather than as generic automated information systems. This distinction arises due to the real-time control and monitoring functions performed by these systems at classified facilities and the degree of centralization of a site`s safeguards system information in the associated databases. As an added requirement for these systems, DOE safeguards and security classification policy is to protect information whose dissemination has the potential for significantly increasing the probability of successful adversary action against the facility, or lowering adversary resources needed for a successful attack. Thus at issue is just how valuable would specific alarm system information be to an adversary with a higher order objective. We have developed and applied a technical approach for determining the importance of information contained in computerized alarm and access control systems. The methodology is based on vulnerability assessment rather than blanket classification rules. This method uses a system architecture diagram to guide the analysis and to develop adversary defeat methods for each node and link. These defeat methods are evaluated with respect to required adversary resources, technical difficulty, and detection capability. Then they are incorporated into site vulnerability assessments to determine the significance …

The PHENIX Management Plan provides the baselines and controls that the PHENIX and RHIC Projects will follow to meet the technical, cost, and schedule goals for the PHENIX detector at RHIC. This plan will be reviewed and updated as required, with revisions made by agreement among the signed participants.