This is an analysis of the U.S. Army's personnel decisions in the Second World War. Specifically, it considers the U.S. Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall's appointment of generals to combat command, and his reasons for relieving some generals while leaving others in place after underperformance. Many historians and contemporaries of Marshall, including General Omar N. Bradley, have commented on Marshall's ability to select brilliant, capable general officers for combat command in the war. However, in addition to solid performers like J. Lawton Collins, Lucian Truscott, and George S. Patton, Marshall, together with Dwight D. Eisenhower and Lesley J. McNair, often selected sub-par commanders who significantly underperformed on the battlefield. These generals' tactical and operational decisions frequently led to unnecessary casualties, and ultimately prolonged the war. The work considers six case studies: Lloyd Fredendall at Kasserine Pass, Mark Clark during the Italian campaign, John Lucas at Anzio, Omar Bradley at the Falaise Gap, Courtney Hodges at the Hürtgen Forest, and Simon Bolivar Buckner, Jr. at Okinawa. Personal connections and patronage played strong roles in these generals' command appointments, and often trumped practical considerations like command experience. While their superiors ultimately relieved corps commanders Fredendall and Lucas, field army and …

Eagles Overhead provides a critical history of US Air Force Forward Air Controllers and examines their role, status, and performance in the Air Force's history. It begins by examining the US's initial adoption of air power, and American participation in aerial combat during World War I and traces the FACs' contributions to every US Air Force air campaign from the Marne in 1918 to Mosul in 2017. However, since 2001 FACs' contributions have been sporadic. Eagles Overhead asks why, despite the critical importance of FACs, have they not been heavily used on US battlefields since 2001? It examines the Air Force FAC's theoretical, doctrinal, institutional, and historical frameworks in the first nine chapters to assess if the nature of air warfare has changed so significantly that the concept and utility of the FAC has been left behind. Or, has the FAC been neglected since 2001 because the Air Force dislikes the capability as it clouds the service's doctrinal preferences? From these examinations, Eagles Overhead draws conclusions about the potential future of Air Force FACs.

The Macedonian Campaign of World War I (October 1915-November 1918) traditionally remains one of the understudied theatres of the historiography of the conflict. Despite its vital importance in the outcome of the war, it is still considered as a mere sideshow compared to the Western Front and the Gallipoli Campaign. This dissertation presents a much-needed re-evaluation of the Macedonian Campaign's diplomatic and political origins within the war's early context. In doing so, this study first concentrates on a longue durée perspective and assesses the main historical events in the Balkans and Central Europe from the end of the French Revolution to World War I. In a perspective running throughout the entire nineteenth century, this dissertation integrates the importance of nascent nationalism in the Balkans and examine the Austro-Hungarian Empire's steady decline and subsequent diplomatic realignment toward the Balkans. Similarly, this work depicts the intense power struggle in Southeastern Europe between some of this story's main protagonists, namely the Austro-Hungarian, Russian and Ottoman Empires. This dissertation also evaluates the rise of new regional powers such as Bulgaria and Serbia and examines their connection to the European balance of power and general diplomatic equilibrium. In the first half of this dissertation, I …

Previous researchers of Jewish history in the Roman Empire have imperfectly employed Greco-Roman sources to describe Roman perceptions of Jews and Judaism by relying on a handful of Greek and Latin written and visual components without attempting to quantify or comprehensively explore this abundant material. Utilizing both quantitative and qualitative methodologies, this dissertation analyzes the vast array of Greco-Roman written and visual sources about Jews and Judaism from the first century BCE to the end of the third century CE. While qualitative reviews of Greek and Latin texts help eliminate potential inconsistencies in the data, computational tools like text-mining analysis quantify the information into calculable results. The addition of visual source material into the framework helps further refine the quantified textual material. Reviews of this data reveal the general traits imperial leaders within the Roman Empire knew about the geography and history of Judaea, Jewish religious beliefs and cultural practices, and Jewish communities in general. Further reviews of the data note regional and, more importantly, temporal variations connecting them to changes both in imperial rule and Judaism. This process presents a more detailed and coherent conception of Roman knowledge of Jews and Judaism than scholars have previously recognized. In addition …

Despite their many successes, Roman leaders continually struggled with indiscipline in their own ranks as they battled Rome's opponents. Desertion and defection were steps that soldiers often undertook to avoid their obligated service. Previous scholarship has largely overlooked this aspect of Roman warfare. This dissertation analyzes why Roman soldiers began turning to desertion and defection throughout the Republican period. Such cases were generally rare in early Rome, but the expanding responsibilities and hardships of warfare in the Middle Republic caused them to rise, as did the sizeable growth of the Roman community. The civil wars of the Late Republic saw especially high cases of such acts, as generals incentivized defections in their opponents ranks. Roman desertion was not unique, but a common occurrence in ancient warfare. This dissertation also addresses how Romans capitalized on desertion and defection in warfare. The Second Punic War offers an example of how Rome achieved victory by encouraging defection in its enemy's alliances. Romans also relied heavily on defectors as a source of intelligence and as a tool in siege warfare. The moral forces of commitment, discipline, dissatisfaction, and desertion were often as important as the tactics and technologies of the participants in Rome's wars.

The expansionist agenda of the Polk administration culminated in the War with Mexico. The capture of Mexico City in September 1847 left the United States Army with the unprecedented task of occupying an enemy capital for an extended period. After the initial theaters of operation proved unable to secure a peace, Maj. Gen. Winfield Scott commenced a campaign to take central Mexico including the capital city. In March 1847, an army of 11,000 soldiers under Scott landed at Vera Cruz. In six months, Scott's army marched over 250 miles and won five major battles. In mid-September, Scott took Mexico City. Throughout the campaign, Scott attempted to implement a pacification plan in an effort to prompt Mexico to open peace negotiations. Concern for his army weighed heavily on him as he faced unprecedented challenges in occupying Mexico City after its capture. The United States simply had almost no experience in the ramifications of fighting a foreign war, other than a few brief small-scale incursions onto foreign soil at Tripoli in 1805 and in British Canada. The difficulties that arose for Scott from the situation in Mexico were frustrating. Scott pacification plan used conciliation, coercion, and force on Mexico's army and people …

Through the U.S. Lend-Lease program, President Franklin D. Roosevelt sought to keep Joseph Stalin's Red Army fighting Adolf Hitler's forces to prevent a separate peace and Nazi Germany's colonization of Soviet territory and strategic resources during the Second World War. Yet after the Red Army's 1943 counterattacks, Roosevelt unnecessarily increased Soviet Lend-Lease aid, oversupplying Stalin's soldiers with more armament than they required for the Soviet Union's defense and enabling their subsequent conquest of East Central Europe and large parts of East Asia. Roosevelt's underestimation of the Red Army's capabilities, his tendency to readily rely on Soviet-influenced advisers, and his unquestioning acceptance of Stalin's implicit threats to forge a separate peace all contributed to his excessive arming of Moscow from 1943 forward. Expanding on the findings of other scholars, this work identifies and explains the impact of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty on Roosevelt's reasoning, the key role of the Arctic convoys in delivering material to the Red Army, and how the unnecessary aid routes through Iran and Alaska resulted in the oversupplying of Stalin's troops. Had Roosevelt not opened these unnecessary routes, the Arctic convoys could have continued to sufficiently supply the Red Army's defensive efforts without empowering it to aggressively spread …